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ABSTRACT

The ebb and flow of federal Indian poliGy over the last
two centuries is a well-studied phenomenon.

Less prevalent,

however, arc examinations of the localized impact of
changing policies on specific tribes and reservations.

The

Omaha Tribe of Nebraska offers a particularly useful model
for this type of "grass roots" analysis.
Virtually all of the federal programs tested on the
Omahas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were
dismal failures, leaving the tribe impoverished and
virtually landless as it entered the post-World War II era.
Over the last fifty years, the Omaha Reservation has
continued to serve as an involuntary proving ground for new
directions in Indian policy.

During this period, however,

tribal members have begun to flex a new-found prowess as
"legal warriors."

By using the federal courts and other

available forums, the Omahas have shed their historic roles
as helpless victims of misguided "reformers" and rapacious
"land sharks."
In the 1950s, the Omaha Reservation became a prominent
example of the bureaucratic folly inherent in the passage of
Public Law 280.

This termination-era statute transferred

reservation criminal jurisdiction from the federal
government to state and local authorities.

When inadequate

state service led to lawless chaos on the reservation, the

Omahas became the first tribe in the PL 2 80 states to seek
and obtain "retrocession" of federal jurisdiction.
Likewise, the Omahas played a leading role in the
annals of the controversial Indian Claims Commission (ICC)
during the 1950s and 60s.

An analysis of the two claims

they prosecuted before the Commission illustrates the
intricacies of the ICC process, and the impact of its
operations on a specific tribe.

Their landmark compromise

with the government after years of complex litigation laid
the procedural foundation for many other ICC settlements.
In the 197 0s and 80s, the Omahas continued their quest
for self-preservation on the judicial battlefield.

Their

partially-successful struggle for the return of the
Blackbird Bend lands in Iowa is one of the more important
Indian land claims of the modern era.

The story of that

litigation exposes a number of important issues in current
Indian relations,

including the dubious role of the federal

government as the continuing "trustee" of Indian lands.
This thesis traces these episodes in the modern "legal
history" of the Omaha Tribe.

It suggests the manner in

which the Omahas' experiences reflect the impact of broader
trends in federal Indian policy.

Just as importantly, it

seeks to demonstrate the remarkable cultural resiliency of
the Omaha Tribe as its moves forward to meet the challenges
of the twenty-first century.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although any errors of fact or interpretation in this
thesis are wholly my own, a great number of other people
deserve credit for whatever merit it may possess.

My

deepest appreciation goes to my committee chairman, mentor,
and friend, Dr. Michael Tate.

His skills as a teacher,

writer and editor are exceeded only by his deft touch around
the green.

In addition, his bibliography on the Omaha Tribe

is the definitive starting point for all research related to
the Omahas.

Many of the resources used in this project

would likely have gone untapped were it not for that
invaluable guide.

Special thanks also to Dr. Jerold

Simmons, not only for his valuable service as a member of my
committee, but also for his continuing encouragement and
much-needed guidance on other projects as well.

Dr. Charles

Gildersleeve of the UNO Geography Department also served
graciously on my committee, and deserves many thanks for
absorbing this lengthy material in a short time, and adding
his own important insight to the final product.
The staff of the Federal Records Center in Kansas City,
particularly archivists Michael Brodhead and Clara Rowland,
were most helpful during my work at their facility.
Similarly, archivist Dennis Bilger of the Harry S. Truman
Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri went out of

his way to help me retrieve valuable materials from the
Dillon Myer and Phileo Nash papers on deposit there.
Special thanks also to Martha Hoch, Deputy Clerk in Charge
at the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Iowa in Sioux City, who was extremely generous with both her
time and her files in helping me piece together the story of
the Blackbird Bend litigation.
Omaha tribal member and former Tribal Judge Ed Zendejas
indulged my requests for interviews, and offered important
personal perspectives on past and current issues confronting
the tribe.

Thanks also to Judy Boughter, who "forged the

path" for this study with her remarkable synthesis of the
Omahas' history during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and kindly shared many of her research materials
with me.

Like Judy, I am also grateful to the University of

Nebraska Foundation for the Presidential Fellowship which
allowed me to focus on this project in relatively
uninterrupted bliss.

All of the faculty and staff in the

UNO History Department have been wonderful to me during my
years there, with special thanks to Jo Headrick and my old
"roomie" Ann Tschetter for their warmth, humor, and support.
My deepest and most personal thanks go to my family.
My parents and in-laws have given me unflagging
encouragement throughout this project.

My sons Ben, Eric,

and Philip have always been available to remind me of the

things that are most important in life, and to divert me
with the sports and other activities we enjoy.

Finally, to

my wife and best friend, Lisa, I will always be grateful for
your patience and understanding during what must be the
longest career transition in recorded history.

Your skills

as a teacher and scholar have been an inspiration for my
work, and your love and support have quite literally made
this effort possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Illustrations... 4 ........................... .

ix

List of Maps............................................

xi

Introduction.............. ............................... 1
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

The Arrival of Public Law 28 0 on the
Omaha Reservation, 1946-1953..................

8

Public Law 280 In Operation on the
Omaha Reservation, and the Battle
Over Retrocession, 1953-1970..................

44

The Omaha Experience In the Indian
Claims Commission — Case 225, 1951-1964.....

86

Round Two Before the Indian Claims
Commission — Case 138, 1951-1966........

133

The Battle of Blackbird Bend, 1966-1995.......

Conclusion. . . ..................................

174
229

Appendix
House Concurrent Resolution 108 —
Public Law 83-280 —

1953.........

1953...............

Omaha Tribal Resolution 69-33 —

Federal Acceptance of Omaha Retrocession —
Nebraska Legislative Resolution No. 16 —
Bibliography............................

viii

235

1969..............

Nebraska Legislative Resolution No. 37 —

234

1969....

237
238

1970... 239
1971....

240
241

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1
Data re: Reservation Law and Order.................

23

Figure 2
Prosecution of Indians, Thurston County,
1946-48.................. .............. ............

35

Figure 3
Appraisal of 1854 Omaha Cession,
ICC Docket 225......................................

106

Figure 4
Photo and caption re: ICC judgment funds........... 115
Figure 5
Photo and caption re: ICC judgment funds........... 117
Figure 6
Photo and caption re: ICC judgment funds........... 118
Figure 7
Appraisal of Cession 151, ICC Docket 138........... 157
Figure 8
Omaha Tribal Income and Expenditures,

1965-66.....

164

Figure 9
Photo and caption re: 197 3 occupation of
Blackbird Bend......................................

183

Figure 10
Photo and caption re: 197 3 occupation of
Blackbird Bend.........................

184

Figure 11
Photo and caption re: 197 3 occupation of
Blackbird Bend......................................

185

Figure 12
Photo and caption re: 197 3 occupation of
Blackbird Bend..................

186

Figure 13
Photo and caption re: 1975 occupation of
Blackbird Bend.....................

190

ix

Figure 14
Photos of Casino Omaha, October 1995...............

214

Figure 15
Photos of Casino Omaha and Missouri River
at Blackbird Bend, October 1995....... *...........

215

Figure 16
Photos of tribal farming operations
at Blackbird Bend, October 1995....................

216

x

MAPS

Map 1
Thurston County, Nebraska.............................

68

Map 2
1854 Omaha Cession....................................

99

Map 3
Iowa Portion of Cession 151.......

139

Map 4
Minnesota Portion of Cession 151.....................

140

Map 5
Missouri Portion of Cession 151
— The "Platte Purchase” ...........................

141

Map 6
Composite of Cession 151..............................

142

Map 7
"Iowa Assignment" in Cession 151 —

ICC Docket 138... 155

Map 8
Blackbird Bend........................................

178

Map 9
Blackbird Bend........................................

180

Map 10
Omaha claim in Blackbird Bend meander

198

lobe..........

Map 11
Omaha claims in Monona Bend and OmahaMission Bend... 199

xi

INTRODUCTION

It has become axiomatic to conclude that federal Indian
policy has vacillated wildly over this nation's 220 years of
existence.

Countless legislative committees, task forces,

and academicians have chronicled the "pendulum swing" of
Indian relations between the disparate goals of forced
"assimilation" on the one hand, and tribal selfdetermination on the other.

Not quite as commonplace,

however, are examinations of the specific ways in which the
historic ebb and flow of broader government policy has
affected individual tribes and reservations.

The "grass

roots" impact of federal policies is an area that invites
additional analysis, for it is only at the "micro level"
that the full human impact of the government's execution of
its trust responsibilities can be truly assessed.
This is particularly the case with the Omaha Tribe of
Nebraska.

Though they are relatively small in number and

have not been the subject of widespread academic attention,
the Omahas have borne more than their fair share of the
burden created by the government's fluctuating goals.
Indeed, since the establishment of the Omaha Reservation in
northeastern Nebraska in 1854, it has served as a virtual
laboratory for federal experimenters, with each new program
contributing to a cumulatively disastrous impact on the
tribe's culture and economy.
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The Omahas suffered particularly grievous consequences
as the reformers' "test case" for "detribalization" through
the allotment of lands in severalty.2

Despite the

pernicious impact of allotment on Omaha landholdings,
government bureaucrats and assimilation advocates touted the
Omaha experiment as a success, paving the way for the
landmark 1887 Dawes Severalty Act.

As historian Michael

Tate has observed, the net effect of the allotment programs
first instituted on the Omaha Reservation was "the
impoverishment of Indians everywhere, the loss of more than
ninety million acres of land once guaranteed by treaty, and
the total assault upon Indian culture in the name of
pragmatic assimilation."

-5

The last fifty years have seen a continuation of the
Omahas' role as a sacrificial pawn in the chess game of
Indian policy-making.

As Commissioner John Collier's

relatively enlightened "Indian New Deal" of the 1930s gave
way to the misguided post-war swing toward "termination,"
the Omaha Reservation in Thurston County, Nebraska once
again became the proving ground for a new direction in
Indian policy.

With the passage of Public Law 280 in 1953,

the federal government transferred civil and criminal
jurisdiction over the reservations in five selected states
to state and local governments.

As the Omaha case would

subsequently prove, virtually no one at the federal, state,
or local level accurately envisioned the potential impact of
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that action on the designated reservations.

Indeed, many

Nebraska state officials proved to be woefully ignorant of
the meaning and effect of PL 280 even years after its
passage, despite the state's ostensible prior "consent” to
its provisions.
Like the allotment experiments seventy years earlier,
the transfer of federal criminal jurisdiction over the Omaha
Reservation to the state of Nebraska produced disastrous
results.

A combination of inadequate state funding and

racial tension between the Omahas and their white neighbors
in Thurston County brought lawlessness and jurisdictional
chaos to the reservation.

The Omahas again gained unwanted

national prominence, this time as the unfortunate victims of
the bureaucratic folly inherent in PL 280.
Based in part on the jurisdictional debacle on the
Omaha Reservation, Congress amended PL 280 in 1968 to allow
states to "retrocede” Indian jurisdiction back to the
federal government.

The state of Nebraska, seeing an

opportunity to rid itself of an expensive bureaucratic
headache, but again not clearly understanding what it was
doing, initially offered to return jurisdiction to the
federal government.

Its offer was accepted.

Though the

state later changed its mind and attempted to "rescind” its
offer of retrocession, the federal courts negated that
effort.

The Omahas then became the first Indian tribe in

the PL 280 states to escape state criminal jurisdiction.

4

With retrocession, the tribe created its own police force
and tribal court system, but conflicts between the Omahas
and local law enforcement authorities concerning
jurisdictional uncertainties continue to plague the county
to this day.
The post-war years also saw a shift in federal policy
regarding the resolution of Indian legal grievances stemming
from 2 00 years of broken treaties.

With the creation of the

Indian Claims Commission (ICC) in 194 6, Congress sought to
provide a "nonjudicial” forum for the final resolution of
all lingering claims, as a precursor to the eventual
termination of tribal existence and the full assimilation of
Indians into white society.

Like virtually every other

tribe in the country, the Omahas took advantage of this new
avenue of redress, filing two separate claims before the
Commission.
Just as the Omahas' experience with PL 280 and
retrocession offers an instructive case study for the
localized impact of those policies, so too does the tribe's
experience before the ICC offer insight into the merits and
the flaws of the Commission's operations.

While the Omahas

ultimately prevailed in the prosecution of both their ICC
claims, those successes came only after nearly twenty years
of tedious and complex litigation.

The Omahas also achieved

another nationally-significant "first," as their pathbreaking compromise with the government forged the

5

Commission's "Omaha Rule" for the processing of similar
settlements.
The resolution of the Omahas' ICC claims also
demonstrates the unfortunate built-in limitations of the
Commission's remedial powers.

As was the case in all

judgments rendered by the ICC, the Omahas were not awarded
interest on the amounts they finally received, thus leaving
them substantially less than "whole" for the injustices they
had suffered.

In addition, the receipt of the ICC judgment

funds resulted in the development of disturbing intra-tribal
factionalism over the distribution of proceeds.
Controversies centering on the use of tribal funds
occasionally plague the Omahas to this day, generally
pitting tribal members who live in urban areas against those
who live on the reservation.
In the 1970s and 80s, the Omahas retained their
prominence as "legal warriors," waging a prolonged and
incredibly complex judicial battle in which they sought to
regain possession of more than 11,000 acres situated east of
the Missouri River.

The tribe claimed that the land had

been a part of its reservation before changes in the river
channel moved it to the Iowa side, where it was occupied
over time by white farmers.

The story of the "Blackbird

Bend" litigation exposes several recurring and important
aspects of modern Indian relations.

Among those themes are

issues relating to Indian political and legal activism,
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racial tensions between tribes and their white neighbors,
and the often-controversial role of the federal government
as the continuing "trustee” of Indian lands.

The Blackbird

Bend litigation is particularly noteworthy on the latter
issue, since the Omahas spent nearly as much energy fighting
against the United States' "representation" of the tribe as
they did in battling the white claimants in Iowa.
This thesis seeks to interpret each of these episodes
in the modern "legal history" of the Omaha Tribe.

The goal

is not only to fill a void in the historical record by
providing a synthesis of the facts, but also to suggest ways
in which the Omahas' grass roots experiences reflect the
impact of larger trends in federal Indian policy over the
past five decades.

By their determined efforts to obtain

that which they considered "rightfully theirs," the Omahas
provide a compelling example of a tribe struggling to
preserve its unique cultural legacy in the face of daunting
bureaucratic and judicial inertia.

It is a story that

deserves to be told, and one that will hopefully spur
additional research relating to numerous other
"underexplored" issues in the modern history of this
remarkable tribe.
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NOTES

1 For a comprehensive examination of the government's
"experimentation” on the Omahas throughout the nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries, see Judith A. Boughter,
"Betraying Their Trust:
The Dispossession of the Omaha
Nation, 1790-1916," (Master's Thesis, University of Nebraska
at Omaha, 1995).
2 See Boughter, "Betraying Their Trust," Chap. 4; and
Leonard A. Carlson, Indians, Bureaucrats, and Land:
The
Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian Farming (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981).
3 Michael L. Tate, The Upstream People:
An Annotated
Research Bibliography of the Omaha Tribe (Metuchen, N.J.:
The Scarecrow Press, 1991), vii.

C H APTER ONE

ENTERING A "DRAGON'S NEST
OF LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONFUSION"
*

*

*

*

THE ARRIVAL OF PUBLIC LAW 280 ON THE OMAHA RESERVATION,
1946 - 1953

On August 1, 1953, the United States House of
Representatives adopted House Concurrent Resolution 108,
proclaiming "the sense of the Congress" that certain Indian
tribes should be "freed from federal supervision and
control" as rapidly as possible.

[Appendix I].

Issued

with the concurrence of the Senate, the Resolution served as
one of the federal government's first overt steps in its
ill-fated "termination" policy of the 1950s and 60s, and
marked yet another momentous swing in the pendulum of
federal policy regarding Indian relations.
Resolution 108 announced a return to the simplistic,
misguided "assimilationist" policies of the late 19th and
early 2 0th centuries, as the federal government once again
sought to move Native Americans involuntarily into the
"mainstream" of society.

The terminationists aspired to

"free" Indians not by way of privatization of tribal lands,
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as had been the case in the earlier allotment era, but
rather by the outright extinguishment of tribal existence.
Representative William H. Harrison of Wyoming, one of the
sponsors of Resolution 108, succinctly noted its purpose by
stating that it "is intended as a directive to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) to start working itself out of a job."3
As a mandate for the federal government to cut
expenditures by getting out of the Indian business,
Resolution 108 marked a dramatic departure from the policies
implemented during John Collier's tenure as Commissioner of
Indian Affairs from 1933 to 1945.

Collier's efforts had

brought an end to the allotment process and served to
strengthen and expand the BIA's role as an insulating bond
between the federal government and the Indian nations.

At

the same time, Collier sought, through vigorous
implementation of the provisions of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, to promote a strongly renewed
sense of tribal sovereignty and self-government.4
Resolution 108 announced an intent to reverse the policies
of the Collier era by severing the federal government's
unique trust relationship with American Indians and
abolishing all federal supervision over the tribes as soon
as possible.
Dillon S. Myer, who served as Commissioner of Indian
Affairs in the Truman administration from May 1950 to March
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1953, played a prominent role in the implemention of the
terminationist ideology.

Myer wasted no opportunity to

advance the Congressional mandate of decentralization and
eventual withdrawal of BIA services.

In a letter to all

Tribal Council Members dated October 10, 1952, Myer clearly
delineated the Bureau's aims:
The policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs with respect
to withdrawal contemplates two major objectives:
(1) that the responsibility which the Bureau now has
for providing Indians with such services as education,
health, welfare assistance, and law enforcement should
be transferred to the agencies of State or local
government which normally provide such services for
other citizens, and (2) that the responsibility for
supervision of Indian trust property should be
transferred to the Indians themselves — either as
individuals or as tribal groups.
Myer pursued those objectives aggressively, frequently
sounding the need to move farther and faster in the
direction of termination. fi
Myer's enthusiastic endorsement of the new governmental
policy did not go unchallenged.

The National Congress of

American Indians urged its members to resist the impending
termination programs, and bitterly criticized Myer for his
"stated intention of working, to the subordination of all
else, for the abandonment of the Federal Government's
trusteeship responsibilities guaranteed to many of you in
your treaties."7

The National Farmer's Union voiced its

opposition as well, issuing a resolution in which it vowed
to "continue to.oppose the revocation of treaties and
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abandonment of the Indian to rapacious, selfish groups who
want the resources on the Indian lands."8

Other observers

expressed their opposition in similar terms, viewing the
shift in policy as "a sweeping betrayal of trust" and seeing
the purported "liberation" of the Indians as nothing more
than a smokescreen for a renewed land grab by non-Indians.9
Not surprisingly, John Collier was one of the most vocal
critics of the termination ideology, calling it a
"compulsive torrent" that had been "stampeded through
Congress," ushering in a new "century of dishonor."10
Collier aimed some of his sharpest rhetoric directly at
Dillon Myer, describing his tenure as "a coercive,
stereotyped and dictatorial one-track drive toward the
destruction of Indian rights and specifically toward the
throwing of all Indian properties 'to the wolves'."11
Notwithstanding that contemporary criticism, some
modern commentatators are relatively charitable in their
evaluation of Congress' intent, suggesting that the
terminationist ideology may have been based upon true
idealism, legitimate budgetary concerns, or even the "anti
colonialist spirit of the post WW II period."12

Myer

himself seems to have been a true believer to the end.

In a

memorandum to the Secretary of the Interior issued on the
day he left office, he frankly acknowledged that the great
majority of Indians seemed opposed to his withdrawal
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programs.

1^

«
Still, he maintained that "trusteeship and

other special forms of government services to the Indians
are holding the Indians back politically, socially and
economically," and urged that "a strong hand be taken by
both this Department and the Congress" to implement the
withdrawal programs.14
Regardless of whether the political dynamics and
motivations of the termination era are viewed as benevolent
or exploitive in nature, the results of termination proved
to be disastrous for those tribes which actually experienced
the process.15

For other Indian groups that were never

actually "terminated," such as the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska,
other Congressional enactments adopted in pursuit of the
termination goal would result in far more harm than benefit.
Indeed, the most notable of those enactments, the measure
that would become known as Public Law 280, would prove
devastating to both the Omahas themselves and non-Indians
who lived on or around their reservation.
Just two weeks after the adoption of Resolution 108,
Congress took the first substantive step in furtherance of
its newly-announced termination policy.

On August 15, 1953,

President Dwight Eisenhower signed into law Public Law 83280 (PL 280).

The new statute provided that the state of

Nebraska and four other states were to assume both civil and
criminal jurisdiction over all "Indian country" within their
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boundaries.16

[Appendix II].

Other states were authorized

to pass legislation or amend their constitution so as to
assume such jurisdiction at their option.

The

jurisdictional chaos that would result from this misguided
legislation, coupled with other adverse effects of the
termination push, would eventually lead to the renouncement
of the entire policy and the close of the "termination era"
some fifteen years later.

In the meantime, however, the law

enforcement and jurisdictional problems arising on the Omaha
Reservation in northeast Nebraska made it the textbook
example of the legislative folly inherent in the PL 280
scheme.
The legislative history of PL 280 indicates that its
sponsors were ostensibly motivated by concern over the
confusing and overlapping jurisdictional bounds between
state, federal, and tribal law enforcement services, and the
resulting problems of law enforcement on and around specific
reservations.

17

.
•
The Senate Report of the bill
provides:

As a practical matter, the enforcement of law and order
among the Indians . . . has been left largely to the
Indian groups themselves.
In many states, tribes are
not adequately organized to perform that function;
consequently there has been created a hiatus in law
enforcement authority that could best be remedied by
conferring criminal jurisdiction on States indicating
an ability and willingness to accept such
responsibility.18
Various other reports and correspondence in the
Congressional records reflect extensive concern over the
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"intolerable situation of lawlessness" in and around certain
reservations as a result of confusion over jurisdictional
bounds.

During 1952 hearings on several bills that would

eventually be melded into PL 28 0, the House Subcommittee on
Indian Affairs heard testimony describing Indian
reservations as "legal no-man's lands" and decrying the
"complete breakdown of law and order on many of the
I

Q

.

.

.

reservations.Significantly,

.

.

.

there is no specific

testimony or evidence in the legislative history regarding
the law enforcement situation on the Omaha Reservation in
1953.

While conditions there were in fact quite poor, the

passage of PL 280 would exacerbate the problem rather than
alleviate it.
Much of the criticism of the PL 280 scheme, both before
and after the bill's passage, focused on the absence of any
provision requiring the consent of the affected Indian
tribes to the transfer of jurisdiction.

Eisenhower himself

expressed "grave doubts" about this "unfortunate" omission
from the bill.20

He signed it nevertheless, having

apparently been advised that all Indians in the five
mandatory states had been consulted and "enthusiastically
endorsed" the legislation, and believing that "its basic
purpose represents still another step in granting equality
to all Indians in our nation."21

He went on to urge

Congress to amend the bill in the upcoming session so as to
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require consultation with the tribes prior to the enactment
of legislation subjecting them to state control.22
Notwithstanding Eisenhower's indulgent attitude toward
the act's basic intent, John Collier and many other critics
were less sanguine about both the law's purpose and its
likely effect.

The New York Times editorialized against the

bill, stating that it had been "whipped through Congress so
rapidly that practically no one interested in Indian affairs
—

least of all the Indians themselves —

knew what was

happening until it had already happened" and that "it could
do great wrong to the American Indian population of many
states."23

The paper went on to note that many of the

interest groups that opposed the bill, including the
Association on American Indian Affairs, the Institute of
Ethnic Affairs, and the American Civil Liberties Union, were
"only now beginning to be heard."24

Collier was

particularly prophetic in his criticism of the bill,
accurately predicting that it would lead to "a dragon's nest
p5
of legal and administrative confusion."
He expressed
dismay and bewilderment at the fact that Eisenhower had
signed the bill despite his recognition of its "most unChristian" approach.
As to the Indians in the five mandatory states, the
proponents of PL 280 were artfully yague in their handling
of the consent issue.

In a letter to the House Committee on
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Interior and Insular Affairs, dated July 7, 1953, Assistant
Secretary of the Interior Orme Lewis indicated that the
Bureau of Indian Affairs had consulted with state and local
authorities, as well as with Indian groups in the five
mandatory states of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
and Wisconsin, and had reported that all of the states had
"indicated their willingness to accept the proposed transfer
of jurisdiction."

The Indian groups in those states were

likewise reported to be "for the most part, agreeable to the
transfer."28
Lewis acknowledged that several tribes had objected to
the proposed transfer, contending that they would be
subjected to inequitable treatment in the state courts, and
that their tribal police organizations were already capable
of maintaining order on the reservation.

Congress

ultimately concluded that the tribal law enforcement
operations on the Red Lake Reservation in Minnesota, the
Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon, and the Menominee
Reservation in Wisconsin were indeed functioning in a
satisfactory manner, and it specifically exempted them from
the provisions of the bill.
Lewis' representation to Congress that the Indians in
Nebraska had been "for the most part agreeable" with the
transfer of jurisdiction to the state had been preceded by
similar Congressional testimony from Commissioner Dillon
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Myer.

Notwithstanding his ardent te^minationist philosophy,

Myer did urge Congress to consult with the affected tribes
before the proposed transfer of jurisdiction because of the
"varying situation" in each of the states with respect to
law enforcement concerns.30

At a February 28, 1952 hearing

before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, Myer proffered
the only direct reference to the Nebraska situation in the
entire legislative history of the bill.

Explaining why no

Nebraska tribes would be exempted from coverage, Myer
stated,

"Nebraska, I believe, would cover the whole State,

because we have gotten in touch with the tribes there."
(emphasis added).
Six months later, Myer made substantially the same
representation at a meeting with his agency superintendents
held at Aberdeen, South Dakota.

There, Myer indicated that

the Bureau had consulted with the individual tribes in each
of the mandatory states, and that any tribe which objected
to the transfer was not included m

the bill's coverage.

Four years after PL 280 went into effect, Winnebago
Agency Superintendent Allen M. Adams presented a slightly
more specific assertion of the supposed prior acquiescence
of the Nebraska tribes.

In a report delivered to a

conference on "Indian Problems of Law and Order" at the
University of South Dakota in June, 1957, Adams stated:
You've heard the remarks here that the Indians in
Nebraska are now under Public Law 280.
Before those
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Indians down there came under that law, the three
active councils were contacted.
All of them expressed
their willingness to come under that law. The board of
supervisors of the two counties where the Indians are
located, Thurston County and Knox County, also agreed
to that.
It was taken up with the Attorney General who
also agreed to it. (emphasis added). 3
BIA and Omaha tribal records appear to confirm these
representations of.Adams, Myer, and Lewis regarding the
prior consent of the Omahas.

On March 9, 1951, Adams'

predecessor as Superintendent of the Winnebago Agency, H. E.
Bruce, convened a meeting of delegates from the four tribal
councils under his jurisdiction (Omaha, Winnebago, Santee
Sioux, and Ponca) for the purpose of discussing a matter
that he described as "the proposed bill to confer civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indians on the State of
Nebraska."34

That meeting resulted in the adoption of a

joint resolution in which the tribal delegates announced
that they had "read, discussed, and carefully considered the
draft of a proposed bill to confer on the State of Nebraska
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians in the State,"
and that "sections 2 and 4 of said proposed bill meet with
the approval of the Indians of said tribes and have their
endorsement."35

The resolution was signed by Tribal

Chairman Amos Lamson on behalf of the Omahas, and was
certified by Superintendent Bruce as having been adopted
*5

unanimously.J °
In light of this apparent indication of consent by the
tribe, and the Congressional testimony of Myer and Lewis on
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the issue, it is easy to understand President Eisenhower's
belief that the Omahas and other Indians affected by the
transfer of jurisdiction "enthusiastically supported" the
passage of PL 280.

Nevertheless, there are several factors

in the historical record which serve to cloud the issue of
the Omahas' consent.

In the first place, the March 9, 1951

resolution precedes the actual passage of PL 280 by more
than two years.

The resolution is not specific as to the

precise piece of legislation being considered, nor does it
specify the contents of "sections 2 and 4" of the bill,
which were the only provisions endorsed by the tribe.

The

resolution thus does not definitively establish that the
Omahas knowingly consented to the ultimate provisions of PL
280.
Moreover, the Omaha tribe was subject to the same
factionalization and political infighting that characterize
any other governmental entity.

Given the two year gap

between adoption of the 1951 resolution and enactment of PL
280, it is entirely possible that the political sentiments
of the tribe and its leadership may have changed in the
interim.

Alternatively, there is some reason to suspect

that the actions of the tribal representatives at the 1951
meeting may not have accurately reflected the attitude of
the tribal membership as a whole.
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Again, the records relating to H. E. Bruce's tenure as
Superintendent of the Winnebago Agency offer some insight
into the latter possibility.

In a May 16, 1949 report to

the Commissioner that is notable for both its thoroughness
and its rather patronizing tone, Bruce provided his own
subjective assessment of the character and abilities of each
of the members of the Omaha Tribal Council.

Writing of

tribal Chairman Amos Lamson (who would sign the 1951
"consent resolution" on behalf of the Omahas), Bruce stated
"[Lamson's] thinking is rather superficial.

He is only one-

quarter or less Indian, does not speak the Omaha language
and will have difficulty maintaining a position of tribal
leadership for these reasons."

He went on to note that

other tribal members "resent his present efforts to help the
-5Q
agency overcome [other problems described m the report]."
Other Council members were variously described as
"unscrupulous and shiftless," "a slow and shallow thinker,"
TO
or "motivated by a desire to feather his own nest."
In a subsequent memorandum to the Aberdeen Area
Director, Superintendent Bruce described Lamson as being
"motivated first, last, and always by personal interest.
he is thoroughly insincere and unreliable.1,40

. .

Bruce

recorded this assessment on May 1, 1951, just eight days
before Lamson signed the "consent resolution" on behalf of
the Omaha tribe.

That resolution would be the only formal
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indication of the government's consultation with the Omahas
regarding PL 280 —

a law that would in fact not even be

enacted until more than two years after this questionable
"endorsement."
A more tangible indication of the uncertainty
surrounding the Omahas' "consent" to PL 280 may be found in
a 1953 Congressional Investigatory Report on the Bureau of
Indian Affairs.

In July, 1952 Congress authorized the House

Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to conduct a
. comprehensive investigation of the BIA in order to
recommend steps that would effectuate the withdrawal of all
federal supervision and control over Indians as rapidly as
possible.41

To perform this investigation, a special

subcommittee was created, which forwarded a request to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for a report from the BIA
addressing numerous specific issues related to the ultimate
termination goal.
The Commissioner,

in turn, sent a memorandum to all

Bureau officials ordering that certain data be gathered from
each reservation so as to facilitate the ultimate withdrawal
of Bureau services.

One of the specific tasks assigned to

agency officials was to ascertain the attitudes of Indians,
state officials, and county officials with respect to the
transfer of law and order jurisdiction over the reservation
to the State.

The responses to that inquiry were compiled
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and summarized in Table XII attached to the final Committee
Report, titled "Data on Reservation Law and Order."
Contrary to the representations of Lewis, Myer, and Adams,
and in sharp contrast to the apparent effect of the 1951
"consent resolution," the Omaha Indians in Nebraska are
clearly indicated as being "not favorable" to the proposed
transfer.42

[Figure 1].

Additional evidence that the Omahas were not
necessarily "willing" participants in the PL 280 experiment
may be found in the text of an appellate brief filed with
the Nebraska Supreme Court in 197 0.

Arguing on behalf of an

Omaha tribal member who had been convicted in state court of
the murder of another Indian, attorney Lawrence E. Murphy
challenged the constitutional validity of PL 280's
jurisdictional transfer.

Murphy asserted that "no

referendum of the members of the Omaha Indian Tribe" had
been conducted prior to the transfer of jurisdiction to the
state in 1953, and that therefore the purported abrogation
of their rights under federal law was constitutionally
infirm.42
While Murphy's 1970 statement was unsubstantiated, the
question of the Omahas' consent is further obscured by the
statements of tribal representative Alfred Gilpin at the
same 1957 conference where Allen Adams had indicated the
tribe's prior consent.

Gilpin did not directly refute
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FIGURE 1
Compilation of data relating to "Reservation Law and Order,"
prepared for Congress by BIA in contemplation of termination
legislationNote indication that attitude of Omaha Indians
is "not favorable" to slate jurisdiction.

SOURCE:
U.S. Congress, House, H. Rep. No. 2503, 82nd Cong.,
2d sess., Report With Respect to the House Resolution
Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to
Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(1953),

Table X I I .
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Adams' statement (he had been delayed by bad weather and was
not present at the conference at the time of Adams' report),
but he repeatedly and bitterly lamented the "damage" and
"destruction" caused to the reservation by its passage.44
Thus, whatever "endorsement" of the transfer of jurisdiction
may have existed among the Omahas prior to 1953 had
apparently evaporated within just a few years.
It is also instructive to note that an examination of
local and statewide newspapers during the period in which PL
280 was being considered and enacted reveals very little
public awareness of the transfer of jurisdiction from the
federal government to the state.

Moreover, even those few

state and local officials who were aware of the bill's
provisions seemed to have little appreciation of its meaning
or likely effect.45

Just as the New York Times had

suggested, the passage of PL 280 seems to have been a fait
accompli long before any substantial portion of the Nebraska
•
Ag
populace, Indian or white, realized what was happening.
Perhaps the apparent lack of public and governmental
attention to the passage of PL 280 in 1953 may be explained
by the most intriguing conclusion to be drawn from an
examination of this law as it affected the Omaha
Reservation.

Surprisingly, PL 280 made very little change

in the day-to-day jurisdictional status of the reservation
because the State of Nebraska had been erroneously
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exercising criminal jurisdiction over the Omahas for some 70
years prior to 1953!47

Enactment of PL 280 was therefore

most likely viewed by Nebraska state officials, as well as
the Omahas who purportedly "endorsed" its passage, as little
more than a Congressional confirmation of the status q u o .
An understanding of this situation requires an
examination of several conflicting decisions of the Nebraska
Supreme Court and the federal courts.

These decisions

reflected, and arguably contributed to, the uncertainty and
confusion that has characterized criminal jurisdiction on
the Omaha Reservation throughout its existence.

Ironically,

that jurisdictional turmoil was not addressed, or even
appreciably acknowledged, by the state or federal courts in
Nebraska until well after the passage of PL 280, which had
been designed to eliminate those very concerns.
The Nebraska Supreme Court most directly addressed the
pre-1953 jurisdictional status of the Omaha Reservation in
Robinson v. Sigler (1971).48

In that case, Omaha tribal

member Enoch Robinson had been tried and convicted in the
Nebraska state courts for the 1969 murder of another Indian
on the Omaha Reservation.49

Robinson sought a writ of

habeas corpus from the Nebraska Supreme Court, arguing that
the state did not have jurisdiction to prosecute an Indian
for the murder of another Indian within the limits of the
reservation.

The bulk of the parties' arguments in Robinson
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were devoted to issues unrelated to the pre-1953
jurisdictional status of the reservation.

In the course of

its decision, however, the Robinson court noted in dicta
that the state of Nebraska had been exercising both civil
and criminal jurisdiction over the Omaha Indians since at
least 1882, over 70 years before PL 280 purportedly gave the
state the right to do so.
The claimed basis for this pre-1953 state jurisdiction
was set out in the brief filed on behalf of the state by
Attorney General Clarence A. H. Meyer, much of which was
accepted by the Court and repeated verbatim in its opinion.
The state argued that it had been vested with criminal
jurisdiction over Indians long prior to 1953 on the basis of
an 188 2 allotment statute which authorized the Secretary of
the Interior to convey tribal land to individual members of
the tribe and retain certain portions in trust for the tribe
CA
as common property.
The statute went on to provide that,
upon completion of the allotments, every member of the tribe
"shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both
civil and criminal, of the State of Nebraska." 5 1

Based upon

that language, the Robinson court held that the state courts
of Nebraska had "either concurrent or residual criminal
jurisdiction" over the Omahas prior to 1953.52

PL 280 had

merely "confirmed it and gave it to the state conclusively
CA
and exclusively."
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The state's position on this issue was reiterated
several years,later in testimony before a Senate
subcommittee considering the amendment or repeal of PL 280.
On March 4, 1976, Nebraska Assistant Attorney General Ralph
H. Gillan appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Indian
Affairs to present the views of the Nebraska Department of
Justice with respect to the proposed Indian Law Enforcement
Improvement Act of 1975.

In the course of his testimony,

Gillen matter-of-factly asserted that PL 280 had not
appreciably changed the jurisdictional facts of life on the
Omaha Reservation:
The history of jurisdiction over Indian country in
Nebraska prior to 1953 is somewhat confusing, and it
may well be that State jurisdiction was mistakenly
exercised. . . in any event, it is clear that for many
years before 1953 the Nebraska courts did exercise
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians on the
reservation. apparently concurrently with the Federal
courts.
The exercise of this jurisdiction was not
challenged before 1953 . . . State jurisdiction had, in
fact been exercised, rightly or wrongly, before 1953.
In 1953, under Public Law 28 0, Nebraska acquired
exclusive civil and criminal jurisdiction over all
Indian country in Nebraska.
It probably did not
involve anv great exchange, as a practical matter, from
what had gone on before, (emphasis added^.5^
Gillan's statement was sufficiently provocative as to
prompt additional inquiry into the matter by the
subcommittee.

Chairman Senator James Abourezk asked the BIA

to investigate and analyze the question of Nebraska's pre
1953 exercise of jurisdiction.

ss

The request resulted in a

responsive memorandum dated March 24, 1976 from the
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Winnebago Agency Superintendent to the Director of the
Aberdeen Area Office.

The Superintendent reported that,

although he had been unable to locate agency records
pertaining to law enforcement activities prior to 1953, he
had determined through discussions with local residents that
the state of Nebraska, specifically Thurston County, had
indeed exercised both criminal and civil jurisdiction over
Indians prior to the enactment of P.L. 280.56

The

memorandum specifically recited conversations with various
individuals,

including Omaha Tribal Chairman Edward L. Cline

and several persons connected with local law enforcement, in
which each respondent confirmed that Indians were routinely
arrested and prosecuted in the state courts of Nebraska
prior to 1953.57
The Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v.
Sigler thus served as both a confirmation of, and an
attempted justification for, the de facto state of criminal
jurisdiction on the Omaha Reservation as it had existed for
almost a century.

Whatever clarity the state court may have

thought it brought to this issue with Robinson, however, was
quickly dissipated by the federal courts.

In Omaha Tribe v.

Village of Walthill (1971), decided just five months after
Robinson. the federal district court specifically rejected
the state court's reliance on the 1882 allotment statute as
.

.

.

.

.

the basis for its assertion of pre-1953 jurisdiction.

Rfi

The
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court held that the provisions of the allotment act had
never been fully executed on the Omaha Reservation, and
therefore criminal jurisdiction within the Omaha Reservation
had not passed to the State of Nebraska by virtue of that
CQ
statute.
Thus the "dragon's nest" remained intact.
While the state's exercise of jurisdiction prior to
1953 was almost certainly erroneous, the fact that it
proceeded without challenge by the federal government for so
many years offers a compelling illustration of the complex
and confusing state of jurisdictional issues surrounding
Indian reservations in the pre-1953 era.

A complete

examination of the historical background of jurisdiction in
Indian territory is beyond the scope of this paper, and is
fin
available in numerous other sources. u
•

Suffice to say,

however, that throughout American history the problem of
criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian lands has
presented a chaotic and often conflicting morass of
treaties, statutes, and regulations, resulting in what one
commentator has accurately described as "a complex labyrinth
which many practitioners and courts find virtually
impossible to master."61
A great deal of this nationwide jurisdictional
confusion stemmed, as it had in Nebraska, from the allotment
ideology of the late 1800's, and the piecemeal
implementation of the various allotment statutes enacted
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during that era.

Specifically, section 6 of the General

Allotment Act of 1887 provided that Indians who were
allotted lands under the Act would thereafter be subject to
the jurisdiction of the state courts, just as the 1882 Act
had been interpreted by the courts in Nebraska to confer
jurisdiction on themselves, as the court held in Robinson v.
Sigler.
For several reasons, however, section 6 of the General
Allotment Act did not have the anticipated effect of
substantially shifting criminal jurisdiction over Indian
lands to the states.

In the first place, section 6 was

never intended to create an exception to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts over certain crimes
committed on Indian reservations pursuant to the Federal
Major Crimes Act.

Furthermore, heirs of an allottee were

deemed not subject to state jurisdiction, thus creating a
totally unworkable practical dilemma for state law
enforcement operations.

That operational dilemma was

expressly recognized by the Acting Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior when he wrote in a 1954 opinion
letter to Assistant Secretary Orme Lewis:
Such complexities and distinctions as these have
rendered the grant of State jurisdiction over Indians
contemplated by the general Allotment Act largely
ineffective.
The sponsors of that legislation assumed
that the allotment of the Indians in severalty would be
but the prelude to the termination of their tribal
relations 4 . . When that program failed to be carried
out, and the Indians . . . continued to maintain their
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tribal relations and the Government continued its
guardianship over them, the subjection of the Indians
to the jurisdiction of the States ceased to have much
reality.
State law enforcement officers could not,
after all, go around with tract books in their pockets,
and being unable to distinguish a patent-in-fee Indian
from a ward Indian, they did not commonly concern
themselves with law violations by Indians, and the
theoretical jurisdiction of the States thus fell into
innocuous desuetude. 3
Given these and many other jurisdictional complexities,
it would be unduly simplistic for modern observers to engage
in sweeping criticism of the Nebraska courts for their
invocation of jurisdiction over the Omahas in the pre-1953
era.

It can be plausibly concluded that the state courts'

exercise of jurisdiction prior to the passage of PL 280 was
not so much a "usurpation" of power as it was an attempt to
pick their way through a jurisdictional quagmire.
For example,

in Kitto v. State (1915), the Nebraska

Supreme Court offered a rather compelling rationale for its
exercise of jurisdiction in Indian cases.

The court noted

that the only way to give meaning to the apparent intent of
the allotment statutes was to construe them so as to
transfer jurisdiction to the state courts after the
allotments were made.

If such jurisdiction was not vested

in the state, the court reasoned, it was vested nowhere.
Indeed, this may have been the case on the Omaha
Reservation, where there was no viable tribal judiciary
before the early 1970s.

On other reservations, however, the

tribes themselves were empowered to handle all "non-major"
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crimes.

The Kitto court concluded that Congress could not

have intended for non-major offenses to go completely
unpunished, and that therefore the Nebraska courts had no
choice but to hear such cases, in order to provide "equal
protection of the law . . .

to all, both Indians and white

men. "6^
Nevertheless, by 1975 the state of Nebraska would
itself acknowledge that its pre-1953 criminal jurisdiction
over Indian matters should have been limited to:

1.)

offenses committed by Indians off the reservation and 2.)
offenses committed on the reservation by non-Indians.65

The

state's actual exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
Indians in the years preceding PL 280 had far exceeded those
bounds.

fkfi

Still, whatever errors had occurred in the

state's invocation of Indian jurisdiction prior to 1953 were
in fact obviated by the enactment of PL 280.

As a

"mandatory" state, Nebraska gained absolute and exclusive
jurisdiction at that time regardless of what had gone on
before.
Thus, the real impact of PL 28 0 on the Omaha
Reservation was not to alter the entity that exercised
jurisdiction over Indian matters, for the state had been
doing that for decades.

What the new law changed was the

pattern of criminal law enforcement operations on the Omaha
Reservation.

An assessment of the effect of PL 280 on the
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Omaha Reservation therefore must begin with an examination
of the law enforcement situation in Thurston County in the
years immediately preceding 1953.
In his report to the Commissioner, dated May 16, 1949,
Winnebago Superintendent H. E. Bruce presented a bleak
account of the abysmal social, economic, and law enforcement
conditions on the Omaha Reservation.

In keeping with the

assimilationist tenor of the times, Bruce scathingly
criticized the attempts of the Collier era administrators to
foster tribal self-government and cultural practices among
the Omahas:
Since acceptance of the Indian Reorganization Act
by the four Nebraska tribes . . . social problems which
were vital and basic . . . have been neglected and
ignored until they have become ugly sores . . . Vicious
social practices, once reasonably controlled, have
multiplied with apparent official sanction and
encouragement . . . All this has served to intensify
maladjustment, confusion, discouragement, and
frustration in the collective pattern of Indian thought
. . . Today a large majority of the Indians on the four
Nebraska reservations exist in a sort of twilight zone
between two cultures -- they have lost the best of
their Indian culture and have reached out to accept
only the worst of the white man's culture.
Bruce went on to provide substantial details regarding many
of the apparent "social problems" that he claimed had
festered on the Omaha Reservation during the Collier era,
including alcoholism, peyoteism, juvenile delinquency,
educational and health deficiencies, breakdowns in marital
and family stability, and many others.
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Bruce's comments about the law and order situation on
the reservation are particularly noteworthy.

After first

acknowledging that state and county courts had been
exercising jurisdiction over offenses committed by or
against Indians within the reservation since the allotment
days, he went on to report that the burden of Indian law
enforcement had been exceedingly heavy for both Thurston and
(TO

Knox Counties. °

.■

#

Bruce compiled statistics from Thurston

County jail records showing that, for the years 194 6 through
1948, Indians were prosecuted

for 64 per cent of the

violations of law in a county

in which they constituted only

2 0 per cent of the population.

He prepared and attached an

exhibit to the report in which he categorized the Indian
prosecutions by type of offense.

[Figure 2].

Bruce

suggested that most of the Indian offenses resulted from
excessive use of alcohol, and noted that bootlegging and

the

manufacturing of Indian "home brew" were particularly
prevalent in the area.
In a refrain that would become even more common after
the passage of PL 280, Bruce reported that county law
enforcement authorities were "seriously handicapped" in
dealing with the Indian situation by a shortage of funds.
Thurston County officials contended that from 75 to 80 per
cent of all funds spent on law enforcement were devoted to
Indian cases.

In light of those numbers, Bruce suggested
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that the county needed and deserved more federal assistance
than the single Indian policeman who was then stationed at
the reservation could provide.69

Bruce recommended that two

additional positions of Indian Police be established, and
urged "close cooperation with county officers in a more
effective enforcement of law among Indians."70

Instead of

providing more assistance, however, the federal government
chose the opposite approach —

proceeding to abandon the

Thurston County law enforcement situation via the passage of
PL 280.

A bad situation soon became significantly worse.
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CHAPTER TWO

"HOW THIS SITUATION CAN EXIST
IN THE UNITED STATES IS BEYOND ME"
*

*

*

*

PUBLIC LAW 280 IN OPERATION ON THE OMAHA RESERVATION
AND THE BATTLE OVER RETROCESSION,

1953 - 1970

However bad the law enforcement situation may have been
on the Omaha Reservation prior to 1953, passage of Public
Law 280 in that year only exacerbated the problem.

The

disastrous effects of PL 280 would include not only a
further deterioration of law and order conditions on the
reservation, but also an increase in racial tension and
animosity between the Omahas and non-Indians living in the
area:

Not surprisingly, a fundamental dichotomy exists

between the Omahas' perception of the reasons for these
problems and the perceptions held by non-Indian residents of
the reservation.
From the non-Indian perspective, the root cause of the
difficulties that followed the invocation of PL 280 lay in
the lack of funding for the local governments that were
required to assume criminal enforcement operations on the
reservations.

After August, 1953, all federal law
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enforcement personnel, few though that may have been, were
withdrawn from the Omaha Reservation.

Prior to the act,

Thurston County was already prosecuting Indians on a routine
basis for all "non-major" crimes, that is, those crimes not
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts under the Federal Major Crimes Act.^

According to

Winnebago Agency Superintendent H. E. Bruce's May, 1949
Report to the Commissioner, there was only one BIA policeman
serving the reservation in the years immediately preceding
passage of PL 280.

This federal "force" was not increased

between 1949 and 1953, despite Bruce's repeated
recommendations for more law enforcement manpower.

Several

other sources likewise indicate that only one federal Indian
officer had served the reservation before 1953.
Despite this apparently minimal pre-1953 BIA presence,
some records seem to imply that the "complete" and
"immediate" withdrawal of federal law enforcement personnel
from the reservation was the primary cause of the ensuing
lawlessness in the area.4

It is hard to understand how the

removal of a lone BIA officer could have become the basis
for all the problems that ensued.

It is probably more

accurate to state that Thurston County found itself
significantly overburdened by the sudden unfunded increase
in its law enforcement responsibilities on the reservation,
since PL 280 had expressly repealed the Major Crimes Act in
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the mandatory states, and the county would now have to
prosecute Indians for both "major” crimes and misdemeanors.
Whatever the precise effect of the removal of that single
federal officer, it is clear that the county soon found
itself unable to adequately police the reservation due to
financial constraints and manpower limitations.

Law and

order conditions in the area quickly deteriorated.
Thurston county officials maintained that they were
doing their best to police the reservation, despite extreme
financial hardship and the federal government's complete
abandonment of the problem.

The county petitioned the state

for assistance, complaining that it "was short on money, had
only one sheriff, and there had been a dramatic increase in
crime among the Indian population.”5
little immediate assistance.

The state provided

Attorney General C. S. Beck

noted that Thurston County had been handling Indian offenses
in its courts since 1875, and offered only the vacuous
platitude that "the problem in Thurston County is not one of
jurisdiction.

The problem is to help the Indians, and by so

doing to help Thurston County."0
By 1957, however, the state had at least recognized the
existence of the funding problem.

Governor Victor Anderson

met with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington to
seek federal financing for increased law enforcement on the
reservation.

Given the passage of PL 280 and Nebraska's

47

status as a mandatory state, the BIA could not agree to
Anderson's request.

The Commissioner did, however, commit

to bolstering the federal programs relating to juvenile
delinquency on the reservation.7
Upon his return to Nebraska, the governor asked the
state legislature to address the problem.

Anderson advised

the Nebraska Unicameral that, because some Indian lands in
Thurston County were exempt from taxation, "it is apparent
that the Indian population of Thurston County assumes a very
small portion of the tax burden of that County, although
constituting about 1/3 of the population."8

The governor

went on to report that for the year 1956, Indians
constituted over 84% of the total jail population in
Thurston County (236 out of 280 individual incarcerations),
and that the total annual cost to the county for the housing
of all prisoners had been $10,549.

To remedy the problem,

Anderson introduced legislation designed to "equitably
distribute the added burden of law enforcement imposed upon
certain counties by reason of the passage of Public Law
280."9

The bill, which passed into law on June 21, 1957,

provided that the state would reimburse the county for
expenses in excess of $500 per month incurred in the feeding
of

Indian prisoners, with the state c o m m i t m e n t limited to a

maximum of $500 each month.

io
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Within several years, it became apparent that the
state's $500 monthly contribution would not suffice.

On May

18, 1961 the Government and Military Affairs Committee of
the Nebraska Legislature conducted a hearing to consider
Legislative Bill 713, a bill that would amend the 1957
legislation so as to provide funding for up to three
additional deputy state sheriffs in the counties affected by
PL 280 jurisdiction.

The transcript of that hearing, which

includes testimony from state and local officials as well as
both white and Indian residents of Thurston County, provides
a wealth of insight into the law enforcement conditions on
the reservation in the early years of PL 280 jurisdiction.11
Norman Otto, appearing as the representative of thenGovernor Frank Morrison, expressed the administration's
frustration with the PL 280 scheme.

Responding to a state

legislator who asked "why [is] this a state concern rather
than a national concern?"

(a question which in itself

reflects the lack of awareness among state officials of the
impact of PL 280 even eight years after its passage!), Otto
replied:
Well, it is only a State concern because the State
accepted the responsibility.
It used to be a national
concern and they asked the State, would you like this
problem, would you like to accept it, and the State
said yes. . . . Maybe the people made a mistake in
1953 but this was their decision.
I think you're
right.
It should have stayed a federal problem.

49

W. Earl Dyer Jr., executive editor of the Lincoln Star,
testified at the hearing "as a private citizen interested in
a problem on which the state must act."

He appeared to have

studied the Thurston County situation extensively, and
offered compelling statistics in support of the proposed
legislation.

Dyer reported that from 1954 to 1958, criminal

cases involving Indians in Thurston County increased from
249 to 353.

Likewise, expenses for the county jail

increased over 178% from 1950 to 1959.

In 1949, the

Thurston County jail had lodged 93 Indians at some time
during the year; by 1958, that number had risen to 334.

In

light of these numbers, Dyer contended that the state had
"the moral and legal responsibility to see to it that law
and order is established in Thurston County —

and that this

blemish is removed from the political face of the state."13
Omaha tribal representatives presented similar appeals
for state action.

Chairman of the Omaha Tribal Council

Alfred W. Gilpin first rebutted the prevalent notion that
the tribe was not paying its fair share of the financial
burden in the county, contending that the Omahas had in fact
been paying taxes on their allotted lands since 1910.

He

went on to urge the Committee to consider the proposed
legislation so as to end the lawlessness "that has caused us
to even lose some of our members by death."14
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Tribal member Edward Cline likewise urged the Committee
members to take action, contending that the reservation was
not safe for women or children at any hour of the day.15
Rev. Reuben H. Ten Haken, a tribal member and clergyman from
Macy, offered a particularly eloquent plea for state
attention to the problem:
The Omaha Reservation is desperately in need of
the kind of law enforcement that this bill makes
possible. . . . We can testify to experience after
experience that cries out for justice. . . . I visit
people in the hospital monthly and sometimes weekly who
have been knifed [or] beaten . . . Violence and
brutality are often left unreported. . . . Our community
[has become] a haven for the lawless to ply their
trades at the expense of ruined lives.16
LB 713 passed into law on July 1, 1961.

As ultimately

enacted, the bill authorized the governor to appoint up to
three deputy state sheriffs for each county in which 60% or
more of the persons convicted for violation of state
criminal laws were Indians.

The "60% rule11 was a last-

minute insertion in the bill, designed to accommodate
legislators from northern Nebraska counties bordering on the
Sioux Reservations in South Dakota, who claimed that their
counties were experiencing Indian problems comparable to
those in Thurston County.

The unanticipated result of that

hasty amendment, however, was to turn what had been a well17
intentloned measure into an "Indian Bounty Act."-1
-

Indians

and their supporters contended that county officials now
believed that the most expedient method to obtain increased
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state funding was to arrest more and more Indians.

The

resulting deluge of Indian arrests created great resentment
among the Omahas, many of whom had originally supported the
legislation. i
«

•

ft

•

•

•

•

The tribe became increasingly anxious to

find some mechanism to escape from state jurisdiction.
Many observers believed that the lawlessness on the
reservation in the years after passage of PL 280 was
exacerbated by the enactment of federal legislation in 1955
which permitted the sale of alcoholic beverages to Indians.
Thurston County Sheriff John Elliott and other non-Indian
officials repeatedly cited alcohol consumption as a major
factor in the escalation of crime on the reservation.

In a

July, 1956 interview with the Omaha World-Herald. Elliott
asserted that rising costs for the transport and housing of
Indian prisoners had depleted county resources, and that no
funds were available for the the maintenance of a deputy at
Macy or Winnebago.

He went on to note that four murders had

occurred on the reservation in a six month period, and
claimed that in each case "the cause was drunkenness
followed by assault and battery."19

Walthill Mayor Dale

French echoed Elliott's comments, stating that the crime
problem on the reservation "has been increased since Indians
20
were allowed to buy and drink liquor.'1
At least a few Omahas shared Elliott and French's
opinion on the alcohol issue.

An article in the July 1,
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1956 Omaha World-Herald Magazine quoted an unidentified
member of the Omaha Tribal Council as asserting that the
lifting of the prohibition on the sale of alcohol to the
Indians had been the "worst mistake the Government and State
o1
ever made."^A
In the minds of most Omahas, however, the problems in
the implementation of PL 280 jurisdiction were not caused
primarily by the increased availability of alcohol on the
reservation or by a lack of funding.

Rather, the general

perception of the Omahas was that local government officials
lacked the fundamental will to fairly and efficiently police
the reservation, due to inherent racism and discrimination.
Council Chairman Edward Cline voiced that tribal impression
in Congressional testimony delivered years later:
[During the PL 2 80 years] the tribe experienced
harassment and unfair treatment at the hands of county
law enforcement officials. . . . [We] were subject to
physical abuse and discriminatory prosecution.
Rehabilitation was nonexistent.
Indians would be
placed in jail upon arrest for minor offenses for which
non-Indians would merely be told to appear in court.
The county sheriff would refuse to set bail for an
Indian, making him sit in jail until he could appear
before the judge for arraignment.22
Cline went on to relate an incident in which a pregnant
Indian girl had pleaded with her Thurston County jailers
that she was about to have her baby.

The baby was born in

the jail, and the girl was given only an aspirin.

Cline

stated that "as a result of this treatment, the baby
died."23

Thurston County Sheriff Clyde Storie strongly
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rebutted Cline's version of the story, contending that the
woman had been found drunk in the street and was initially
taken to a hospital.

She left the hospital voluntarily, and

was later found again on the streets of Walthill.

She was

then jailed at Pender where she could be monitored by a jail
matron.

A doctor was called, and was present at the birth.

The baby was born with the umbilical cord twisted around its
neck and could not be saved.24

Whatever the truth in this

specific case, it is easy to envision the heightened tension
and animosity associated with the incident.
The Omahas' frustration and resentment toward the
state's exercise of jurisdiction under PL 280 was also
evidenced in the poignant statements of Tribal Chairman
Alfred Gilpin at the University of South Dakota's Conference
on Indian Affairs in 1957:
Public Law 28 0 has actually left our Omaha and
Winnebago Reservations lost since 1953. . . . Ever
since then we have had no law protection. . . The
Omahas and the Winnebagos pay tax on their trust land.
It seems as though we should enjoy the same services as
other communities . . . The county should be able to
give us a deputy on the reservation, which it hasn't
done.
We had some killings going on there, one right on
Main Street, which could have been prevented if we had
law and order.
This is not exaggerating.
It's exactly
the truth . . . How this situation can exist in the
United States is beyond me.
In an interview conducted twenty years later, Gilpin
still lamented the tragic consequences of PL 280 on the
reservation.

He recalled his persistent but largely futile
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efforts to convince, state officials to meet their newlyaccepted responsibilities to the tribe:
In Macy, we had murder, we had rape, we had
bootlegging, we had gunfights, right on the streets.
. . . I asked them, 'Why did you accept [PL 280
responsibilities] if you're not going to give us these
services? . . . You're talking about money — we're
talking about lives.'26
As the situation deteriorated, tribal leaders, county
officials, and concerned non-Indian residents took steps to
address the area's problems.

Realizing that it could no

longer rely on the federal government for any substantive
assistance, the tribe announced a long-range cooperative
program for community development.

The plan was designed

first to identify the tribe's aspirations for its future,
and then to move toward those objectives with the assistance
of state, local, and private institutions.27

As a corollary

to its long-range plan, the tribe took part in a program
administered by the national Association on American Indian
Affairs called "We Shake Hands."

The program was publicized

as an effort to "end the social and spiritual isolation of
the tribal community by encouraging friendly relations
between them and the white communities around them."28
On December 3-4, 1958, a conference was convened in
which state, county, and tribal representatives sought to
solve the law enforcement problems on the reservation.

29

Although the tone of the meeting was apparently cordial and
constructive,

little substantive progress was made.
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Governor Anderson's representative at the conference was
particularly passive, suggesting that the state would get
actively involved in the problem only after the tribal
councils and local officials had made "an honest effort" to
solve the difficulties on their own.30
Despite the good intentions evidenced by these
conferences and programs, they could not resolve the day-today problems of law enforcement on the reservation.

By

1961, the Omaha Reservation had gained a national reputation
as a glaringly bad example of the inherent folly of the
terminationist ideology in general, and of PL 280 in
particular.

Representative Arnold Olsen of Montana called

specific attention to the Nebraska debacle, declaring on the
floor of the House of Representatives that PL 280 had
created a "lawless area" in which "murdered men have lain in
the street within the Omaha Reservation for over 24 hours
before police have investigated."

^i

As the PL 280 years dragged on, the community-action
programs and cooperative ventures ground to a standstill due
to suspicions and resentment among both the Omahas and the
non-Indian residents of Thurston County.

In the late 1960s,

tensions that had reached the boiling point were ignited by
an incident in which a 2 0-year-old white woman was abducted
and raped by seven Indian men after attending the Winnebago
Pow-Wow on the reservation.

Although the suspects were
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arrested and charged almost immediately, many non-Indian
area residents claimed that the Indian suspects had been
given preferential treatment.

A letter signed by 67 persons

identified only as "concerned citizens of Thurston County"
was mailed to local newspapers, alleging that the crime had
been "hushed up" by local authorities.

The letter, printed

in its entirety on the front page of the Pender Times,
starkly reveals the simmering racial tension and hostility
that had festered in the area throughout the PL 280 years:
We have watched the newspapers and listened to the
newscasts since [the abduction and rape] happened and
have seen or heard no mention of this crime.
Why? A
similar incident happened a few weeks earlier where two
couples were beaten . . . and no mention of this was
ever made public.
And I would guess that the criminals
were gently reprimanded and reminded that this was a
'no-no' and that the Great White Father who doles out
the monthly checks and commodities for this 'poor'
misguided minority group was unhappy with them.
But
they received their checks the next month so they could
stay drunk and continue their drunkedness and criminal
acts.
We who live in this community are getting just
about all we can take of this favoritism; it is time we
whites demand our equal rights.
If seven white men had
committed this horrendous crime . . . it would be in
the headlines the following morning and swift legal
action would be taken.32
County officials denied the allegations of preferential
treatment for the Indian suspects, pointing out that the
crime had been reported in several area newspapers and on
local television broadcasts even before the letter was
published.

J

Thurston County Attorney Mark Fuhrman did

acknowledge, however, that some areas around Macy and
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Winnebago were a "jungle," where it was not safe for persons
to go out at night.34

Once again, Fuhrman and other county

officials pointed to the lack of state and federal financial
support as the fundamental impediment to improved law
enforcement.
The letter outraged the Omahas and Winnebagos, who
called it a "slur on their race."35

In protest, the tribes

initiated an economic boycott of white businesses in
Walthill.

The boycott resulted in a statement released by

Walthill Mayor Blair Richendifer,

in which most of the 67

signers of the original letter apologized for any
"misinterpretation" of the letter's meaning, and contended
that it had not been intended to condemn "the whole Indian
nation."

The Indians, however, refused to accept the

proffered apology, noting that "it was addressed to no one
[and] signed by no one," and contained "more of the same
type of bigotry, racism and implications toward Indian
people."37
Quickly, a county "human relations board" comprised of
both Indian and white representatives was formed to address
OO
the issue, and the boycott ended shortly thereafter.
As
the seven Indian men accused of the crime were brought to
trial in Thurston County District Court, however, racial
animosity continued to simmer.

In January,

1970, editor

Anne Flicker of the Walthill Citizen reported that she had
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received a threatening phone call in which the caller
invoked the name of the Omaha Tribal Council and warned her
"not to come to Macy but to stay in Walthill like the other
TO
Walthill garbage."
The following month, Indian inmates m
.

,

the Thurston County jail revolted against the overcrowded
conditions there, threatening to burn the jail down.40
Sheriff Clyde Storie called for assistance from neighboring
law enforcement agencies, and reported that force was used
on at least one prisoner in quelling the disturbance.
Several days later, three fires were set in Macy by
arsonists, and Indian residents went to the streets to
patrol the area.41
Ultimately, all seven of the Indian men accused of the
kidnapping and rape were convicted.

Two were sentenced to

life imprisonment, thereby producing more claims of racial
discrimination.

Wayne Tyndall, Secretary of the Omaha Tribe

and brother of one of the men sentenced to life, claimed "No
Indian can receive a fair trial in Thurston County."42
Tribal Chairman Ed Cline was even more vehement in echoing
Tyndall's allegations of discrimination:
What we see is what we've seen from the beginning, the
white man's intent to keep the Indian prisoner in his
own land. . . . We know damn good and well our people
don't get fair and humane treatment . . . W h i t e law
enforcement leans on the Indian. . . . We'll always
mistrust the white man. We're not prejudiced against
him.
We're simply telling the truth.
White people
have to be watched.
The white man has no logical
reason for telling his children to watch us.
But we
have to tell our children to watch them.
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The non-Indian response to such comments was again
voiced by Anne Flicker.

The Walthill Citizen editor argued

that the Indians' claims of inequitable treatment were
"overexaggerated," stating "it's been blown past the point
where it's believable.
past.

I know they have been taken in the

Now that is over and done with.

Don't forget, a few

whites lost their scalps, too."44
While incidents like the 1969 rape case served to
escalate the racial tensions on and around the Omaha
Reservation, a more fundamental dispute between the Omahas
and non-Indian residents centered on the question of how
best to resolve the problem of lawlessness on the
reservation —

a problem that both sides readily

acknowledged.

This battle would focus on the concept of

"retrocession," and it became a struggle that the Omahas
would eventually win.
By the mid-1960s, the terminationist ideology of
immediate post-WW II era was on the wane.

Dissatisfaction

with the effects of PL 28 0 in several states, coupled with
the well-publicized failures of the Menominee and Klamath
reservation terminations, combined to bring about yet
another federal re-examination of the Indian jurisdictional
problem.

The new federal posture on Indian matters

eventually manifested itself in Titles II through VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.

Those statutes would
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substantially amend the provisions of PL 280, bringing
dramatic changes to the Omaha Reservation.
The process that would lead to the 1968 amendments
beqan in 1961, when the Senate Judiciary Committee
commissioned its Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights to
conduct an extensive analysis of the legal status and
constitutional rights of Native Americans.

Led by its

chairman, Senator Sam Ervin, the subcommittee gathered
testimony and evidence over a four year period.

In June

1965, a delegation of Omahas led by Tribal Chairman Edward
Cline testified before the subcommittee, expressing a strong
desire for amendments to PL 2 80 that would allow the federal
government to resume jurisdictional control.

A

R

The

investigation culminated in a comprehensive report issued in
1966, in which the subcommittee concluded that PL 280 had
"resulted in a breakdown in the administration of justice to
such a degree that Indians are being denied due process and
A (Z

equal protection of the law."HO

The report recommended

extensive amendments to PL 280, including provisions
requiring Indian consent to any further transfers of
jurisdiction and, most importantly for the Omahas,
provisions for the retrocession of jurisdiction back to the
federal government.
The Ervin Committee's Indian rights provisions remained
stalled in Congress for two more years.

On March 6, 1968,
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President Lyndon Johnson sent to Congress a message entitled
"The Forgotten American."47

That message marked the Johnson

administration's formal repudiation of the termination
policy, as Johnson called for a new policy of "selfdetermination" for American Indians.

The President

specifically asked Congress to amend PL 280 along the lines
recommended by the Ervin Committee two years earlier.
Ultimately, the amendments to PL 280 came to fruition
as Titles II through VII of the landmark Civil Rights Act of
1968.

For the Omahas, by far the most significant change

was contained in Title IV, Sec. 403(a).

That section

provided:
The United States is authorized to accept a
retrocession by any State of all or any measure of the
criminal or civil jurisdiction, or both, acquired by
such State pursuant to [PL 2 80].
(emphasis added; the
underlined language would prove to be crucial in later
judicial interpretations of the statute vis a vis the
Omaha situation.)48
With this statutory language, Congress cracked open the door
for Indians in all the PL 280 states to escape the perceived
inequities inflicted upon them during the 15 years of PL 280
jurisdiction.

The Omahas would become the first tribe in

the nation to push through that door.
Just as PL 28 0 had not provided for Indian consent to
the transfer of jurisdiction to the state, the 1968
legislation did not give Indians the power to initiate
retrocession.

The federal government was authorized only to

62

accept retrocession "by any state."

Thus, it was up to the

state of Nebraska to determine whether it wished to return
jurisdiction to the federal government.

The debate on this

issue would turn into a bitter contest, once again pitting
the Omahas against county officials and their other nonIndian neighbors.
The Omahas, of course, had been seeking an escape from
state jurisdiction almost from the moment PL 280 went into
effect.

With passage of the 1968 amendments, the tribe

moved quickly to position itself for that long-desired
release.

Chairman Cline traveled to Washington to meet with

the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on the retrocession
issue.

He was advised to file a formal request with the

BIA, after which a representative would be sent to the
.

.

reservation to assist the tribe m
subsequent meetings in January,

.

its efforts.

4 , 0

At those

1969, Cline informed the BIA

representatives that the tribe wanted its own jail and court
facilities, and that the Omahas would expect the BIA to
provide law enforcement coverage on the reservation until
the tribe could establish its own police force.50

On that

same day, the Omaha Tribal Council adopted Resolution No.
69-33, asserting the tribe's strong desire for the return of
federal jurisdiction, and requesting "urgent action" in
furtherance of that goal.51

[Appendix III].
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In sharp contrast to the Omahas' perception of
retrocession as the long-awaited deliverance from their
problems, Thurston County officials and non-Indian residents
viewed it as yet another impending blunder on the part of
the federal government.

They described it as a policy

fraught with danger and destined to make a bad situation
infinitely worse.

Once again, the local non-Indian

perception was that if only adequate financial resources
could be obtained, the state and county could quite
adequately and fairly police the reservation.
Sheriff Clyde Storie was so distressed by the
possibility of retrocession that he wrote a letter to
President Richard Nixon arguing against the return of
jurisdiction to the federal government.

Storie contended

that retrocession would be a major step backward for the
Omahas and could only lead to grievous consequences for the
entire community.

He warned against the "creation of

special agencies for any one group of people," and proposed
a "simple solution to the whole problem."

Storie's

solution, not surprisingly, was for the federal government
to provide the county with sufficient funds to adequately
police the reservation.

With additional financial support,

the sheriff claimed,

office "can do the job and will do

the job."52

his
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As Storie's letter indicates, local non-Indian
opposition centered on the potential danger and inequity
inherent in the re-creation of a "state within a state,"
complete with its own police force and tribal courts.
County officials argued that the "checkerboard pattern" of
Indian and non-Indian owned land on the reservation.would
make day-to-day jurisdictional determinations a practical
impossibility for both county and tribal police forces.53
Moreover,

local residents believed that retrocession would

entitle Indians to take advantage of all the benefits of
state citizenship with none of the concurrent
responsibilities.54
With these strong competing viewpoints before it, the
Nebraska Legislature stepped into the retrocession debate.
Attorney General Clarence A. H. Meyer recommended that the
Legislative Council appoint a special committee to address
the issue.55

That committee held hearings on July 31 and

August 1, 1968, which produced the expected differences of
opinion between the Omahas and county officials.

The

committee also visited the Pine Ridge and Rosebud
reservations in South Dakota, which were then under federal
jurisdiction, to determine how those systems were operating.
Finding that federal/tribal jurisdiction on the South Dakota
reservations generally "worked well," the committee
ultimately concluded that jurisdiction should be returned to
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the federal government, provided that the BIA agreed to
assume immediate responsibility for day-to-day law
enforcement operations on the reservation.56
The Council's recommendation, combined with the lure of
the potential cost savings inherent in the abandonment of
Indian jurisdiction, proved too much for the state to
resist.

On April 16, 19 69, the Nebraska Legislature

unanimously adopted Legislative Resolution 37, in which the
state retroceded to the federal government "all jurisdiction
over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas
of Indian country located in Thurston County, Nebraska,
acquired by the State of Nebraska pursuant to Public Law 280
of 1953."57 [Appendix IV].

The preamble to the resolution

clearly indicates the cost-cutting motivation for its
adoption, declaring that the assumption of jurisdiction by
the state in 1953 had led to "steadily increasing costs"
which Thurston County did not have a sufficient tax base to
pay for, and noting that the

state's financial assistance

to the county had "increased each biennium."58

Plainly, the

state saw retrocession as an opportunity to rid itself of a
messy and expensive problem, despite the strong misgivings
of local non-Indian residents.
With the issuance of the state's offer of retrocession,
the burden shifted to the federal government to act on the
proposal.

Executive Order No. 114 35 vested the Secretary of
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the Interior with the unilateral power to accept or reject
offers of retrocession on behalf the federal government.^9
When the state of Nebraska tendered its offer, Secretary
Walter Hickel responded by ordering yet another
investigation of conditions in Thurston County.

The BIA

investigators who had been sent to Nebraska quickly
confirmed that which had been apparent for years —

that law

enforcement conditions in the county were indeed abysmal.
The BIA reports and memoranda stemming from those
. investigations are replete with the now-familiar litany of
claims and counterclaims among the Omahas and local
officials.

For example, in an August 1, 1969 memorandum,

Area Special Officer William F. Walker reported that, in his
meeting with Omaha tribal officials, he had been inundated
with details of discriminatory prosecution,

inadequate and

inhumane jail facilities, and generalized mistreatment of
the Omahas by county law enforcement officers.

fin

County

officials, on the other hand, renewed their argument that
they were willing to deliver adequate policing of the
•

reservation,

if sufficient funding could be provided. fi1
•

•

•

•

•

In keeping with the new federal policy of "selfdetermination" for Indians, and based upon the BIA reports
confirming the poor law enforcement conditions on the
reservation,

Secretary Hickel ultimately decided to accept

Nebraska's offer of retrocession.

Yet a complication still
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lingered.

The Winnebago Tribe, occupying the northern

portion of Thurston County, did not wish to undergo
retrocession, and it issued a tribal resolution to that
effect on April 17, 1969.62

[See Map 1].

Hickel attempted

to meet the desires of both the Omahas and the Winnebagos by
issuing a "Notice of Acceptance of Retrocession of
Jurisdiction" dated October 16, 197 0 in which he accepted
jurisdiction over only a part of the area tendered by the
state of Nebraska,

i.e.. he accepted jurisdiction over only

the area "located within the boundaries of the Omaha
Reservation in Thurston County, Nebraska."63 [Appendix V].
With that notice, the Omaha Tribe became the first Indian
nation in the country to undergo retrocession.
Yet even before the federal "acceptance," state
officials had begun to express second thoughts about the
wisdom of retrocession.

Nebraska Senator Roman Hruska and

state Attorney General Clarence Meyer asked the Department
of Interior to "take no hasty action" on retrocession until
all aspects of the jurisdictional problems on the
reservation had been thoroughly examined.64

In the minds of

state and county officials, the Secretary's "partial"
acceptance clouded an already chaotic situation.

Meyer

contended that the state still retained jurisdiction to
prosecute Indians, because the federal "acceptance" of
jurisdiction did not comport with the terms of the state's

68
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MAP 1

Thurston County, Nebraska
Boundary between Omaha and Winnebago
Reservations shown in green
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c.

e

offer. 3

Thurston County Attorney Mark Fuhrman indicated

his complete uncertainty over the jurisdictional status of
the reservation, stating to a reporter,
going to happen.

"You tell me what's

I don't know."66

Despite the confusion among state and county officials,
the Omahas were elated with the Secretary's acceptance, and
proceeded with plans for their own tribal police force,
jail, and court system.

Congress appropriated $100,000 in

interim funding to establish a BIA law enforcement presence
on the reservation.

f. 7

By late November,

1970, a tribal

judge, police captain, and five patrolmen were stationed on
the reservation, awaiting construction of the tribe's new
courthouse,

jail, and police station.68

Construction of

that multipurpose building was completed in 1971, and the
Omahas looked forward to a new era of self-determination and
economic advancement.

^

In the meantime, however, the federal government's
"partial" acceptance of the Nebraska Legislature's 1969
offer of retrocession provided the state with a viable legal
theory upon which to attempt to rectify what it now deemed
to have been a mistake.

Relying on the basic principle of

contract law that, in order to be effective, the acceptance
of an offer must be the "mirror image" of the original
offer, the Nebraska Legislature, on February 1, 1971,
,

,

.

7

purported to "rescind" its offer of retrocession.

0
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[Appendix VI].

The ensuing litigation over the efficacy of

the federal "acceptance" and the state's "rescission" would
once again lead to conflicting decisions by the state and
federa1 courts.
In State v. Goham (1971), the Nebraska Supreme Court
sided with state and county officials and held that the
Secretary of Interior's action had not constituted a legally
,

*7 -i

valid "acceptance” of the state's offer.

Rather, the

court viewed the Secretary's "notice of acceptance" as
merely a "counteroffer, which the state was then free to
accept or reject.

The Court stated:

The measure of the jurisdiction to be retroceded was a
matter for the state to determine, and is not dictated
in any way by the federal act.
The attempted
acceptance was not in accordance with the terms of the
offer, and was therefore of no force and effect.
It is intriguing to note that, at least initially, even
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Louis R. Bruce shared the
state's belief that the Secretary could not accept only part
of the state's offer of retrocession.

In an October 30,

1969 letter to Winnebago Chairman Gordon Beaver, Bruce
attempted to elicit a clarification of the Winnebagos'
position, indicating that their refusal to accede to
retrocession was a serious obstacle to the Omahas' request.
Bruce told Beaver that Nebraska's offer could only be
accepted or rejected in its entirety, writing "we cannot
accept more or less than the specific area . . . offered for
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retrocession by the state."73

By the time of the

Secretary's "Notice of Acceptance" one year later, the
Department of Interior had either changed its opinion on
this issue, or decided to proceed with the Omaha
retrocession despite it.
Notwithstanding the apparent strength of the state's
legal argument (as impliedly acknowledged in Bruce's
letter), the federal courts made short work of the Goham
decision.

In Omaha Tribe v. Village of Walthill

(1971), the

federal district court held that the language of the 1968
amendments to PL 280 was sufficiently flexible so as to
allow the Secretary to accept "piecemeal retrocession."74
The federal court specifically rebutted the state‘court's
reasoning in Goham, stating:
The problem I have in accepting the interpretation
reached by the High Court of Nebraska is that here we
are not considering a contract that was entered into
between Nebraska and the United States Government, but
rather a legislative Act. . . . The words 'The United
States is authorized to accept a retrocession . . . of
all or any measure of criminal . . . jurisdiction
acquired by a State' refutes [Nebraska's] contention
and gives the United States Government the right to
accept 'any measure' of the jurisdiction offered back
to it by a State, (emphasis added).
The district court's decision validating the Omaha
retrocession was upheld by the U. S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the 8th Circuit in 1972.76

When the U. S.

Supreme Court declined to review the case in 1973, the
Omahas' battle for retrocession was over.

7 7

For better or
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worse, the tribe was now permanently in control of its own
law enforcement operations.
As might be expected, relations between the new tribal
police force and Thurston County law enforcement officials
were strained from the beginning.

In it's offer of

retrocession, the state had retained jurisdiction over
traffic offenses committed on public highways within the
reservation.

That "loophole" in the system became a

particularly troublesome point of conflict between the two
forces.

County officials claimed they were often forced to

stand idly by and watch violators commit crimes due to the
vagaries of the jurisdictional issues.

Likewise, tribal

officials complained that the county officers often acted
outside their authority by making sham arrests for purported
"traffic offenses."78
An added practical problem for both police forces lay
in the determination of the ethnic identity of criminal
offenders or suspects.

The newly-created Omaha Tribal Court

did not possess criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, nor
could it prosecute Winnebagos or other non-Omaha Indians who
committed crimes on the reservation. 7 Q
3

Just as many

observers had predicted, this anomaly led to substantial
uncertainty in the investigation and prosecution of crimes.
Until the specific ethnic identity of a criminal offender or
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suspect was determined,

it was impossible for county or

tribal police to know which force had jurisdiction.80
On March 14, 197 5, the BIA convened a meeting with
tribal and county officials to resolve the lingering
jurisdictional conflicts between the two police forces.

The

meeting seemed to swing toward the Omahas' view of the
situation, with the issuance of a report by Agency Special
Officer Eugene Trottier in which he "confirmed" that various
county police officers had made arrests of Indians for other
than traffic offenses within the Thurston County portion of
the reservation.81

Trottier's report further indicated that

county officials were warned that the failure to coordinate
their efforts with tribal police "might expose county
officials to undesirable litigation."82
Several weeks after that meeting, Trottier wrote to
Thurston County Sheriff Clyde Storie, offering to "crossdeputize" county officers so as to allow them clearer
authority in dealing with reservation crimes.

He asked that

Storie, in return, offer cross-commissions as deputy county
sheriffs for the tribal police officers.83

Storie refused

the offer, contending that the Indian police did not meet
state qualifications for deputization.

County Attorney

Mark Fuhrman did agree, however, to "suggest" that the
Sheriff and his officers make a stronger effort to cooperate
with the federal and tribal enforcement personnel.
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Fuhrman's "suggestion11 notwithstanding, the decades
since the Omaha retrocession have seen continuing tension
between the Omahas and their non-Indian neighbors regarding
law enforcement and jurisdictional issues.

By 1975, when

the Winnebago Tribe decided that it too wished to undergo
retrocession, the state of Nebraska had concluded that the
•
.
Omaha retrocession
had been "a monumental mistake.1
1ft

Numerous state and county officials journeyed to Washington
to testify before the Senate's Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, which was considering a bill that would
allow Indian tribes such as the Winnebagos to unilaterally
initiate retrocession.

There they related a litany of

complaints regarding the adverse effects of retrocession,
and lobbied strongly against its extension to the
Winnebagos.
The full story of the debate over the Winnebago
retrocession is beyond the scope of this paper.

It may be

noted, however, that the primary thrust of the state and
county objections to the Winnebago initiative related to the
perceived problems caused by the Omaha retrocession six
years earlier.

Among those testifying in opposition to

Winnebago retrocession were Thurston County Attorney Mark
Fuhrman, Sheriff Clyde Storie, and the ubiquitous Anne
Flicker, who contended that the Omaha retrocession had been
a grievous constitutional error,

inasmuch -as it had the
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effect of "recognizing a sovereign Nation within the
confines.of the Continental United States."87

In a less

dramatic prepared statement, a staff member of the Nebraska
Legislature's Judiciary Committee testified:
The 1969 criminal retrocession of the Omaha Tribe was
initiated for the sole reason of relieving the State of
Nebraska of $90,000 of law enforcement costs.
Since
that time it has become very clear that the financial
savings was of little compensation for the confusion
and jurisdictional questions which have resulted. . .
This lack of clarity breeds confusion to the extent
that oftentimes jurisdictional authorities will ignore
or avoid areas of unclear jurisdiction.
When this
happens, problem areas which otherwise may be resolved
are simply not dealt with and the problem continues to
exist or worsen.
The non-Indian frustration with the "lack of clarity"
created by the Omaha retrocession evidenced in this 197 6
testimony would linger for many years.

Even nine years

later, Sheriff Clyde Storie continued to insist that the
Omahas "should be assimilated into the white man's culture,"
and that retrocession had been a "step backward" for the
tribe.89

A local group of non-Indians calling themselves

the "Concerned Citizen's Council" continued to complain of a
"law enforcement void" on the reservation.90

The gap

between that view of the situation and the Omahas'
perception seemed as wide m

1985 as it had ever been. 91
•

Captain Thomas Janis of the Omaha Tribal Police Force
claimed that retrocession was "working real well," and that
crime had dropped on the reservation since 197 0, with a
corresponding rise in tribal self-esteem and satisfaction. 92
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Janis' 1985 comments echoed the sentiments expressed by
Tribal Chairman Edward Cline some ten years earlier.

Cline

had also testified in the 1975-76 Senate hearings, and his
view of the situation contrasted sharply with those of the
non-Indian witnesses.

He asserted that retrocession had

been a godsend for the tribe, allowing its members to escape
"physical abuse and discriminatory prosecution" at the hands
of county law enforcement officials.

Cline concluded his

Senate testimony by stating:
Although problems do exist, the Omaha Tribe has been
very content with its law and order system since
retrocession of criminal jurisdiction.
Located in a
Public Law 280 state, retrocession of criminal
jurisdiction and the maintenance of the law and order
system has been the first step to self-determination
for the Omaha Tribe, (emphasis added).93
That tentative and troublesome "first step" would be
followed by more confident Omaha strides on different legal
fronts in the ensuing years.
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at Large 23 (March 3, 1885): 385,
The seven original "major
crimes" were murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent
to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny.
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CHAPTER THREE

"THIS IS A TURNING POINT OF MY PEOPLE
AND WE DEMAND JUSTICE"
*

*

*

*

THE OMAHA EXPERIENCE IN THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION
CASE 225
1.951 - 1964

At the same time the Omahas were attempting to cope
with the consequences of Public Law 280 in Thurston County,
the tribe was waging an equally consequential legal struggle
1,2 00 miles away in Washington, D.C.

The forum for that

battle was the Indian Claims Commission (ICC).

Created in

1946 at the outset of the terminationist offensive, the ICC
began its life as a curious eddy in the current of postwar
federal Indian policy.

The ICC's creators envisioned an

objective, non-judicial forum in which the nation's Indian
tribes could obtain a swift and permanent adjudication of
long-held grievances against the government.

This new

tribunal was designed to be largely free of the constrictive
legal and political obstacles that had always delayed, and
often prevented, the resolution of Indian claims in previous
decades.1

On its surface, the legislation creating the ICC
•

seemed to produce just such an entity.

2
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As many commentators have observed, however, the ICC in
practice did not live up to the lofty goals upon which it
was founded.

The Commission that had been designed to be

streamlined and "nonjudicial” quickly assumed a decidedly
court-like sluggishness, bogging down in many of the same
adversarial and legalistic swamps that had plagued the
judicial handling of Indian claims in earlier years.3

Given

the volume of claims filed and the historical complexities
of the issues involved, the delays were at least
understandable, if not always entirely justifiable.4
More disappointingly, however, the high-minded
principles upon which the ICC was ostensibly founded were
undermined almost from the outset by the burgeoning
terminationist ideology, as tribal claims became enmeshed
with and co-opted by the assimilationist aims of the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations.

In his message accompanying

the signing of the Act, President Truman hinted at this
dilution of the motives driving the ICC's creation:
It would be a miracle if in the course of [our dealings
with the Indians] — the largest real estate
transaction in history — we had not made some mistakes
and occasionally failed to live up to the precise terms
of our treaties and agreements . . . But we stand ready
to submit all such controversies to the judgment of
impartial tribunals. . . With the final settlement of
all outstanding claims which this measure insures,
Indians can take their place without special handicaps
or special advantages in the economic life of our
nation and share fully in its progress.
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Truman's suggestion that the ICC's resolution of Indian
claims would allow the tribes to "take their place" in
society presages the evolution of the ICC into an instrument
of termination.

In practice, the Commission became simply a

liquidating agent —

a necessary condition precedent to the

federal government's getting out of the Indian business.6
The creation, operation, and legacy of the ICC have
been thoroughly explored and evaluated at the "macro level"
by many knowledgeable commentators,

including Harvey

Rosenthal, John Wunder, Francis Paul Prucha, Vine Deloria,
Jr., Wilcomb Washburn, and others.

n

These observers have

generally concluded that the ICC turned out to be, at best,
a well-intentioned but flawed and incomplete resolution of
q
. . .
the Indian claims problem.
At worst, it is viewed as a
bastardized travesty of justice and another tragic
.

.

.

,

governmental debacle in the field of Indian policy.

Q

While the generalized impact of the ICC has thus
received ample scholarly attention, a relatively neglected
area of inquiry is the localized or "micro level" effect of
particular ICC adjudications on the tribes which prosecuted
those claims.10

The story of that grassroots experience,

from the initial filing of the Omaha's claim in 1951 until
its ultimate resolution in 1964, provides an instructive
illustration of the complexities involved in the ICC
process, and the impact of its awards on a specific tribe.
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Just as the relatively small and overlooked Omaha Tribe
gained modest notoriety as the first Indian group in the
nation to undergo retrocession (see Chapter 2 infra) , so too
did their ICC claims produce a "first" in the Commission's
history —

the "Omaha Rule" for processing proposed

compromise settlements.

The result is an Omaha imprint on

the annals of the institution that makes its claim
particularly worthy of examination.

Moreover, the Omaha

case study offers the opportunity to examine several other
seldom-explored aspects of the ICC's micro-level impact —
the divisive intra-tribal controversies over the
distribution and use of the funds awarded, and the way in
which those funds were ultimately utilized for the tribe's
benefit.

For the Omahas, these "aftermath" issues were as

much a part of the ICC story as the claims themselves.
An evaluation of the specific impact of the ICC on the
Omaha Nation requires a brief review of the Commission's
enabling legislation and its statutory mandate.

The broad

language of the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 seemed
to provide all that Indian claimants and their supporters
could have hoped for.

The legislation created a three-

person panel (later expanded to five members), which was
authorized to hear and resolve virtually every conceivable
type of grievance that any "identifiable Indian group" might
wish to prosecute against the United States.

Specifically,
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the Commission's jurisdiction extended to five separatelycategorized causes of action,

including claims based upon

fraudulent or unconscionable treaty provisions, and claims
based upon land confiscations without compensation.

In

addition, an extraordinarily open-ended "catch-all"
provision allowed the filing of claims based upon "fair and
honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing
rule of law or equity."11
The Act specifically extinguished any statute of
limitations defense that might otherwise have applied to
such claims and allowed Indian claimants to hire attorneys
of their own choosing to prosecute their claims.

In a

provision that reflected the desired "once and for all"
nature of the Commission's mandate, the Act required that
all Indian groups be formally advised of the creation of the
Commission, and it actively solicited the submission of
claims.12
The Act's liberal jurisdictional provisions were
significantly tempered, however, by the limitations of the
actual remedial powers exercised by the ICC.

The Commission

awarded only monetary judgments; it did not restore land to
claimants.

For many Indians, cash awards, no matter how

substantial, were not a satisfactory recompense for lands
wrongfully taken.13

Likewise, very early in its proceedings

the Commission determined that it would not award interest
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on the amounts found to be owed to claimants.

Its ruling on

that issue was subsequently upheld by both the Court of
Claims and the Supreme Court, and became a source of
considerable discontent among claimants and their
supporters.14
An equally significant restrictive element was
introduced by the ICC's method of determining land claims'
valuation.

The Commission took the position that it would

award monetary judgments based upon the value of the land in
question at the time of taking,

i.e.. at its eighteenth or

nineteenth century value, rather than its current market
value.3,5

Coupled with the refusal to grant prejudgment

interest, this limitation meant that the final judgments
awarded most claimants would fall far short of restoring
them to the position they would have reached had they
retained the land in question.
While each of these limitations on the Commission's
power was essentially self-imposed, the 1946 Act
specifically provided an additional "reducing element" in
the computation of final awards.

The government was

statutorily authorized to "offset" from the Commission's
awards the value of certain payments made to the tribes in
the p ast.16

The establishment of the appropriate amounts of

these offsets generated considerable controversy and delay
in the processing of claims, as attorneys sparred endlessly
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over the details of government payments and annuities made
generations before.17
The determination of land ownership and valuation some
100 years in the past necessarily turned the ICC litigation
process into an interminable "battle of the experts," and
spawned a symbiotic cottage industry in anthropological
research, ethnography, and real estate appraisal.

While the

resulting documentation would provide a rich source of data
for modern researchers, the laborious process of collecting
and analyzing that material became a significant additional
impediment to the rapid resolution of claims.
Operationally, the Commission's consideration of
claims evolved into a three-stage process.

The threshold

determination, generally labeled the "title phase," involved
the establishment of Indian ownership of the land in
question.

If that issue was decided in the Indians' favor,

the case proceeded to a second stage, the
"liability/valuation phase."

Those proceedings involved

exhaustive investigation and voluminous testimony regarding
the facts of the claimants' allegations and the value of the
land in question.

If and when the liability issue was

established in the Indians' favor and the value of the
property was determined, the Commission proceeded to the
third step, called the "offset phase."

There the parties

contested the appropriate amount by which the judgment would
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be reduced for payments made to the claimants since the time
of the taking.

Each of these stages in the process

typically involved extensive evidentiary hearings,
accompanied by the preparation and filing of countless
motions, briefs, and proposed findings on behalf of the
parties, and generally concluded with the Commission's
rendering of an interlocutory order resolving the central
issue in that phase, i.e., title, valuation, or offset.
Each of those interlocutory orders, in turn, was often
subject to motions for reconsideration or rehearing,
creating further delay and expense for the parties.18
The fourteen-year history of the Omahas' ICC litigation
provides a classic illustration of the bureaucratic delays
and legalistic wrangling that became ingrained in the
Commission's operations.

The Omaha saga began with the

filing of their original complaint with the Commission on
August 8 , 1951.19

Assigned Docket Number 225, the complaint

initially asserted a number of grievances related to the
government's negotiation of various treaties with the Omahas
prior to 1 8 5 4 . Specifically, the Omahas alleged that they
had been induced to enter into those unspecified treaties
and agreements through fraud and misrepresentation on the
part of government agents.

The tribe's attorneys couched

their claims in language that the Commission would later
describe as "typical" of many ICC complaints:
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(a) By failing to disclose and explain the true
meaning of the language used in the treaties to those
executing the same on behalf of the Indians . . . [who
were] unlettered and unfamiliar with the use of the.
English language and not comprehending the full meaning
of the language used.
(b) By secret instructions given to the
Commissioner sent to negotiate treaties.
(c) By special inducements of lands and goods.
(d) By promises given to the Indians that
they would be permitted to remain in possession of the
lands described in the treaty.
(e) By promises to permit them to continue to hunt
and fish in ceded territory.
(f) By making consideration payable at the will
and pleasure of the President and Congress.
(9) [By negotiating and executing the treaties
with Indians who] were without authority of the tribe
and acted contrary to the wishes and intentions of the
authorized leaders and members of the tribe.21
In addition to those specific allegations of fraud, the
Omahas claimed that the payments made to the tribe for the
lands ceded pursuant to the pre-1854 agreements had
"amounted to a small fraction of the value of the land and
were an "unconscionable consideration."

Leaving no

portion of the 194 6 Act unused, the tribe also attacked the
treaties by way of a generalized invocation of the Act's
"fair and honorable dealings" language.23
Having set out their grievances with respect to the
pre-1854 treaties in the preliminary paragraphs of their
complaint, the Omahas then presented five separately-stated
counts in which they attacked the provisions of their
landmark 1854 treaty with the government, and their
treatment pursuant to several subsequent agreements.

The

1854 treaty was the major land cession in Omaha history and
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the defining moment in their future relations with the
federal government.24

By the terms of the treaty, the

Omahas ceded to the government all of their traditional
homelands west of the Missouri River, reserving to
themselves only a 300,000 acre tract which would become the
Omaha Reservation.

In return, the government agreed to pay

the tribe $975,739.54, and to protect the Omahas from the
Sioux and other hostile neighboring tribes.
In Count I, the tribe alleged that it had not been
properly compensated for all the lands conveyed pursuant to
the 1854 treaty, due to errors in the surveying of their
traditional homelands.25

count I further alleged that the

government had failed to prevent white encroachment onto
Omaha land prior to the 1854 treaty in disregard of the
pg
promises made m prior treaties.
Count II alleged that
the amount paid to the Omahas for a portion of their
reservation that was set aside for the Winnebago Tribe in
18 65 was unconscionably low.

The tribe asserted that it had

been paid $50,000 for 103,000 acres, amounting to 50 cents
per acre for land that they now deemed to have been worth
77

"in excess of $5.00 per acre."6 '
In Count III, the Omahas claimed that the government
had failed to protect them from the Sioux and other hostile
tribes as agreed in the 1854 treaty, resulting in the death
of 22 men and the theft of at least 152 horses and other
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property.28

Count IV again invoked the catch-all language

of the 1946 enabling legislation, claiming that the Omahas
had not been dealt with "fairly and honorably."29

Finally,

in Count V the tribe sought an accounting from the
government with respect to its performance as guardian and
trustee of the tribe's funds, property, and other assets.30
In their prayer for relief, the Omahas asked the Commission
to revise all of their treaties and agreements with the
government so as to provide them "the reasonable and fair
- value of the lands so ceded," and to compensate them for the
depredations of the Sioux.31
The filing of the original Omaha complaint in August,
1951 initiated a two-year period of tactical skirmishing in
which the attorneys for the tribe and the government
exchanged numerous motions, replies, and other procedural
documents.

On October 6 , 1953, that "paper war" culminated

in a Commission Order requiring the Omahas to sever the
allegations of their original complaint into three
“JO
separately-docketed claims.
In compliance with that
order, the tribe filed amended complaints, entered as
Commission Docket numbers 225-A, 225-B, and 225-C.
Case 225-B became the "Winnebago cession" claim,
essentially reiterating the allegations of inadequate
compensation for the 103,000 acres ceded to the Winnebagos,
as set out in Count II of the original complaint.33

Case
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225-C was filed more than five years later, asserting the
tribe's claims for trespass and losses from Sioux raids, and
repeating the request for an accounting as previously
alleged in Counts III and V of the original complaint.34
Those proceedings meandered through the ICC machinery for
years, but both took a back seat to the much weightier
allegations of Case 225-A.
Filed on October 6 , 1953, the Omahas' amended complaint
in Case 22 5-A refined and greatly expanded the tribe's
original allegations relating to the 1854 Treaty.

It would

become the centerpiece of the Omaha litigation, engaging the
services of dozens of lawyers, anthropologists, historians,
geographers, and appraisers over the next seven years.

The

complex mixture of ownership issues, boundary
determinations, and valuation questions presented in Case
2 2 5-A illustrates the complexity of the ICC's burden and
offers a compelling explanation for the glacial pace of its
progress.
In order to understandably convey the ICC's handling of
the issues presented in Case 225-A, it is necessary to
examine both the convoluted provisions of the 1854 Treaty
itself and the prior interpretations of that treaty by the
Court of Claims and Supreme Court.

Pursuant to Article I of

the 1854 Treaty, the Omahas ceded to the federal government
all of their ancestral homelands located west of the
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Missouri River and "south of a line drawn due west" from the
confluence of the Ayoway and Missouri Rivers.35
2].

[See Map

The "Ayoway River" referred to in the treaty is the

stream now identified as Iowa Creek, which empties into the
Missouri River near present-day Ponca, Nebraska.

The

artificial boundary running west from its confluence with
the Missouri became known as the "Ayoway" or "due west"
line.

The ceded territory was bounded on the west by the

so-called "Shell Creek line," on the south by Shell Creek
and the Platte River, and on the east by the Missouri River.
The conveyed land totaled 4.5 million acres, for which the
Omahas were paid $881,000, or 19.6 cents per acre.
By the terms of the treaty, the Omahas retained all of
their traditional lands located to the north of the Ayoway
line, unless they found those lands unsuitable.

In the

event the Omahas deemed those "remainder lands" north of the
Ayoway line to be unsatisfactory for their permanent home,
they were authorized to exchange the northern acreage for a
portion of the ceded territory south of the Ayoway line.
The new location in the southern territory was to be no
larger than 300,000 acres.

If the Omahas opted to accept

the southern acreage, they thereby ceded to the government
all of their lands north of the Ayoway line, and were to be
compensated for that land at the same rate the government
agreed to pay for the southern cession, with an offset for
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MAP 2
The 1854 "Omaha Cession," with boundaries outlined in green,
and "Ayoway Line" in red.
Source:
Omaha World-Herald. May 4, 1958.
Despite its
"unofficial" nature, this map is far more useful in
identifying the land at issue in Case No. 225 than any of
the maps formally introduced before the ICC.
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the 300,000 acres chosen in the south.

Finding the country

north of the Ayoway line to be too close to the home range
of their eternal tormentors, the Sioux, the Omahas chose to
take instead a 300,000 acre tract in the Blackbird Hills
area of present-day northeastern Nebraska.

That property

(less the portion ceded to the Winnebagos in 1865) became
the present Omaha Reservation in Thurston County,
Nebraska.36
More than fifty years after the 1854 treaty, the Omahas
had still not been paid for the additional acreage north of
the Ayoway line that they had ceded by virtue of their
acceptance of the 300,000 acres south of the line.

In 1910,

they sought and received from Congress a special
jurisdictional act conferring authority on the Court of
Claims to hear and determine their claim for compensation
pursuant to the 1854 treaty.37

The Court of Claims

ultimately held that the Omahas' land north of the Ayoway
line had totalled 783,356 acres.38

Upon subtracting the

300,000 acres in the south that the tribe accepted for its
reservation, this left a balance of 483,365 acres for which
the government was obligated to pay the Omahas the same 19.6
cents per acre it had paid for the rest of the ceded land.
The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the Court of Claims'
decision, with some minor modifications, and the government
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ultimately paid the Omahas an additional $117,655.31 for
this "excess acreage" north of the Ayoway line.39
Based upon that tortuous history, the Omahas' petition
to the ICC in Case 225-A ultimately centered on two
fundamental assertions:

1.) that the 19.6 cents per acre

originally paid for their 4.5 million acres south of the
Ayoway line was "grossly inadequate" and "unconscionable";
and 2.) that the Court of Claims' judgment in 1918 awarding
the Omahas that same 19.6 cents per acre for their "excess
acreage" north of the Ayoway line was likewise
unconscionably inadequate.

With that framing of the issues

in place, the case moved forward into the first stage of the
ICC p r o c e s s —

the "title phase."

The title proceedings began with an exchange of motions
and briefs in which the parties debated the res judicata
effect of the prior Court of Claims and Supreme Court
opinions on the ICC's consideration of the Omahas' ownership
of the land in question.

In an interlocutory order entered

October 19, 1954, the Commission held that the Court of
Claims' decision in 1918 was controlling as to the
boundaries, the acreage, and the price paid to the Omahas
for lands ceded pursuant to the 1854 treaty.48

It further

held that the Court of Claims litigation had conclusively
established the Omahas' "Indian title" to the ceded property
north of the Ayoway line and the government was barred from
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attempting to relitigate that issue before the Commission.
As to the much larger cession south of the Ayoway line,
however, the Commission held that the Court of Claims'
decision had not conclusively established the Omahas' title
to the land conveyed.

Thus the Omahas were placed in the

rather novel position of having to prove to the ICC's
satisfaction that they had in fact "owned” 4.5 million acres
of land that they had already formally conveyed to the
federal government by treaty more than 100 years before.
Only after "proving” that which the federal government had
already implicitly acknowledged would the tribe be allowed
to address the issue of the appropriate valuation of the
property.
On September 27-29, 1955, an evidentiary hearing was
convened before the ICC to address the ownership question.
University of Nebraska anthropologist Dr. Frederick Champe
testified on behalf of the Omahas, while the government
relied on the opinions of Smithsonian archaeologist G.
Hubert Smith.41

Both experts conducted admirably extensive

research into the history of the Omaha Tribe in the disputed
territory, and they reached similar conclusions regarding
the facts of the Omahas' presence there.

On the legal issue

of "title” to the land, however, they came to diametrically
opposed conclusions.

Smith concluded that "At no time after

their arrival on the west side of the Missouri did [the
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Omahas] have exclusive control or possession of the area
involved.”42

(emphasis added —

"exclusive” control was the

ICC standard for determination of Indian title).

Champe, in

contrast, took the position that the Omahas had indeed
established exclusive possession of the area in question
since at least the 1750s, and that they therefore had
established compensable "Indian title" to the 4.5 million
acres.

He testified:

[The Omahas] were free to move about anywhere
within the area, except to stand off these raids from
the Dakota, and perhaps the Pawnee, or whoever; but
they had their farms near the various villages we have
indicated. . . . they hunted from the village locations
out along the southern side of the Niobrara into west
and north central Nebraska, and the intervening rivers
out along the Elkhorn.
At no time that I am aware, has [sic] any of the
surrounding tribes made any attempt to settle within
the [4.5 million acres in question] and I can only
conclude that the Omaha used and occupied that area as
they chose during that entire time, (emphasis added).43
Also appearing on behalf of the Omahas were Tribal
Council Chairman Gustavus White and Secretary George Grant.
Their testimony is a poignant reminder of the bleak
conditions on the reservation at that time, and the tribe's
aspirations for a better future.

White told the Commission:

I come here to represent my people in their
thinking, and what they have in their hearts. . . . We
hired these lawyers to fight for what we think is
rightfully ours.
And my people have prayed that they
will be given . . . what we think is rightfully ours.
And if we are awarded what is rightfully ours, my
people want to use this to better themselves, educate
our young ones, . . . and rehabilitate ourselves some
way. . . . This is a turning point of my people, and we
demand justice.4
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Ultimately, the ICC agreed with Dr. Champe on the issue
of Omaha title.

In an opinion rendered January 18, 1957,

Chief Commissioner Edgar Witt noted that "under cross
examination, Dr. Smith agreed almost in toto to the facts
and conclusions as testified to bv Dr. Champe.” (emphasis in
original).45

Accordingly, he ruled that the Omahas had

established, by use and occupancy, their title to the 4.5
million acres south of the Ayoway line.46

The case then

proceeded to the valuation phase.
Just as the title proceedings had turned into an
ethnographic and anthropological debate between the parties'
experts, the question of the appropriate valuation of the
Omahas' territory ultimately centered on the competing
opinions of the parties' real estate appraisers.

On

February 24, 1958, an evidentiary hearing commenced before
Commissioner Louis J. O'Marr to determine the fair value, as
of 1854, of the 4,982,097 acres of Nebraska real estate once
"owned" by the Omahas.47

As was the case at the title

hearing more than two years before, the parties' experts
presented starkly contrasting opinions.48

The government's

appraiser, William G. Murray, divided the Omaha tract into
five Classifications according to the quality and
desirability of the land in question.49

He then assigned a

sliding scale of values to the various classes, ranging from
$2.00 per acre for "choice sites along the Missouri and
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Platte River" to 10 cents per acre for "very poor land . . .
not suited for settlement."50

[See Figure 3].

Averaging

his figures across the total acreage, he arrived at a value
of 55 cents per acre, for a total value of $2,725,000.51
Naturally, the Omahas' expert disagreed with Murray's
conclusions.

During almost three full days of testimony

that would create 2 00 pages of transcript, appraiser W. D.
Davis vigorously advocated a substantially higher value for
the Omahas' cession.52

Arguing that the Omaha territory had

been considerably more attractive than Murray suggested, and
taking into consideration comparable sales figures for a
period extending some twenty years after 1854, Davis
ultimately arrived at a value of $1.50 per acre, for a total
recommended award of $7,437,100.53

Thus the ICC found

itself confronted with two widely divergent expert opinions
on valuation, with almost $5 million hanging in the balance.
Not surprisingly,

it chose a middle course between the two

extremes.
In a decision delivered on November 28, 1958, the
Commission criticized the opinions offered by both Murray
and Davis and reached its own conclusion on the valuation
issue.54

Writing for the ICC, Commissioner O'Marr held that

Murray's work had been too limited in terms of the evidence
considered.

Davis,

in turn, was chastised for considering

comparable sales and other valuation evidence that O'Marr
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1.

Choice sites along the Missouri and Platte rivers,
the southern end.

especially at

300.000 acres @ $2.00 an acre - $600,000
2.

High quality land, near Choice sites,
water transportation.

near timber and water and

700.000 acres @ $1.25 an acre - $875,000
3.

Medium quality land, near streams and some timber,
to water transportation.

but not close

800.000 acres @ 70 cents an acre - $560,000
4.

Poor quality land in 1854 period, Tittl e or no timber,
but not suited to settlement.

soil good

2.500.000 acres @ 25 cents an acre - $625,000
5.

Very poor land, no timber, hilly, soil poor, not suited
settlement and remote in distance from settlement and
access to water transportation.

to

650.000 acres @ 10 cents an acre - $65,000
Total

4,950,000 acres <§ 55 cents an acre

$2,725,000

I conclude that the value of the Omaha tract on the basis of the
evidence analyzed and presented was 55 cents an acre on March 16, 1854
or a total value of $2,725,000.

FIGURE 3

Government-hired appraiser William G. Murray's
"sliding scale" and final conclusion regarding the
valuation of the 1854 Omaha cession.
Offered in ■
evidence before the ICC in Case No. 225, February
25, 1958.
Source:

William G. Murray, Appraisal of the Omaha
Tract in Nebraska, 1854 (New York: Clearwater
Publishing Co., 1957) p. 131.
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deemed too remote in time to be relevant to the 18 54 value
of the Omaha cession.

Notwithstanding its criticism of both

experts' opinions, the Commission arrived at a figure that
i
was much closer to the government's position.
O'Marr held
that the appropriate valuation of the Omaha cession would be
75 cents per acre, for a total payment of $3,736,573.40.
Subtracting the previously-paid "unconscionable"
consideration of $975,739.54, the Commission ruled that the
Omahas were entitled to an award of $2,760,833.86, minus
whatever offsets were found to be appropriate.55
With the issuance of that order, the Omahas' ICC saga
moved significantly closer to a conclusion.

Although the

troublesome question of offsets remained to be decided, and
the separately-docketed claims in Cases 225-B and 225-C
remained pending, the general framework of a final
resolution was in place.

During the six months following

the Commission's November 28 Order, the parties exchanged
motions and proposed findings relating to the issue of
offsets.

The Omahas stipulated to a small offset of $25,000

for unspecified prior payments, but the parties clashed over
the government's claim for an offset based upon the payment
of $374,465 to the Omahas in 1926.

That payment had been

specifically authorized by special acts of Congress as
interest on the Court of Claims' 1918 judgment relating to
the lands north of the Ayoway line.

The government argued
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that the payment of that sum had been a "gratuitous"
offering to the Omahas,

for which it was now entitled to a

credit against the ICC award.

The Commission disagreed.

On

May 6, 1959, the Commission held that the 1926 payment to
the Omahas, having been mandated by Congress, was not
"gratuitous" within the meaning of the ICC Act of 1946, and
therefore would not be allowed as an offset against the
$2,760,833 award.

That decision became the final

dispositive order in Case 225-A.

The amount of the award to

the Omahas was established at $2,735,833.86 and a final
order was issued to that effect.56
In the weeks following the Commission's May 6 final
order, the government filed the usual complement of motions
to vacate or reconsider, all of which were denied.

On July

31, the government routinely filed its notice of appeal to
the Court of Claims.

If followed to its normal conclusion,

that appeal, combined with the pending claims in Cases 225-B
and 225-C (which had by this time evolved into Case 225-D),
might well have extended the Omaha litigation another
several years.

Fortunately for both sides, that dismal

prospect was averted.

During the late months of 1959, the

government and the Omahas took innovative steps to
consolidate and resolve all of the tribe's claims in one
final compromise settlement

109

On December 22, 1959, the government and the tribe
filed a joint "Stipulation of Settlement," in which they
agreed to a final compromise of all of the remaining
litigation between them.

The proposal encompassed the

tribe's still-pending claims in Dockets 225-B, 225-C, and
225-D, and the government's recently-filed appeal to the
Court of Claims in Case 225-A.

By the terms of the

stipulation, the Omahas agreed to accept $2.9 million in
full settlement of all claims set forth in Dockets 225-A
through 2 2 5-D, and the government agreed to dismiss its
appeal to the Court of Claims in 225-A.57
The filing of that proposed compromise settlement
presented the Commission with a situation it had not
previously faced in almost thirteen years of operation.

Its

handling of the proposal resulted in the enunciation of a
new set of operational guidelines for the approval of such
settlements in the future —

a procedure that would become

known as the "Omaha Rule."
In a landmark opinion delivered by Commissioner Arthur
Watkins on February 11, 1960, the ICC approved the proposed
compromise settlement and praised the Omahas and the
government attorneys for their efforts to bring the
litigation to a conclusion.58

Watkins noted that the

Commission's operations had become intolerably slow and he
urged other parties to enter into compromise agreements as
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"the best hope for the early settlement of hundreds of
claims still pending before the Commission.1,59

While

encouraging the use of compromise agreements like the Omaha
settlement, Watkins also professed concern over possible
abuses in the processing of such settlements which might
later lead to renewed Indian charges of bad faith or
dishonorable dealings.

To avoid such a result, the

Commission enunciated a set of procedural guidelines for the
negotiation and approval of proposed settlements, designed
to ensure "that the agreements are fair, understood, and
approved by a majority of the Indian tribe members,

[so]

that the Indians will accept the final judgments in good
faith."60
Specifically, the Commission's new "Omaha Rule"
required parties wishing to enter into a compromise
settlement to comply with the following steps:
1. On behalf of the Indian claimants, the original
compromise agreement was to be signed by the Tribal Council
Chairman, as well as all the individually-named petitioners
and their respective counsel.

On behalf of the government,

the agreement was to be signed by the Attorney General or
his designated representative.
2. The parties were to file a joint motion with the
Commission, setting forth the terms of the proposed
compromise and requesting a hearing on the matter.

^
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3. An open evidentiary hearing would be held before the
Commission.
4. At the hearing, the Indian claimants were directed
to present as witnesses the Tribal Chairman, Secretary, and
any other individual tribal members who wished to appear.
%

Those witnesses were to testify as to "what has been done by
them or the attorneys . . . to acquaint tribal members with
the provisions of the agreement."

In addition, the

Commission would require the parties to offer documentary
- evidence in the form of Tribal Council resolutions approving
the compromise settlement and authorizing the Chairman to
sign it on the tribe's behalf.

The government was required

to provide a letter from the Secretary of the Interior
approving the compromise.61
Finding that these procedures had been substantially
followed in the Omaha case, the Commission entered a "Final
Judgment" contemporaneously with its February 11, 19 60
opinion,

in which it approved the compromise agreement and

directed the government to pay the Omaha Nation the net sum
of $2.9 million in full and final settlement of all claims
it had asserted m

Case 225. *

On that same day, the

Commission issued a separate order authorizing the payment
of $217,900.25 to the Omahas' attorneys and $17,313.96 to
their appraiser, W. D. Davis, with both bills to be paid
from the $2.9 million judgment fund.63

The issuance of
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those orders brought the Omaha litigation in Case 225 to a
close.

A few procedural obstacles still remained, however,

before the Omahas would collect their judgment.
The 194 6 Act provided that final ICC awards were to be
submitted to Congress for the appropriation of funds for
64

payment. *

•

Prior to 1960, this had been largely a rubber

stamp process, with the judgment amounts routinely approved
by Congress and deposited into the Federal Treasury for
distribution to the tribes under the direction of the
Secretary of Interior.

Beginning in 1960, however,

Congress took steps to increase its oversight of ICC awards,
requiring special legislation for the payment of each
judgment, specifying the use and distribution of the
funds.66

The Omahas' award became ensnared in this

heightened Congressional scrutiny, creating another
significant delay before the tribe could reap the benefits
of its hard-won legal victory.
The ICC formally "reported" its judgment to Congress on
February 23, 1960.

Bills providing for the appropriation

and disposition of the Omaha award were then introduced in
both the House and Senate, followed by a period of over a
year and a half during which the bills were considered by
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the
House Indian Affairs Subcommittee.

During their

investigations, the Congressional committees sought input
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from the Interior Department and, more importantly, from the
Omahas themselves with respect to the anticipated uses of
the judgment fund.

As with most other tribes awaiting ICC

awards, the central issue facing the Omahas was how best to
distribute the ICC award —

through individual per capita

payments, or by "communal" investments in tribal programs
and resources.

67

The heated intratribal debate on that

issue would have far-ranging consequences for the Omahas,
including intense factionalization between on and offreservation tribal members, a redefinition of tribal
membership qualifications, and a dramatic turnover in the
membership of the governing tribal council.
The Omahas' decision regarding the distribution of
their ICC award came on March 8, 1961, when the Tribal
Council unanimously adopted a Resolution in which it
approved the provisions of the two bills then pending in
Congress for the dispersal of the Omaha fund.

Those

companion bills, House Resolution 5971 and Senate Bill 1518,
called for per capita payments of $750 to each enrolled
tribal member possessing "Omaha blood of the degree of onefourth or more," and provided that the balance of the
judgment fund should be used "as appropriate for the future
economic security and stability of the Omaha Tribe of
Nebraska."68

Upon Congress' receipt of the tribal

Resolution and a similarly favorable report from the
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Department of the Interior, the appropriation bills were
consolidated and passed into law on September 14, 1961.69
The statute established a four-month period for the filing
of new petitions for tribal membership, after which the
applications would be examined by the tribe over a three
month period for approval or rejection.

By January 14,

1962, Tribal Chairman Alfred Gilpin was predicting that
almost three thousand members would receive individual
shares of the judgment.70

Adult members would receive cash

payments of $7 50, while the shares owed to children would be
held in trust until each child reached age 21.
4].

[See Figure

The balance of the judgment fund was targeted for

economic and social improvement projects, to be determined
by the tribe and approved by the Secretary of Interior.71
In June, 1962, almost eleven years after the filing of
their original ICC complaint, the per capita payments were
finally distributed to each of the adult members of the
Omaha tribe.

For most of the Omahas, this tangible reward

from the long ICC fight was a welcome, but short-lived,
benefit.

Ed Zendejas, a tribal member who was a young child

at the time of the distribution, recalls the general
euphoria on the reservation as the checks were received:
"My grandmother was practically throwing dollar bills out
the window.

The general feeling was 'We're rich!'"

7

2

The

Walthill Citizen newspaper reported a "considerable increase
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.- L o u is A. Snur.scci (in head dre ss ),
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:it righ t. T h e m o n e y r e p r e s e n ts the
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FIGURE 4

Photo and caption from Omaha World-Herald, January 18, 1964
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in business activity" as many tribal members

used the cash

to buy clothes, furniture, or appliances.73

Others paid

off

old bills or made improvements to their homes, and many
parents indulged their children with new bicycles.74
Figure 5].

[See

Not all the recipients used their shares so

benignly, and one tribal member noted sadly that the
distribution had resulted in "too many drunks."75
While the impact of the per capita payments faded
quickly, the communal portion of the Omahas' ICC award was
earmarked for significant, and largely successful,

long-term

social and economic development programs on the reservation.
Among the initial projects utilizing the ICC fund were the
construction of three new family housing units and a new
multi-purpose community building designed to house
administrative offices, adult education classrooms,
conference rooms, and a large tribal meeting
•
room/gymnasium.

7

6

[See Figure 6],

In subsequent years,

funds from the ICC judgment were used, in whole or part, for
several other reservation projects,

including a new water

and sewage system for the village of Macy, a factory for the
manufacture of hydraulic tractor parts, a tribal hog
production facility, and the development of recreational
facilities designed to boost tourism on the reservation.

7 7

The U.S. Department of Interior would note several years
later that it was "most gratified with the effects of the
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Artist's rendering of the proposed Omaha Tribal Community
Building, constructed with funds from the ICC judgment fund
in Case N o . 225.

Phouo depicting one of the new tribal housing units, located
to the rear of an existing adobe structure.
Three such
units were constructed with the initial proceeds of the ICC
judgment fund in Case No. 225.
FIGURE 6

Source:

Omaha World-Herald. September 29, 1962.
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programming by the tribe for the use of the balance
remaining after the per capita distribution."78
Shortly after the ICC funds were received, Commissioner
of Indian Affairs Phileo Nash appeared at the Omahas' annual
pow-wow, and complimented the tribe on its handling of the
ICC fund.

7 Q

.

.

.

,

Nash specifically praised the tribe's

limitations on per capita distributions and the fact that
$40,000 had been set aside for educational scholarships.

He

urged the tribe to safeguard the childrens' portions of the
award and warned that those funds should not be disbursed
"in the child's early years before the full educational
requirements are known."80

Even as the majority of the

tribe basked in the good feelings generated by the influx of
long-awaited cash, however, rumblings of discontent were
heard from other quarters.
Although the Tribal Council's decision to approve the
distribution plan established by the Congressional
appropriation statute was unanimous, and had been reached at
an open meeting attended by approximately 200 adult members
of the tribe, not all the Omahas were pleased with the
dispersal program.

Tribal members who lived off the

reservation were particularly concerned,

feeling that their

needs and desires would not be taken into account in making
final decisions regarding the use of the "communal" balance
of the judgment fund.

As early as October, 1961, an off-
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reservation faction led by tribal member Clarence White
expressed misgivings about the distribution plan, demanding
that the Council "recognize their problems," and prepare "a
joint program . . .

to coordinate the off-reservation

Indian's development with his reservation brothers."81

Many

of these off-reservation members argued that the entire fund
should have been distributed per capita, believing that they
would realize little benefit from the on-reservation
•

.

•

•

Q O

improvements paid for by the undistributed balance. *
The tension and divisiveness escalated over the ensuing
months.

By October,

1962, the off-reservation faction had

become a unified and potent political force, which flexed
its muscle in the tribal elections held on November 5.
Voters ousted longtime Tribal Chairman Alfred Gilpin, along
Q O

with four other incumbent members of the Council. J
Ironically, the new Council and its Chairman Louis Saunsoci
had no better success in appeasing some of the offreservation members.

One year after the election, a small

group of Omahas living off the reservation was still
complaining that they were being treated like "outcastes" by
the Council, and threatening lawsuits because "you have
[our] money and are using it without [our] permission."

84

In addition to the acrimony created by the tribe's
distribution of the ICC funds, the "one quarter blood"
provision incorporated into the distribution statute became
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a source of great consternation for some Omahas.

As of

1961, approximately 2 00 persons with less than one-fourth
Indian blood were enrolled as members of the Omaha Tribe
pursuant to the provisions of the tribal Constitution
adopted in 1936.

pC

Moreover, Congressional investigators

determined that an unknown number of descendents of the
aboriginal Omaha Tribe were not formally enrolled as members
of the tribe, but were nevertheless entitled to share in the
judgment.
To bring closure to the issue, the Omaha legislation
called for the Secretary of Interior to create a new
membership roll comprised only of those persons meeting the
one-fourth Indian blood requirement.

The one-quarter blood

rule would then become the new standard for tribal
membership, and would be incorporated into the Constitution
by amendment.

By endorsing this procedure through its March

8, 1961 Resolution, the tribal council unilaterally revoked
the membership of some 200 individuals.

The ousted members

were not only eliminated from participation in the $750 per
capita distribution, but also were deprived of the various
other services and benefits available to tribal members.
Some of those 200 did not go quietly.
In August,

1962, one of the former tribal members who

had not been allowed to share in the ICC distribution
initiated a protest movement among disenrolled Omahas,
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culminating in a threat to seek an injunction prohibiting
further distributions of ICC funds.86

Although no

litigation actually ensued and the protest quieted rather
quickly, the ousted members' lingering resentment coincided
with that of the off-reservation faction to create an air of
intra-tribal tension and division that would remain for
07
.
,
,
years.
That lingering tension would be re-ignited several
years later when the Omahas received another influx of ICC
funds.
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NOTES

A complete examination of the insufficiencies in the preICC Indian claims process is beyond the scope of this paper.
Generally speaking, however, the creation of the U.S. Court
of Claims in 1855 initially opened the door for the
prosecution of certain types of claims against the federal
government, which previously had been barred by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
In 1863, however, Congress closed
even this limited avenue of relief to Indians by amending
the Court of Claims Act to exclude from its jurisdiction
claims based on violation of Indian treaties.
Thereafter,
the only way that Indian tribes could pursue claims against
the government was by the passage of a special congressional
act specifically allowing that particular litigation.
For
obvious reasons, such a system proved inequitable and
ultimately unsatisfactory.
Comprehensive analysis of these
problems is available in numerous sources, including the
seminal 1928 Meriam Report, and several modern commentaries.
See, for example, Lewis Meriam, The Problem of Indian
Administration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1928) pp. 805-811; John R. Wunder, Retained Bv The People. A
History of American Indians and the Bill of Rights (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 89-91; and William C.
Canby, Jr., American Indian Law. Nutshell Series (St. Paul:
West Publishing Company, 1988), 264-268.
2 Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946; U.S., Statutes at
Large 60 (August 13, 1946): 1049-56.
(hereafter ICC Act of
1946).
3 The Commission was originally designed to remain in
operation for only ten years, with all claims to be filed
within the first five years.
ICC Act of 1946. sections 12
and 23.
In light of the large volume of claims filed and
the extraordinary demands of the Commission's work, its life
was repeatedly extended by Congress, until it finally
expired in 1978.
^ Despite its amply-documented failings, even the most
bitter of the ICC's critics must concede that the Commission
did provide a viable, albeit imperfect, mechanism for
Indians to prosecute a wide variety of claims against the
government.
Virtually every recognized Indian group in the
country took advantage of the opportunity.
By the time of
its extinction in 1978, the Commission had heard and decided
almost 500 separately-docketed claims, with the Indian
claimants winning awards in 58 percent of them.
Harvey

124
Rosenthal, "Indian Claims and the American Conscience," in
Irredeemable America: The Indians' Estate and Land Claims,
ed. Imre Sutton (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1985), p. 67. The total amount awarded by the
Commission during its lifetime is a matter of some dispute
among the ICC commentators.
For example, Donald Fixico
asserts that the awards totaled $669 million, Rosenthal
estimates the figure to be "some $800 million," while
Francis Paul Prucha sets the amount at "more than $818
million." Whatever the precise figure, Prucha's observation
that the ICC awards did at least provide "a sizable
injection of money into the tribal economies, even though
the lasting effects of the sum were not great," seems to be
a reasonable and objective view.
Francis Paul Prucha, The
Great Father: The United States Government and the American
Indians, 2 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1984), vol. 2, p. 1022.
See also Donald L. Fixico,
Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy. 1945-1960
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), p. 186,
and
5 Harry S. Truman, Statement upon signing of The Indian
Claims Commission Act of 1946, August 13, 1946, Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S.
Truman. 194 6 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1962), p. 414.
6 This conclusion is almost universal among the ICC
analysts.
See, for example, Prucha, The Great Father, vol.
2, pp. 1022-23; and Wunder, Retained Bv The People, pp. 9193. Whatever doubt may have existed about the shift in the
ICC's philosophical underpinnings evaporated in 1960, when
Arthur Watkins was appointed to the Commission.
Wunder
accurately refers to Watkins as the "godfather of the
termination policy." Ibid, p. 112.
In some instances, ICC
awards were used virtually to extort tribal acceptance of
termination.
See Robert C. Carriker, "The Kalispel Tribe
and the Indian Claims Commission," Western Historical
Quarterly 9 (January 1978): 19-31, describing Senator Frank
Church's attempts to have the ICC's award to the Kalispels
withheld until the tribe agreed on a plan of termination.
7 Rosenthal's work is by far the most comprehensive
examination of the legislative history and operation of the
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See Harvey D. Rosenthal, "Their Day in Court: A
History of the Indian Claims Commission" (Ph.D.
dissertation, Kent State University, 1976).
An abridged and
updated version of his findings may be found in chapter one
of Sutton, Irredeemable America. In addition to Rosenthal's
work and that of Prucha, Wunder, and Fixico, generalized
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1022.
9
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calling the ICC a "self-defeating" institution and "a
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11 ICC Act of 1946. sec. 2.
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Most commentators suggest
that simple political expediency was behind the decision,
concluding that the ICC was "trying to avoid paying large,
politically unacceptable claims." See Leonard A. Carlson,
"What Was It Worth? Economic and Historical Aspects of
Determining Awards in Indian Land Claims Cases," chapter 4
of Sutton, Irredeemable America, p. 98; and Howard M.
Friedman, "Interest on Indian Claims: Judicial Protection of
the Fisc," Valparaiso University Law Review. 5 (Fall, 1970):
26-47.
Others have pointed to the impact of the Court of
Claims' decision in Loval Band or Group of Creek Indians v.
United States, 97 F. Supp 426 (Ct. Cl. 1951) and the Supreme
Court's decisions in United States v. Alcea Band of
Tillamooks. 341 U.S. 48 (1951) and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States. 348 U.S. 273 (1955), where the Court held
that, in the absence of statutory direction, the taking of
Indian land was not compensable under the Fifth Amendment,
and thus no interest was due.
See Le Due, "The Work of the
Indian Claims Commission," p. 14; and Wunder, Retained Bv
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15 For analysis
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of the Commission's
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chapter 4 in Sutton, Irredeemable America.
16 ICC Act of 1946. sec. 2.
17
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all of the ICC treatments previously cited, including
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R. White, "Barmecide Revisited: The Gratuitous Offset in
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18 As with other elements of the ICC story, the Commission's
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secondary literature.
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the Commission's processing of claims may be found in
Rosenthal, "Their Day in Court," pp. 157-158.
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22 Ibid., paragraph 16.
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"Betraying Their Trust," pp. 93-99.
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(192 0). The Supreme Court denied the Omahas' request for
interest on this award, holding that interest could be
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and favorably evaluated in U.S. Congress, Senate, Providing
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Omaha World-Herald. September 21, 1963, p. 2.
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See "Constitution and By-Laws of
the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska," March 30, 1936, Article II,
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Constitutions and Bv-Laws of the Indian Tribes of North
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Colorado, 1972): pp. 49-58.
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p. 2 .
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CHAPTER FOUR

"THIS MAY BE ONE OF THE MOST NERVE-WEARING, DIFFICULT
SITUATIONS TO EVER COME BEFORE THE COMMISSION"

ROUND TWO BEFORE THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION —

CASE 138

1951 - 1966

The Omaha experience before
Commission did not conclude

the Indian Claims

with the tribe's receipt and

distribution of the funds produced by the settlement of Case
22 5.

As that case wound its tedious way through the ICC's

procedural machinery, the Omahas also maintained an active
interest in another cause pending before the Commission.
That parallel proceeding,

ICC Docket 138, would eventually

be resolved in favor of the Omahas in a manner similar to
that of Case 225.

It would

consequences, both good and

also produce many of the same
bad, for the tribe and its

individual members.
As the docket number indicates, Case 138 actually
commenced several months before the tribe initiated its
claim in Case 225.

On July 20, 1951, the Omahas joined with

the Iowa Tribe and the Confederated Sac and Fox Tribes
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Three
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Nations") to file a petition seeking recovery of the fair
market value of each of the tribes' respective interests in
almost 10 million acres in what is now western Iowa and
northwestern Missouri.

While the Three Nations were co

petitioners before the Commission, their interests in the
case were largely separate and adversarial.

Indeed, the

tribes would ultimately expend nearly as much time and
effort in arguing cross-claims among themselves as they
would in establishing liability against the federal
government.

Taken together, the myriad claims and cross

claims in Case 138 presented the ICC with a bewildering set
of historical circumstances, such that one of the parties'
attorneys

would describe it as "one of the most nerve-

wealing, difficult situations to ever come before the
Commission.1,1
Despite the complexity of the legal issues and the
"shared" nature of the claims involved in Docket 138, the
case would ultimately produce a judgment of $1.75 million in
the Omahas' favor —

funds that would both benefit the tribe

and resurrect many of the same intratribal tensions created
by the award in Case 225.

Case 138 therefore represents a

significant and noteworthy chapter in the Omahas' modern
legal history, one that again illustrates the "mixed
blessing" nature of the ICC experience for individual
tribes.

In addition, an examination of Docket 138 is useful as
a classic example of the laborious tasks often faced by the
ICC.

In this proceeding, just as in many others addressed

by the tribunal in its 32 years of existence, the Commission
was asked to resolve a labyrinthine series of disputes
involving the interpretation of treaties and agreements
executed more than a century earlier, most of which were
impenetrably vague and contradictory even at the time of
their execution.

Notwithstanding the many legitimate

criticisms of the ICC and its operations,2 the Commission's
efforts to interpret those anomalies and to produce some
measure of justice for the long-suffering Native Americans
are certainly worthy of recognition.

Case 138 provides a

particularly useful example of that "expository role" played
by the ICC.
Omaha claims in Case 138 centered on the convoluted
provisions of treaties that the tribe executed with the
federal government in 1830, 1836, and 1854, as well as
treaties negotiated with other Midwestern tribes regarding
the same territory.**

The procession of events began in

1825, when the federal government intervened in the bloody
warfare that was then raging among a number of tribes in the
upper Midwest, primarily the Sac and Fox tribes of the Upper
Mississippi basin and the Yankton Sioux of southern
Minnesota.

Greatly oversimplified, the warfare involved
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incursions from the east by the Sac and Fox, and from the
north by the Yankton Sioux, into the traditional hunting
grounds of the less-aggressive Iowa, Otoe, and Omaha tribes
in the area of what is now western Iowa.
Seeking to avoid future difficulties between the
warring tribes, the federal government sought to construct
an agreement that would "promote peace among the tribes, and
establish boundaries among them and other tribes who live in
their vicinity, and thereby remove all causes of future
difficulty."4

The resulting treaty, concluded on August 19,

1825 at Prairies des Chiens in Michigan Territory,
established a southern boundary on Sioux territory, which
would become known as the "Article 2 line," and acknowledged
the respective interests of numerous other tribes in the
lands south of that line.
The Omahas were not parties to the 1825 Prairie des
Chiens treaty, although their interests in the area involved
in those negotiations would be expressly acknowledged by the
federal government and by most of the other tribes in the
ensuing years.6

By implication, the treaty also recognized

a Sac and Fox interest in the area south of the Article 2
line, although the Omahas would later argue before the ICC
that the Sac and Fox had "no proper claim to the area,"
since whatever interest they purported to have acquired was
based on conquest rather than aboriginal use as a
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traditional hunting ground.7

In addition, the 1825 treaty

committed the government to convene additional councils in
subsequent years to establish specific boundaries for the
various tribes' respective hunting grounds in the lands
south of the Article 2 line.8

Those future councils would

also obtain the assent of other tribes with interests in the
area, such as the Otoe and Omaha, who were not parties to
the treaty.9
The federal government took no immediate steps to
convene the promised additional councils and, predictably,
new tensions arose between the various tribes in the area.
By August,

1828, a bitter dispute had arisen between the Sac

and Fox tribes on the one hand, and the Omaha and Otoe
tribes on the other.

The Sac and Fox claimed that any

interests that the Omahas might have had in the Iowa lands
had been ceded to the former via the 182 5 treaty, and the
Sac and Fox threatened war against the Omahas and Otoes if
they continued to hunt in the area.10

The Omahas naturally

claimed that their historic interests in this land could not
have been extinguished at Prairie des Chiens since they were
not even a party to that agreement.

Hostilities also loomed

between the Sac and Fox and the Yankton Sioux, who also had
not assented to the 1825 treaty.
In July,

1830, the federal government finally made good

on the commitment it had made five years earlier by
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compelling representatives of the Omaha, Iowa, Otoe, Sac and
Fox, and various bands of Sioux to gather once again at
Prairie du Chien.

The ostensible purpose of that council

was to resolve the lingering boundary problems among the
tribes in the area, and thereby "remove all causes which may
hereafter create any unfriendly feelings between them."11
That benign intention notwithstanding, the treaty executed
at the 1830 Prairie du Chien council did far more than
simply resolve intertribal boundary disputes.

It resulted

in the tribes' unknowing "cession" of the entire area in
question in exchange for small government payments and
annuities.

This area would later earn the title of "Cession

151" among government policy makers.

[See Maps 3 - 6 ] .

The negotiation and execution of the 1830 Prairie du
Chien Treaty, and the events that followed its execution,
would become the linchpin of the Three Nations' claims in
the Docket 138 ICC litigation.

In their Petition to the

ICC, filed July 20, 1951, the tribes alleged that they had
been intentionally misled from the outset as to the true
purpose of the Prairie du Chien council.

While government

representatives purported to seek only peace among the
tribes, their actual goal had been to obtain the complete
extinguishment of all Indian claims to western Iowa in order
to open the area to unrestricted white settlement.

This

subterfuge, alleged the petitioners, was consistent with

139

M IN N E S O TA

.D A K O T A

WISCONSIN

V . . W*

av

j v

'^

| ( l „ , k „ . p U 3»

--

f A—
p
=W"v; v
'-r^vs
\
Ana m o w n

i'^r

TSiort!

• » |Jl -JO

-D2f-a-.no r\xt*-si

\hi

i Cnj

ZV<lT_:.

MISSOURI

MAP 3
Depicting portion of Cession 151 territory located in
present-day Iowa, with "Article 2 line" shown in red.
Source:
Charles C. Royce, comp., Indian Land Cessions in
the United States. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of
American Ethnology, Part 2 (Washington, D.C., Governmnent
Printing Office, 1899), Plate CXXXI, "Iowa 1."
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MAP 4
Depicting small portion of Cession 151 territory located in
present-day Minnesota.
Source:
Charles C. Royce, comp., Indian Land Cessions in
the United States. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of
American Ethnology, Part 2 (Washington, D.C., Governmnent
Printing Office, 1899), Plate CXL, "Minnesota 1."

MAP 5
Depicting the southernmost portion of Cession 151, located
in present-day Missouri, which would later become known as
the "Platte Purchase.”

Source:
Charles C. Royce, comp., Indian Land Cessions in
the United States. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of
American Ethnology, Part 2 (Washington, D.C., Governmnent
Printing Office, 1899) , Plate CXLIV, "Missouri 1"
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MAP 6
A "combination" of the preceeding Royce maps, depicting the
entire Cession 151 territory.
Source:
ICC. Docket 138, "Petition Relating to Lands in
Western Iowa and Northwestern Missouri (The Trust Lands),"
Briefs, Card 1 of 7.
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President Andrew Jackson's aggressive implementation of the
recently-enacted Indian Removal Act of 183 0, which
explicitly announced the government's intent to remove all
Indians from eastern lands and force them onto unsettled
western territory.12
Unaware of those underlying political motivations, the
Omahas and other tribes which gathered at Prairie du Chien
in July,

18 3 0 believed that the meeting represented merely

the government's "initial step . . .

in discharging its

obligations under the Treaty of 1825 to fix and establish
boundary lines," and that "a cession of lands would not be
13
required by [the government]."XJ

Interpreters were provided

for the tribes, but the Three Nations would later allege
that those translators were neither willing to nor capable
of providing the tribes with the assistance necessary to
negotiate on an equal basis with the government.14
The "plan" presented by government representatives,
ostensibly designed to settle tribal boundary disputes, was
in reality a masterful combination of strong-arm
intimidation and diplomatic obfuscation.

After first

compelling all the gathered tribes to sign a peace agreement
among themselves under threat of U.S. armed intervention,
the treaty commissioners "proposed" that the tribes
relinquish to the government "that portion of the country
between the Demoine [Des Moines] and Missouri [Rivers],
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which you all assert a right to hunt upon; to be allotted as
a common hunting ground."15

This proposal would give rise

to the fundamental misunderstanding upon which all the later
grievances arising out of the 1830 treaty would be based.
The Omahas and other tribes at Prairie du Chien believed
that they were ceding the land only for the limited purpose
of having it subsequently allotted and assigned back to them
based upon fixed and specific boundaries.

The government,

in contrast, viewed the cession as an outright
relinquishment of Indian title in exchange for agreed-upon
cash payments and annuities, with the land to be
subsequently used and distributed in whatever manner the
government might deem appropriate.
Specific language in the treaty can be utilized to
support both viewpoints.

The first sentence in Article One

provided that the tribes "cede[d] and relinquish[ed] to

the

United States all their right and title to the lands
[described]."

A subsequent passage in the same Article,

however, seemed to place significant limitations on the
government's future use of the land:
But it is understood that the lands ceded and
relinquished by this Treaty, are to be assigned and
allotted under the direction of the President of the
United States, to the Tribes now living thereon, or to
such other Tribes as the President may locate thereon
for hunting, or other purposes.1^
While the first portion of the underlined language was
consistent with the Three Nations' understanding of the
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purpose of the treaty, they would later allege that they
were completely unaware of the final clause in that passage,
purporting to give the President the right to settle other
tribes on the land in question.17
Laboring under these crucial misunderstandings, twelve
representatives of the Omaha Tribe affixed their marks to a
treaty that would ultimately lead to the loss of more than 3
million acres of the tribe's traditional hunting grounds
east of the Missouri River.

The consideration paid to the

tribe for this massive land cession amounted to $2500
annually for ten years, along with the government's promise
to provide the tribe with one blacksmith and $500 worth of
.

I

Q

agricultural implements. °

The Iowas and Sac and Fox

received identical payments.
It took only three years for the confusion surrounding
the meaning and intent of the 183 0 treaty to manifest
itself.

In a treaty executed September 26, 1833, the

government granted to the Chippewa, Ottawa and Potawatomi
Indians a five million acre tract which was entirely
. 1 9
encompassed within the Cession 151 territory.
That treaty
,

was concluded without the consent or knowledge of the Omahas
or the other tribes involved in the 183 0 agreement, and
without the payment of any additional consideration to those
groups.
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Although that unilateral action by the government
appeared to indicate that the United States considered the
land in question to have already been entirely ceded by the
Three Nations, the government contradicted that impression
by taking steps in the ensuing years that partially
acknowledged the continuing title of the Omaha, Iowa, and
Sac and Fox Tribes.

For example, in 183 6 the government

concluded a series of treaties with each of the tribes that
had been a party to the 18 3 0 agreement, whereby the Indian
groups relinquished their respective interests in the
southernmost portion of the Cession 151 territory —
that would become known as the Platte Purchase.20
5].

an area
[See Map

The Omahas' share of the payment for this cession

amounted to just $1,270.21
In subsequent years, the government continued to
acknowledge the title of the Prairie du Chien tribes to the
Cession 151 territory.

In 1837, the United States concluded

a series of treaties with the Sac and Fox and the Iowa to
relinquish their respective interests in the remaining area
of Cession 151.22

Likewise,

in April, 1838 the government

acknowledged the Omahas' continuing interest in the Cession
151 territory by negotiating a treaty in which they too
would have expressly ceded their title to the area, but that
treaty was never ratified by Congress.

Finally,

m

the

seminal 1854 Treaty with the Omahas, which established their
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reservation on the Nebraska side of the Missouri River, the
tribe formally relinquished its interest in the remaining
area of Cession 151 on the Iowa side of the river.24

The

total compensation paid to the tribe over the previous two
decades for the more than three million acres in question
amounted to $2 6,27 0, or less than 1 cent per acre.25

More

than 100 years would pass before that "purchase price" would
be adjusted upward.
The ICC petition jointly filed by the Omaha, Iowa, and
Sac and Fox Nations in Docket 138 on July 20, 1951 took full
advantage of all the potential theories of recovery provided
by the broad language of Section 2 of the 194 6 ICC A c t .26
In their First Cause of Action, the petitioners sought
revision of the 1830 treaty on several alternate grounds:
1.) that the treaty had been executed by the Three Nations
under duress; 2 .) that the tribes had been induced to sign
the treaty with the promise that the lands thereby ceded
would be allotted back to the tribes with precisely defined
boundaries; 3.) that the provision in the treaty purporting
to allow the President to settle other tribes on the land
was directly contrary to representations made to the tribes
at the Council and to the tribes' understanding of the
agreement; and 4 .) that the consideration paid to the tribes
was "nominal in amount and unconscionably small."

2 7
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The tribes' Second Cause of Action alleged that the
government's acquisition of the Cession 151 area constituted
a wrongful "taking" without just compensation in violation
of the Fifth Amendment, for which the tribes were entitled
to recover under Clause (4) of Section 2 of the A c t .28

In

their Third and Fourth Causes of Action, the Three Nations
employed similar language to seek recovery under Clauses 1
and 2 of the Act, generally providing relief for all claims
in law or equity against the United States.
Finally, the petitioners' Fifth Cause of Action invoked
the broad "fair and honorable dealings" language contained
in Clause (5) of Section 2 of the Act to attack a litany of
governmental transgressions surrounding the 1830 Treaty.
Among these were the failure to provide competent
interpreters and advisers, and the failure to inform the
Three Nations of the treaty provision which purported to
give the President the right to locate other tribes on the
Cession 151 lands.
After seeking and obtaining three separate extensions
of time, and being denied a fourth, the United States
finally filed its answer to the Three Nations' allegations
on June 2, 1952 —
had been filed.

almost one full year after the petition
The answer asserted the government's usual

panoply of standard defenses, including the assertion that
the government's dealing with the tribes "were at all times
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fair and honorable," and that the Three Nations had
"received a fair, just and reasonable compensation for their
purported claimed interest in and to said lands."29

More

specifically, but no less predictably, the government
asserted that the Omahas and the other tribes involved in
the 1830 negotiations had not maintained the necessary
"exclusive possession" of the Cession 151 area in the years
prior to the treaty.

Rather, the government argued that the

land had been "used by numerous groups or bands of Indians
as a common hunting ground and that no one group or band
used or occupied the land to the exclusion of other groups
or bands."30
In addition, the government took the unique position
that the "cessions" of land made by the various tribes in
the 183 0 treaty were in fact superfluous,

inasmuch as the

United States had already acquired full title to the area by
way of earlier cessions by these tribes.
government,

Thus, argued the

it had "acquired no additional right, title or

interest in and to said lands which it did not already
possess."31

Just as in Case 22 5, the Omahas and their co

petitioners would therefore be required to "prove" that
which the government had already explicitly acknowledged
through its course of dealings with the tribes over several
decades in the nineteenth century —

namely, that the Three
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Nations had possessed both a de facto and de jure
compensable interest in the Cession 151 territory.
With the issues thus framed by the parties' initial
pleadings, the case moved sluggishly forward through the
"title phase" of the Indian Claims Commission's
procedures.

After more than two years of reciprocal

discovery among the litigants, the "title hearing" commenced
before Acting Chief Commissioner Louis J. O'Marr and
Associate Commissioner William M. Holt on December 7, 1954.
Consistent with the typically glacial pace of the
Commission's proceedings, the witness testimony and
arguments of counsel would ultimately extend over three
separate sessions, spanning more than three years.
initial hearing in December,

1954 began with the opening

statements of the parties' respective counsel.
attorneys,

The

The

including I. S. Weissbrodt on behalf of the

Omahas, struggled to summarize the series of treaties
involved in the case and the complicated web of claims and
cross-claims.

Just as in Case 225 and most other ICC

proceedings, the "battle of the experts" then ensued.
To establish their title to the Cession 151 area, the
petitioners presented the testimony of Dr. Anthony F. C.
Wallace, an anthropologist from the University of
Pennsylvania.

Wallace testified that the Three Nations had

each maintained exclusive occupancy of a distinct portion of
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the tract, and that a reasonable interpretation of the
provisions of the 1830 treaty necessarily recognized those
respective interests.33

The government countered Wallace's

opinions with those of anthropologist and "ethno-historian"
Mildred Mott Wedel.

Predictably, Wedel testified that the

tribes in question had not established exclusive occupancy
of the disputed area, and that the Treaty of 1830 did not
give rise to compensable continuing interests in the land.34
Following the December 10, 1954 session, the hearing was
adjourned until February 23 of the following year, at which
time Wedel concluded her testimony.

The hearing adjourned

the following day, and the "paper war" commenced anew.
For almost two years after the hearing, the litigants
filed volumes of findings,

objections, motions, replies

other procedural documents with the Commission.

and

The

countless papers exchanged between the parties

during this

period reflected both the emotionalism and the

legal

complexity of the case, not only between the government and
the Indian claimants, but also between the claimants
themselves.
were,

The written cross-attacks among the petitioners

in some instances, even more bitter than the sparring

with the government's attorneys, as illustrated by a set of
"Objections" filed by the Sac and Fox on December 26, 1956.
In that memorandum, the Sac and Fox attempted to completely
exterminate the claim asserted by their Omaha co-petitioners
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by raising the same argument they had used against the
Omahas in the years leading up to the 1830 Prairie du Chien
council.

They argued that the 1825 Prairie des Chiens

Treaty had established the Sac and Fox and the Iowa tribes
as the only owners of the Cession 151 territory.

Omaha

claims to the land, therefore, could only be legitimitized
by "ignoring" the Treaty or blatantly mischaracterizing its
terms.

By such misrepresentation, the Sac and Fox claimed,

the Omahas thrust upon the Commission a "basic and material
error" of such magnitude that it "raise[d] a serious
question as to the adequacy and reliability of any or all of
the Omaha's [proposed] findings."35
Notwithstanding such internecine disputes and cross
claims, the case was

finally submitted to the Commission for

decision on February

15, 1957, following oral arguments of

counsel.

later, on July 31, 1957, the ICC

Six months

rendered its decision on the title issue.

It

was an

unqualified victory for the Omahas and their co-petitioners.
In its "Findings of Fact," the Commission expressly
held that title to the Cession 151 area was in fact vested
in the Three Nations, as well as the Otoe-Missouri, at the
time of the signing of the 1830 Treaty.

It found that, by

the pronouncements and actions of the officials conducting
the 1830 Prairie du Chien negotiations, and by its actions
following the execution of the treaty, the United States had
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acknowledged the use and occupancy of each of the tribes in
•
the area in
question.3 ft

The ICC also agreed with the petitioners' arguments
regarding the interpretation of the crucially troublesome
treaty language which purported to give the government the
right to settle other tribes on the Cession 151 lands.

The

Commission held that the government's subsequent grant of
land to the Potawatomi in 183 3 was contrary to the plan
under which the tribes had been enticed to execute the
Treaty.

The area was being ceded to the government solely

to allot it back only to those tribes whose interests were
being acknowledged therein.
With the question of general Indian title thus
resolved, the Commission was faced with the more difficult
task of establishing the specific interests of each of the
tribes in the Cession 151 area.

Writing for the unanimous

Commission, Chief Commissioner Edgar E. Witt noted, with
justifiable regret, that the tribes' conflicting claims and
the government's failure to abide by its promise to fix
their respective boundaries made the problem "even more
difficult now than it would have been at the time of the
Treaties of 1825 or 1830."37
Witt ultimately held, however, that the evidence had
established "with reasonable certainty" the parts of the
Cession 151 area that had been used and occupied by each of
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the claimant tribes.

The Commission therefore proceeded to

divide Cession 151 among the claimants as follows:

the Iowa

Tribe was awarded an undivided interest in that portion of
Cession 151 "lying easterly and southerly of the watershed
which separates the Nodaway and Nishnabotony Rivers in said
cession and extends from the Missouri River to the easterly
line of the cession about midway between the sources of the
Nodaway and Nishnabotony Rivers."

As to the remainder of

the cession area, the Commission determined that the
evidence was "not sufficient to make a division between the
areas used by the Otoe-Missouria, Omaha, and the Sac and Fox
tribes."38

Accordingly,

it held that each of those

claimants was entitled to "an undivided one-third interest
thereof."39 [See Map 7].
After the usual motions for rehearing on the title
issue had been filed and rejected, Docket 13 8 (now
permanently consolidated with the Otoe-Missouri's claim in
Docket 11-A) proceeded into the valuation phase.

Almost

four years later, on May 22, 19 61, a hearing commenced
before Chief Commissioner Arthur Watkins and Associate
Commissioners William M. Holt and T. Harold Scott to hear
evidence on the valuation question.

The evidence presented

in this phase of the case differed significantly from the
"battle of the appraisers" in Case 225.

While the

petitioners offered the testimony of several experts
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MAP 7
Depicting the approximate location of the boundary line
between the portion of the Cession 151 area assigned by the
ICC to the Iowa Tribe, and the portion assigned to the
Omaha, the Otoe-Missouri, and the Sac and Fox.
Source:
Charles C. Royce, comp., Indian Land Cessions in
the United States. Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of
American Ethnology, Part 2 (Washington, D.C., Governmnent
Printing Office, 1899), Plate CXXXI, "Iowa 1."

156

regarding land settlement patterns, topography, climate,
soil quality, and crop productivity in the Cession 151 area,
none of those witnesses affixed a firm valuation to the
land.40
The government,

in contrast, again presented the

meticulously-detailed work of appraiser William G. Murray.
Murray presented a 374-page report in which he analyzed the
value of the land at three different dates.41

For the

Platte Purchase area in northwest Missouri, comprising
2,041,000 acres, Murray assigned a value of 50 cents per
acre as of the date of the tribes' respective cessions in
September and October,
$1,020,500.

1836, for a total valuation of

For the western Iowa tract, comprising

8,338,260 acres, he assigned a value of 25 cents per acre as
of February,

1838, the date of the Iowa and Sac and Fox

cessions of that territory.

For the Omahas and Otoes, he

used a valuation date of April 17, 1854, and assigned a
value of 70 cents per acre.

[See Figure 7].

Unlike Case 225, the Commission was never required to
render a final decision on the question of value in Docket
13 8 .

Led by the Omahas, whose pathbreaking settlement in

Case 225 had produced the "Omaha Rule" for consideration and
approval of compromise agreements, each of the claimant
tribes in Dockets 138 and 11-A ultimately negotiated an
individual settlement of their Cession 151 claims.
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It is not surprising that the Omahas would have been
the first of the Docket 138 litigants to seek and obtain a
settlement.

The tribe had received its long-awaited payment

in Case 225 in June, 1962, just one year after the valuation
hearing in Docket 138.42

As the 138 litigation meandered

along with no end in sight and the Omahas realized the
tangible benefits of their settlement in Case 225, the
possibility of terminating their involvement in Case 138 in
a similar manner no doubt took on increasing appeal.

In the

months following the May, 1961 valuation hearing, the
Omahas' attorneys negotiated with government counsel in an
effort to reach a compromise regarding the tribe's claims.
The negotiations reached fruition in early 1964, when the
Omahas' claims were severed from those of the other tribes,
and the government agreed to pay the tribe $1.75 million in
full satisfaction of its claims in Docket 138.43
With that stipulated agreement in place, the stage was
set for application of the Commission's recently-enunciated
"Omaha Rule."

This provision established procedural

requirements for the approval of such compromises by both
the ICC and the tribal membership involved.44

The parties'

efforts to comply with those requirements are reflected most
vividly in the transcript of the ICC hearing conducted on
March 13, 1964, at which the Commission was asked to approve
the terms of the proposed settlement.

45
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Appearing on behalf of the Omahas were Assistant Tribal
Business Manager Francis Freemont, Jr. and Wilson Wolf,
Secretary of the Council.

Both men were asked to relate the

manner in which the tribal membership had been notified of
the proposed settlement, and the methods by which tribal
approval had been debated and ultimately obtained.

Freemont

testified that a meeting of the Tribal Council had been
convened on February 14, 1964, at which the tribe's attorney
had explained the terms of the settlement in detail, to the
unanimous satisfaction of the Council.

That acceptance was

formalized with the adoption of a Council Resolution
approving the settlement, a copy of which was offered into
evidence before the ICC.
Freemont further testified that the Council meeting was
followed on the same day by a meeting of the general tribal
membership, at which the terms of the proposed settlement
were again explained in both English and the Omaha language.
Freemont related the steps that had been taken to give
notice of the meeting to the tribal members, through
mailings, newspaper notices, and radio and television
announcements.

Minutes of that meeting were offered into

evidence, reflecting a vote of 228 to 2 in favor of the
settlement.

Both Freemont and Wolf were repeatedly asked

whether they felt that the tribal membership understood the
terms of the agreement, and whether the members felt the
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settlement was "fair and equitable."

Both witnesses

consistently answered "yes" to those questions.4^
In addition to its value as a demonstration of the
"Omaha Rule" in operation, the settlement hearing in Docket
138 is intriguing as an illustration of the hoped-for
"finality" of ICC decisions, and the evolution of the
Commission into an instrument of termination.47

The Omaha

representatives were pointedly asked, both by counsel for
the government and by Chief Commissioner Arthur Watkins
himself, whether they understood that the proposed
settlement would preclude the tribe from making "any further
claims of any kind or purpose or nature against the United
A
.
.
.
.
States."
When Freemont equivocated slightly in answering
Q

that question, Watkins and the government's attorney took
pains to elicit an acknowledgement from him that the time
for filing claims under the ICC Act had expired, and that
the tribe had no further pending claims before the
Commission.49

A similar acknowledgement of the "finality"

of the settlement was elicited from Wolf.50
The terminationist flavor of the settlement hearing was
even more directly revealed in the comments of Associate
Commissioner Scott at the conclusion of Wilson Wolf's
testimony.

After being told by the Omahas' counsel that the

tribe intended to distribute only a portion of the
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settlement proceeds on a per capita basis, reserving the
rest for tribal programs, Scott remarked:
That is mighty good news.
It isn't our objective
here, but there was a hope in Congress that the
settlement [of these] claims might have some influence
in bringing the Indians into the normal cultural
economic pursuits of life.
I mean, they are mighty
fine people, and [we need] any program that . . .
gives them an opportunity to become assimilated in the
formal pursuits of life.
We hope that eventually the Federal Government
will be relieved of the present and continuing
paternalistic burden, really I am not talking about
finances now, but upon the approach, the Indians
coming on out to normal life, standing on their own
feet, and becoming leaders and members of the various
communities throughout the country.
Wolf and Freemont did not respond to Scott's encouragement
of their future "normality."
Satisfied with the evidence of tribal consent presented
at the hearing, the Commission entered a "Final Judgment" on
April 14, 1964.

It approved the compromise agreement and

awarded the Omahas the sum of $1.75 million in final
settlement for its ancestral hunting grounds east of the
Missouri River.52

Though pleased with the result, the

Omahas' experience in Case 22 5 made them well aware that it
would still be some time before the money found its way to
C -J
the tribe's bank account.
Just as had been the case with the $2.9 million
settlement in Case 225, the Omahas were forced to wait more
than two years for the receipt of this new award.

By an Act

of June 9, 1964., Congress appropriated the $1.75 million
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necessary to cover the Omaha judgment.54

Those funds were

deposited into the U. S. Treasury to the credit of the
tribe, to be held in escrow with interest at 4% per annum,
pending the preparation and approval of a plan for their
distribution and use.

On April 19, 1965, the Tribal Council

approved a plan which, like the 1962 design, called for per
capita payments of a portion of the judgment fund, reserving
the balance for tribal economic development programs.55
On August 25, 1966, Assistant Secretary of the Interior
Harry R. Anderson submitted a report on the Omaha situation
to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
which was considering a pending bill for disposition of the
Omaha judgment fund.56

Anderson's report provides an

evaluation of the tribe's proposed distribution of the award
in Case 138, and a revealing assessment of the Omahas' use
of the funds awarded four years earlier in Case 22 5:
In general, the membership of the Omaha Tribal Council
has shown considerable sophistication in the
management of tribal affairs during recent years.
The
experiences of the Council in the handling of programs
established for the use of the previous judgment award
has proven a valuable one and a number of tribal
leaders show excellent leadership qualities. . . . The
Omaha Tribe has made excellent use of most of the
judgment funds awarded in 1960. . . . In general, it is
our feeling that the Omaha tribal members have gained
much valuable experience in the handling of their
previous award which will benefit the program
development of the present award.
Anderson's report detailed many of the social,
educational, and economic development programs funded by the
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award in Case 225, and concluded that the similarly proposed
distribution plan for the Case 138 fund should be
CO
approved. ° [See Figure 8 ]. Despite the generally
favorable tone of Anderson's evaluation, he stopped well
short of recommending that the Omahas be given total
autonomy in the use of their new judgment fund, and he made
it clear that the Omahas' success in the management of the
1962 ICC award did not mean the tribe was ready for
termination from its federal connection:
Despite the local activities stimulated by the use of
the past judgment fund a great deal remains to be
accomplished in terms of economic opportunities for the
Omaha people.
As was pointed out previously, the
unemployment level and resultant welfare caseloads are
extremely high. . . . Despite the forward strides being
made it is our feeling that there must be additional
time allowed for the tribe to gain the knowledge and
experience which is vital and essential in the
administration of complex tribal affairs.
These
qualities in the tribe must be assured before exclusive
supervision and control of the tribal estate can be
transferred to the tribe with confidence. . . 59
On November 2, 1966, President Lyndon Johnson signed
Public Law 89-717, authorizing the distribution of the Omaha
judgment fund, as proposed by the Tribe and approved by
Congress.60

Seven anxious weeks later, on December 23,

1966, each adult tribal member received a check for $270.

61

As with the 1962 award, payments apportioned to minors were
placed in a trust account for future educational purposes.
Shares were paid to 2,660 certified members,
resided on the reservation.62

1,279 of whom

Not surprisingly, a portion
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IN C O M E
Source

Fiscal yenr
1005 a m o u n t

Fiscal yenr
1QGG am ou nt

Interest, U .S . T rea su ry fu n d s.......................................... j ........................—
Land rentals.................................................. ..................................... _.....................
A w ard docket 1 3 8 ................................................................ ............... _...............................
Sale of sand and gravel...................................... ............ _............... ...................................
Sale of m aterials .................................. ......... ..................................................... .................
T rib a l fees............................... ......................... ................................... .....................................
O th e r ............................. ............................... ............................................................................

551,841
20, 506
1,750,000

582, 338
24,355

83

731
571
GO
11

T o ta l...............................................................................................................................

1,831, 430

108, 075

E X P E N D IT U R E S
Fiscal year
1005 a m o u n t

Use

Fiscal year
10GG am ount
advanced

I ’cr capita pavm cnts (P u b lic L a w 87-235)______________ ____________________
M em bership ro ll_______________________________________ ___________________
A tto rn e y fees and expenses (docket 138)____________________________________
Counseling expenses_______________________________________________________
F arm expansion program . _______________________ ____. . . _____. . . __ _______
Economic developm ent__________________________ _________________________
Scholarships___________ _________________________ ____________. . . . . . . . . _____
C o in m u n lrv Ijiiilrlln g ........ .................... ..
............ . .
..
A d m in istratio n ____________________________________ ;__________________________________
D iv id e n d paym ent _____________________________________________________________ . . .
C ap ital expenditures_______________________________________________________
T rib a l governm ent________________________________________________________

51, 030
780
133,820
3, 707
13,0<)0
10,000

3.300
40, 203

58, 842

T o ta l.................................................................................................................................

229, 243

175,102

13, 142
9,400

54,200
25,000
12, 500
3, 300
5, 550
64, S0Q

P ro g ram ing of ju d g m en t funds
P rogram

1961

1 OGG

am ou nt

proposal

Per capita p a y m e n t............................ ................. ............... ............... .................................
T r ib a l loan program _________ _______ _____ _________________ _____________
L a n d purchase p rog ram _____ _____________ ____ ___________________________
F a rm enterprise ep.xauslon....... ..................................................... ..................... ...............
In d u s tria l developm ent.............................. ............... ................... .....................................
Scholarship g ra n t_______ ____ ____
_________________________________
C o m m u n ity b u ild in g ____ _________ _______ ________________ ________ ______
A d m in istratio n and In itia l organisations_________________________________ _
T r ib a l sanitation projects__________________________________ _______________
T u rk and reservation program ______________________________________________
Im p ro v e m e n t of trib a l buildings and grounds__________ _____. . . . . . . . __ . . . .
Ilu rla l in3uranco program __________________________________________________
_____ ___________. . . . . . ______ . . . ____
Legal scrvlcc3_.. . . . . . . . . . .
..

i 52, 002, 500
150, COO
50, 000
0 5 ,0 0 0
2 5 0 ,0 0 0
40, 000
1 1 0 ,0 0 0
GO. 000
30, 000
0
0
0
0

J~$720, 000
0
200. 000
70 ,0 0 0
2 5 0 ,0 0 0
GO, 000
0
5 3 ,2 7 4
0
20, 000
10, ooo
40, 000
3 0 ,0 0 0

T o ta l.................................................................................................................................

2, 757, 500

1 ,4 6 4 ,1 7 4

1 $750 per capita to 2,GGO m embers.
1 L im it oI5270 per capita La present proposed b ill.

FIGURE 8
Schedule of income and expenditures for the Omaha Tribe,
fiscal year 1965-66, reflecting prior use of 1962 ICC
judgment distribution and anticipated use of 1966 judgment.
Source:
U.S. Congress, "Providing for the Disposition of
Funds Appropriated to Pav a Judgment in Favor of the Omaha
T ribe,11 S. Report 1683, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966,
Exhibit D. [ser. set 12710-5].

165

of the money was used for Christmas shopping, but most
Omahas reported that their shares wont toward rent,
groceries, clothing, and other necessities.
official observed to a reporter,
checks arrive.

One tribal

"You'll know when the

The vultures [bill collectors] will be here

first."63
While this additional ICC award was a gratifying and
much-needed addition to tribal coffers,

it also reignited

many of the same intratribal controversies that had been
smoldering since the 1962 ICC distribution.

In the months

leading up to the December, 1966 distribution, an offreservation faction led by Clarence White and Arthur
Springer organized itself as the "Land and Resources
.

.

Development Association."

A

The group leveled a series of

public charges against the tribal leadership, accusing the
Council of establishing a "dictatorship" that discriminated
against off-reservation members and ignored their plight in
the urban settings of Omaha, Lincoln, and Sioux City.65

The

Tribal Council, chaired once again by Alfred Gilpin
responded to the accusations with an ostensibly sympathetic
ear, but claimed that the tribe's ability to assist the offreservation members was severely limited by BIA
regulations.66

Winnebago Agency Superintendent Alfred

DuBray confirmed Gilpin's assertions.

6 7
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The tension between the on and off-reservation factions
would plague the tribe for years, resulting in sporadic
intra-tribal political and legal upheavals following the
final ICC distribution in 1966.68

To a significant extent,

those differences remain a problem within the tribe to this
day, as some off-reservation members feel a continuing sense
of isolation from the decision-making process.

Ed Zendejas,

an attorney and tribal member who lives off the reservation,
recently voiced that frustration, asserting that "once you
- leave the reservation, you're ignored with respect to the
CQ
use of tribal revenues."
That exclusion is grounded m
the language of Article V, section 1 of the Omaha Tribal
Constitution, which provides that only members who reside on
•
•
• elections. 7 n
the reservation
may vote in Tribal
Council
Zendejas proposes that the tribe issue "ownership share
certificates," comparable to corporate stock, to all
enrolled members, whether they lived on or off the
reservation.

Holders of certificates would be entitled to

vote on a "Board of Directors," which would control tribal
revenues in conjunction with the separately-elected
Council.71

It is uncertain when or if such a proposal might

be acted upon by the Council,
While those types of negative repercussions of the ICC
awards should not be minimized,

it seems difficult to

dispute the conclusion that the ICC experience was a
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valuable one for the Omaha Tribe.

The funds generated by

the two Commission judgments were, by and large, put to
beneficial use by both the individual members and the tribe
at large.

The educational, economic, and social improvement

projects funded by the Commission awards almost certainly
would not have been possible without the ICC litigation.
While it is a legal truism that "justice delayed is justice
denied," it may be argued with equal force in the Omahas'
case that "justice delayed is better than no justice at
all."
Perhaps just as significantly, the successful
resolution of the tribe's ICC litigation may have given it
valuable insight into the rewards available to it on the
judicial battleground.

Even as it celebrated its 1966 ICC

award in the new community building paid for by its 1962
judgment, the tribe was setting its sights on an even more
ambitious legal fight.

This would be a struggle in which

the Omahas would seek not merely monetary compensation for
past injustices, but the actual reacquisition of land that
the tribe felt still belonged to it.72
Blackbird Bend loomed on the horizon.

The Battle of
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CHAPTER

5

"THE RIVER WILL RUN RED."
*

*

*

*

THE BATTLE OF BLACKBIRD BEND
1966 - 1995

Buoyed by the success of its claims before the Indian
Claims Commission, the Omaha Tribe soon turned its attention
to an even more ambitious legal battle.

Beginning in 1966,

the Omahas sought to regain possession of more than 11,000
acres situated east of the Missouri River, which the tribe
claimed had been a part of its reservation before changes in
the river channel moved the land to the Iowa side.

The

ensuing judicial odyssey would span almost thirty years, and
would become so emotionally charged and legally complex that
it would make the tribe's ICC claims seem almost mundane by
comparison.
The results of the Iowa land claims battle, which became
known as the "Blackbird Bend litigation," cannot be captured
in simple terms of a legal "victory" or "defeat."

While at

first glance the twelve published court decisions seem to
indicate that the Omahas succeeded in their quest fur the
return of their land, the tribe was, in fact, bitterly
disappointed with the final outcome of the litigation.

The
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Omahas ultimately obtained title to only a small portion of
the total acreage they claimed, and they felt that they were
the victims of fraud by the federal judiciary and the
Department of Justice throughout the proceedings.
Yet the Omahas' opponents could not be wholly satisfied
with the legal outcome either.

For the white farmers in

Iowa who had asserted title to the land prior to the
litigation, the loss of even a single acre was a bitter pill
to swallow.

Even those Iowans whose title to the property

was ultimately upheld by the courts incurrred substantial
legal expense and endured years of uncertainty as the cases
made their way through the court system. .
The Blackbird Bend litigation has received substantial
attention in both the academic and popular press, and it is
a subject of national import on several levels.

In its most

"technical" aspects, the Blackbird Bend proceedings produced
significant judicial statements on the arcane subject of
riparian landowners' rights, as those rights are affected by
the complex geological actions known as "accretion" and
"avulsion."1

In addition, the Blackbird Bend cases required

the courts to interpret and apply a federal statute adopted
in 1834 which gave a clear judicial preference to Indian
claimants in any boundary disputes with "white persons."
That statute had never previously been invoked or
interpreted by the courts, and its constitutionality and
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applicability to the Blackbird Bend dispute became the
subject of substantial debate, both among the parties and in
the academic press.
On another level, the Blackbird Bend litigation
provides valuable insight into the often-overlooked "human"
dimensions of legal issues relating to land ownership.

Both

the Omahas and the Iowans pursued their claims with a dogged
determination that occasionally approached violence,
offering stark evidence of the deep emotional bonds that tie
persons to the lands of their ancestors.

That emotionalism

grew stronger as the litigation weaved its way through the
court system, belying the staid legal concepts at issue in
the cases.
Blackbird Bend also offers another opportunity to
examine the "localized" impact of federal Indian policy,
this time in the context of the federal government's
paternalistic role as the continuing "trustee" of Indian
lands.4

The court documents, transcripts, and other records

pertaining to the litigation reveal an extremely
antagonistic relationship between the Omahas and the
government attorneys who were bound by law to act on the
tribe's behalf.

Throughout the proceedings, the Omahas

found themselves "represented" by officials who did not
share their view o f the facts or law, and whose "assistance"
the tribe would have much preferred to do without.

Those
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conflicts are not readily apparent in the published judicial
decisions rendered in the Dlackbird Bend cases, nor were
they significantly discussed in the contemporary news
accounts or academic analysis of the proceedings.

For the

Omahas, however, they were every bit as much a part of the
Blackbird Bend story as the decisions themselves.
Although actual litigation would not commence until
1975, the Omahas began giving formal notice of their claims
to the Blackbird Bend area as early as 1966.

In February of

that year, Tribal Chairman Alfred Gilpin first indicated
that the Omahas had "staked their claim" to the Iowa land
with Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officials, and that
"action was pending" on the matter.5

The tribe's stated

objective was to gain "official recognition" of the land as
a part of the Omaha Reservation.

That initial claim

encompassed three full sections and parts of three others,
as the area was then platted by the State of Iowa.

[See Map

8 ].

From the beginning of the dispute, the Omahas' claims
were grounded in the language of their seminal 1854 Treaty,
in which they ceded the remainder of their traditional
hunting grounds on both sides of the Missouri River for a
g
300,000 acre reservation in northeastern Nebraska.
The
precise acreage set aside for the Omaha Reservation was not
formally established until 1867, when the boundaries were
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surveyed for the General Land Office by T. H. Barrett.7

The

"Barrett Survey" established the eastern boundary of the
reservation as the "centre" of the Missouri River's main
channel. 8

•

At the time of the survey, the reservation

acreage included a thumb-like "meander lobe," or peninsula,
jutting east from Nebraska into Iowa and known as "Blackbird
Bend."

[See Map 9],

Over the next seventy years, until the

river channel was stabilized by the Corps of Engineers in
the 194 0s, the river would move back and forth over the
Blackbird Bend lands, ultimately "straightening" itself to
the west and south and leaving the Blackbird Bend lobe on
the Iowa side of the river.

Because that land was cut off

from the remainder of the reservation, non-Indians in Iowa
gradually took control of the property.
In asserting its claim to those Iowa lands, the Omaha
Tribe was about to be swept up into another judicial
maelstrom —

one that would weave an incredibly complex

trail through the federal court system over a period of
almost twenty years.

In addition to the Supreme Court's

review of the dispute, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
would address the case on seven separate occasions, and the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Iowa
would render four separate published opinions in the cases.
As with the Omahas' ICC claims, the Blackbird Bend
litigation would yield only a partial redemption of the
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tribes' historic claims, but would create far-ranging
consequences for the tribe's future.
The Omahas' "notice" to the BIA in early 1966 produced
no immediate results.

In December of that year, the tribe

announced that the matter was "in the hands of their
attorneys" for the possible filing of a lawsuit to reclaim
i n .
.
.
.
the land. u Despite that hint of immediate action, the
issue lingered for several more years, while the tribe
conferred with BIA officials and Interior Department
attorneys regarding the details and merits of their claim.11
In August,

1972, Nebraska Senators Roman Hruska and

Carl Curtis, and Representative Charles Thone delivered a
letter to Indian Commissioner Louis Bruce, asking the BIA to
allocate $50,000 to help settle the simmering boundary
dispute along the river.

Bruce was advised that the Omaha

and Winnebago Tribes claimed as much as 9,000 acres on the
Iowa side of the river, which was "being used for private
gain by Iowa farmers and the state government."13

Before

the BIA's bureaucratic machinery plodded into action,
however, the burgeoning spirit of Indian political activism
that swept the United States in the early 1970s found its
way to the Omaha Reservation, bringing the Blackbird Bend
dispute to a potentially dangerous head.
On April 3, 1973, twelve carloads of Omaha Indians
moved onto a portion of the Blackbird Bend lands in Monona
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County, Iowa.

Led by former (and future) Tribal Chairman

Edward Cline, the "occupying force" pitched several teepees
and tents on the site, announcing their intention to remain
camped on the land indefinitely, and to farm it for tribal
benefit.14

[See Figures 9 - 12].

Most of the group

identified themselves as members of the American Indian
Movement (AIM), an organization that had achieved nationwide
notoriety in the preceeding years as an aggressive
instrument for the advocacy of Indian rights.

Indeed, the

- AIM-backed occupation of Blackbird Bend followed closely

on

the heels of the group's most renowned action — the Indian
occupation and subsequent government siege of the village of
Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation in South
Dakota.15
With the violence at Wounded Knee fresh in everyone's
mind, both Indians and white officials expressed hope that
Blackbird Bend "would not turn into another Wounded Knee."16
Tensions ran high, as Cline informed authorities that the
Omahas, although unarmed, would resist efforts to remove
them from the land.

Two days after the occupation began,

the Indians met at the site with a group of attorneys
representing the purported "owners" of the land.

The thirty

minute conference resulted in no appreciable change in the
parties' positions.

The attorneys maintained that their

clients had obtained title to the land through several
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FIGURE 9
Photo and caption from Sioux City Journal. April 6 , 1973.

Treaty

A

M a t th e w S h e r id a n ,
a member
of the
O m aha In d ia n T rib e
o f M acy a n d A m e r i c a n
Indian
Movement
d i r e c t o r t h e r e , d is 
plays
a
framed
p h o to c o p y o f what he
said is the 1 8 5 4 treaty
under
which
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O m a h a s c la im lan d
now on the Io w a side
of the M i s s o u r i R ive r.
H e ’3 t a l k i n g to J o u r n a l
reporter
Bob
G u n s o lle v .

FIGURE 10
Photo and caption from Sioux City Journal, April 6, 1973.
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Photo and caption from Sioux City Journal, April 6,
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FIGURE 12
Photo and caption from Sioux City Jour n a l , April 6, 1973
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"quiet title" actions prosecuted in the Iowa state courts in
previous years.17

Cline and the other Omahas argued that

those decisions had no effect on the tribe's ownership of
the land since the Omahas had not been named as an
interested party in the suit, and the Iowa courts had no
jurisdiction over an Indian reservation.

The occupiers also

told reporters that they would "defend our land the way you
would defend your home," and blamed the federal government
for failing to protect the tribe's interests when the land
had been slipping into white control.18
Several weeks later, Cline and two other men involved
in the occupation were arrested on larceny charges by the
Monona County Sheriff's Department.

The arrests stemmed

from the men's picking corn that was growing on the disputed
land, and which had been planted by the Iowa "owners."19
While the other two men were released routinely on bond,
Cline chose to remain in jail, and was released five days
later after a preliminary hearing.

The charges against the

men were referred to the Monona County grand jury to
OA
determine whether indictments were warranted. w
While those criminal proceedings were pending, one of
the white claimants, Harold Jackson,

initiated a civil

action against Cline and the other occupying Indians to try
to regain possession of the land.

The matter was heard on

May 7 by Monona County District Judge Donald Pendleton.

21
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Nine days later, Pendleton issued an order requiring Cline
and the other Omahas to vacate the land, pending further
hearings on the question of actual ownership of the
property.22

This opening skirmish in the Battle of

Blackbird Bend quickly subsided as Cline and his compatriots
left the property before Monona County Sheriff Albert Wood
arrived to formally serve them with Pendleton's order.23
It is apparent that the Omahas were not sufficiently
funded or unified to sustain this initial 1973 occupation of
the Blackbird Bend lands.

Because the AIM-sponsored action

was not endorsed by the Omaha Tribal Council, Cline and the
other AIM members were forced to look elsewhere for
financial assistance.24

When that effort failed, the

occupiers retreated, but they remained committed to the goal
of gaining the disputed lands.
Meanwhile, the BIA, which had been asked to address the
matter more than seven years earlier, finally lurched into
limited action.

Wyman Babby, Aberdeen Area Director for the

BIA, requested a formal opinion on the question of title
from the Solicitor of the Department of Interior.25
the issuance of that opinion in February,

With

1975, and a change

in the leadership of the Tribal Council during the interim,
the stage was set for the Omahas to return to Blackbird
Bend.
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On April 2, 197 5, members of the tribe re-occupied the
Blackbird Bend lands.

Several key elements distinguished

this effort from the short-lived 1973 sit-in.

First and

most significantly, the 1975 occupation was fully endorsed
by the Omaha Tribal Council, which was now chaired by the
leader of the failed 1973 action, Edward Cline.

Whatever

AIM presence may have remained from 1973 was no longer
visible in 1975, and the tribe presented a unified and
cohesive front in asserting its right to the land.26

Signs

were erected around the property reading "Boundary line
Omaha Indian Reservation.

No trespassing.

Federal law

prohibits damage or removal of this sign.
prosecuted.

,

.

9

7

Violators will be
.

Omaha Tribal Council.11^

The occupiers

constructed a small heated cottage on the property and
prepared for a long stay.

[See Figure 13].

The 1975 occupation was also directly supported by BIA
officials, buttressed by the long-awaited Interior
Department opinion in which the federal government formally
asserted Indian title to the property.

O

Q

.

That opinion,

authored by Interior Department Solicitor Kent Frizzell,
declared that the disputed lands had been a part of the
Omaha Indian Reservation since 1854, and that title should
be vested in the United States as trustee for the tribe.

29

Based on that opinion, BIA attorney Herbert Becker publicly
reiterated the Omahas' original argument that the earlier
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"quiet title" actions in the Iowa state courts had not
resolved the question of title to the property, since
neither the Omahas nor the federal government had been named
as parties in that suit.30

Beyond Frizzell's assertion of

Indian title to the property, however, there was little
agreement between the Omahas and the federal government on
any other issue relating to the Blackbird Bend dispute.
Indeed, from that point on, the tribe would find itself
spending nearly as much time battling its purported
governmental "representatives" as it would in fighting the
purported Iowa "owners" of the land.
The BIA's initial proposal for solving the Blackbird
Bend problem was for the Iowa claimants to simply lease the
land from the federal government as trustee for the tribe,
and to continue to farm it as they had been doing during the
previous decades.

Not surprisingly, this proposal held

little appeal for either the Omahas or the Iowa farmers.
The Omahas did not want to lease to the Iowa claimants,
since the tribe's constitution mandated that tribal members
.
.
.
be given first
priority
m

•
the awarding
of leases. 31

For

their part, the Iowans expressed little interest in renting
land that they believed they had owned for generations.

3 2

Even if the Omahas had been amenable to the BIA's
leasing proposal, significant disagreements remained over
the specific mariner in which Omaha title to the property
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would be formally established.

BIA attorneys advised the

Omahas that court action would be required to fully
establish the tribe's ownership.

They reasoned, with

substantial logic, that the Iowa claimants would not agree
to being ousted without first having their day in court.33
Having waited almost ten years for the government to take
action on their claims, however, the Omahas were in no mood
to wait for the courts to grind their way to a decision in
the case.
In a meeting with BIA Commissioner Morris Thompson and
Interior Department attorneys shortly after the 1975
occupation began, Edward Cline and other tribal officials
resisted the attorneys' efforts to convince them to vacate
the land while the government prosecuted an action on the
tribe's behalf.

Cline asked,

make like we own it?
people.

"Why can't we go ahead and

We're not going to hassle these

But we are prepared to defend ourselves."34

Acknowleging that the BIA should have resolved the matter
years earlier, but also believing that violence and
bloodshed were imminent, Interior Department Solicitor Kent
Frizzell begged the Omahas to leave the property and give
him a chance to fight their battle in court "with clean
hands."35

Cline reluctantly agreed to discuss Frizzell's

recommendations with the full tribal membership, but the
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Omahas did not move off the property, and even bigger
disagreements with the government attorneys loomed.
On May 19, 197 5, the U.S. Department of Justice, acting
in the capacity of trustee for the Omaha Tribe, filed suit
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa
seeking to establish that approximately 2,900 acres within
the original Barrett Survey of the Blackbird Bend meander
lobe belonged to the Omaha Tribe.36

In its complaint,

docketed as Case No. C75-4024, the government also asked for
immediate injunctive relief allowing the tribe to maintain
control of the land it had occupied since April 2.
The Omahas were outraged by the unilateral action taken
by their purported "trustee."

The tribe viewed the

government's claim as precipitous and unduly "constricted,"
asserting Omaha title to only a fraction of the total
acreage that the tribe felt it owned.

More grievously, the

Omahas believed that the Department of Justice attorneys
were acting in concert with Iowa state officials and the
"politically and financially powerful squatters occupying
the Tribe's lands" to defraud the tribe.37
Kent Frizzell defended the government's action as a
legitimate attempt to forestall violence and bloodshed at
Blackbird Bend.38

In a letter to Cline, Frizzell wrote:
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I can appreciate the tribes's justifiable frustration
after 40 years of trying to secure department support
for for its title claim.
I cannot be responsible for,
nor can I justify, past inaction.
By the same token, I
cannot rectify the consequences of that action
overnight.
Courts exist so as to settle controversies
in an orderly fashion.
The alternative to such
settlement is too often bloodshed. 0
On the day after the government filed its "quiet title"
action in Case 4024, the tribe filed a complaint of its own,
prepared by private counsel John T. O'Brien of Sioux City,
Iowa, asking that the Iowa claimants be restrained from
interfering with the tribe's possession of'the land.40

That

suit, docketed as Case No. C75-4026, did not seek to "quiet
title" to any of the disputed land, because the Omahas did
not feel that all the preparation had yet been completed to
conclusively establish their ownership of all the land.
Rather, the tribe sought only to maintain its occupancy of
the land and, more importantly, to serve notice of the
Omahas' strong opposition to the "constricted" complaint
filed on their "behalf" by the federal government on the
previous d a y .41
Two weeks later, the Omahas filed a motion to dismiss
the government's complaint in Case 4 024, arguing that the
tribe's interests were not being adequately represented in
that proceeding.42

In a tribal resolution attached to the

motion, the Omahas contended that they had been "grossly and
completely abandoned by the Department of Justice," and that
the Attorney General and Secretary of the Interior had
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breached their trust responsibilities by secretly acting in
concert with the Iowa claimants.43
The Indians argued that the U.S. attorneys who
prepared, filed, and prosecuted the complaint in Case 4024
had limited the tribe's claim to only 2,900 of the total
6,390 acres within the Blackbird Bend lobe, and had
completely abandoned the Omahas' claim to approximately
5,000 additional acres in two areas north of Blackbird Bend,
known as the Monona Bend and Omaha Mission Bend tracts.44
. The Omahas' anger was exacerbated by the fact that the
United States Attorney who filed the complaint in Case 4024,
Evan L. Hultman, had previously served as Attorney General
for the State of Iowa.

In that capacity, Hultman had

represented the state in earlier disputes with the current
Iowa claimants of the Blackbird Bend area.

That litigation

had been settled by dividing the Blackbird Bend lobe among
the non-Indian claimants and the state, with the result that
the State of Iowa itself now claimed title to about 700
AC
acres of the land sought by the Omahas.
On June 5, 1975, Federal District Judge Edward J.
McManus consolidated the two cases for hearing on the
requests for injuctive relief, and granted the Omahas a
preliminary injuction allowing them to continue their
occupancy of the land during the pendency of the litigation.
McManus' order also required, however, that all proceeds
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from the tribe's farming operations on the land be deposited
with the court and held in escrow until title to the
property could be determined.46
Several weeks later, Judge McManus denied the Omahas'
motion to dismiss the government's complaint, holding that
the tribe's arguments regarding United States Attorney
Hultman's conflict of interest were "without merit at this
time."47

The Omahas viewed this as simply another example

of the governmental conspiracy against them, inasmuch as
McManus had been the Lieutenant Governor of Iowa at the time
of the earlier intra-state litigation regarding the
Blackbird Bend lands, and was thus well aware of Hultman's
prior connection to the case.

Over the ensuing years, the

federal courts would repeatedly reject the tribe's
continuing allegations of fraud and conspiracy among the
government attorneys, often imposing sanctions on the tribe
for repeatedly raising what the courts deemed to be
AO
"frivolous" claims. ° Nevertheless, the fraud charges would
resonate throughout the extended course of the litigation,
creating a disturbing atmosphere of hostility that would
ultimately contribute to the dismissal of the tribe's claims
for most of the lands it sought.
By October,

1975, the Omahas had completed the

preparation of their claim for all the Iowa land to which
they felt entitied.

On October 6, attorney John T. O'Brien
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filed the tribe's second independent complaint in the
Blackbird Bend proceedings.

In the new action, docketed as

Case No. C75-4067, the Omahas named nearly 100 separate Iowa
landowners as defendants, and asserted title to three
separate tracts of land totaling 11,300 acres on the eastern
49

side of the river. 7

.

Tract One encompassed an additional

3,490 acres within the Blackbird Bend meander lobe (in
addition to the 2,900 acres within the Barrett Survey
claimed for the tribe in the government's suit).
10].

[See Map

Tract Two was the "Monona Bend" area located north of

Blackbird Bend, comprising 4,185 acres.

Tract Three was a

72 5 acre parcel farther to the north known as "Omaha Mission
Bend."

[See Map 11].

In addition, the tribe's complaint

asked for damages in the amount of $50 million for the
defendants' wrongful use of the land over the previous fifty
years,

in contrast to the government's complaint for the

Omahas which sought no monetary relief.
As the dozens of Iowans named in the Omahas' complaint
were served with court notices in the case, tensions rose
again.

Some of the defendants joined forces to hire former

Iowa Congressman Wiley Mayne as their attorney, and all
expressed a common resolve to fight for the land they had
farmed for generations.

One of the named defendants, Mrs.

Howard Miller, voiced a common sentiment:
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MAP 10
Depicting the additional acreage within the Blackbird Bend
lobe, but outside the Barrett Survey, claimed by the Omahas
in Case 4067.
The government's complaint on "behalf" of the
tribe in Case 4024 sought only the area within the Barrett
Survey line.
Source:
"Motion of Omaha Indian Tribe To Have Disqualified
and To Enjoin Evan L. Hultman, United States Attorney,"
November 7, 1985, Case Nos. C75-4024, C75-4026, and C75-4067
consolidated, Federal District Court For Northern District
of Iowa, Western Division.
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MAP 11
Depicting all the additional acreage sought by the Omaha
Tribe in Case 4067.
Source:
Appendix prepared for United States Supreme Court,
Case Numbers 78-160, 78-161 consolidated, p. 148.
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My dad bought this land from the man who homesteaded
it. He bought that land, we have title to it and we're
not giving it up."50
Mayne counseled his clients to refrain from resorting to
"self-help" measures in defense of their land, despite their
understandable shock and anger at being told that they were
not rightfully entitled to their property.5^
The Omahas responded to the Iowans' resentment with
equal indignation, publicly asserting that those who were
now complaining about the tribe's claim had known for years
that the land belonged to the tribe, and had been merely
"squatting on the land for the last fifty years."52
Attorney John O'Brien defended his clients to reporters,
stating:
A great number of people who live there [in Monona
County] took over the land when the Missouri was a
wild river.
They ran people off it and claimed it for
their own when it was really Indian land. . .. You're
going to hear they [the Omahas] are no-good, lazy
devils.
But they're hard working people trying to get
ahead like anyone else.
Edward Cline reported that shots had been fired at the
Omahas who were occupying the land, but that "authorities
had failed to take action."54

Despite those hostilities,

Cline expressed sympathy for the Iowans who were going to
lose land to the Omahas.

He pointed out, however, that the

fault lay not with the Indians, but rather with the Iowans'
attorneys who had failed to warn them of the potential
problems with their title at the time they purportedly
acquired the land.
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On January 26, 197 6, Judge McManus granted a motion
filed by the Omahas seeking to have the three pending cases
consolidated for trial.56

In so doing, he placed in issue

the title to all the Iowa land claimed by the Omahas,
thereby effectively overriding the the government's
"constricted" complaint filed on the Omaha's behalf.

Three

months later, however, Judge McManus reversed course.

On

April 5, 1976, he entered a new order in which he held that
the tribe's allegations in Case 4067 were "hindering an
orderly and efficient administration of justice."57

McManus

therefore severed the Omaha's claims for the additional
acreage outside the "Barrett Survey Area" in Blackbird Bend,
and their claims for the lands at Monona Bend and Omaha
Mission Bend.

The net effect of the April 5 order was to

cause the case to proceed to trial on the "constricted"
complaint originally filed by the government,

leaving the

Omahas' claims for the much larger additional areas "on
hold" for more than eight years.58

While the severance

order may have been grounded in legitimate procedural
concerns, to the Omahas it signaled a judicial "sell-out" of
their claims, and offered further evidence of a continuing
governmental conspiracy.

6 9

The case proceeded to trial before Judge Andrew W.
Bogue on the issue of title to the 2,900 acres within the
Barrett Survey.* From November 1 to December 6, 1976, the

202

parties presented voluminous and complex expert testimony
and scores of maps, charts and other documentary evidence in
seeking to establish the precise nature of the meanderings
of the Missouri River from 1867 until the 1940s.60
From a purely legal perspective, the dispositive issue
before the court became relatively straightforward.

Under

centuries-old principles of riparian property law, land that
is moved to the opposite side of a river by reason of an
"avulsion" remains the property of the original landowner.
Courts have traditionally defined an avulsion as the sudden
and clearly perceptible shift of identifiable land from one
side of a river to the other.

If, on the other hand, a

river's current causes land on one side of the river to
gradually erode away and slowly "re-emerge" by sedimentary
action on the opposite side, the newly created land is
considered an "accretion" to the property of the owner on
that side of the river.61

At Blackbird Bend, therefore, the

Omahas generally argued that their land had been shifted to
the Iowa side by avulsion, while the Iowans claimed that the
operative geologic forces had been those of erosion and
accretion.62
While the relevant legal doctrines could thus be
succinctly stated, the application of those principles to
the movements of the Missouri River in the Blackbird Bend
area from the 1860s to the 1940s was not nearly as clear-
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cut.

A full examination of the massive amounts of evidence

offered by the parties relating to the movements of the
river is beyond the scope of this chapter, and is best
presented in Judge Bogue's painstakingly-detailed analysis
contained in his published decisions in the case.63

The

difficulty of the court's task is reflected in dicta offered
by the judge within his opinion:
The events which the court is obliged to
reconstruct occurred long ago and they were events of
nature; so far as we know these events were not
observed in their entirety by any person who could
today be a witness concerning them. . . . In the
process of pulling together the extensive and
complicated evidence presented in this case, it becomes
apparent that the movements of the Missouri River have
not been so clean and precise that they easily fall
into legal categories conveyed by the terms "accretion"
and "avulsion.1,64
Despite those misgivings, Judge Bogue ruled in favor of
the Iowa landowners on May 2, 1977.

He held that the Omahas

had failed to sustain their burden of proving that the
Blackbird Bend area had been detached from their reservation
and re-deposited on the Iowa side of the river, consistent
with the theory of avulsion.

Accordingly, he awarded title

to all of the disputed land within the Barrett Survey to the
Iowa defendants, and ordered that the funds generated by the
Omahas' farming operations during the previous two years be
paid to them as well.65
The continuing emotional and moral complexity of the
dispute was reflected in a supplemental letter from the
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court delivered at the time of the decision.

In the letter,

Judge Bogue took the unusual step of revealing his personal
feelings about the equities of the case.

He wrote of his

"distaste for the laws of avulsion and accretion which have
brought about this seemingly unfair result," and criticized
the original creators of the reservation for failing to
define the boundaries "by degrees of longitude and latitude
or some other permanent type of description."

Bogue went on

to declare that Blackbird Bend "should have remained the
property of the Tribe for evermore no matter whether it was
under water or divided in whole or in part by water, and no
matter how it got that way."

He concluded by suggesting

that "the least that should be done is for the Congress to
reimburse the Tribe for its loss.

If this Court had the

power to order such payment, you can rest assured it would
be done."66
The District Court's "personal" sentiments did little
to appease the Omahas.

Incensed by the decision, they vowed

to remain on the land despite the court's dissolving of the
June 5, 1975 injunction which had given the tribe temporary
possession.

When Monona County Sheriff Albert Wood and

County Attorney Stephen Allen served the "occupying" Omahas
with a court order to vacate the property, Edward Cline told
them that their attorneys were in the process of appealing
the District Court's decision, and that the tribe would not
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comply.67 .As county officials began to "organize a force to
remove the Indians as expeditiously as possible," the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals stepped in, issuing a temporary
stay of Judge Bogue's decision.68

That temporary order was

subsequently extended so as to allow the tribe to remain in
possession of the land throughout the continuing
litigation.69
On April 11, 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's decision, and ordered that title to the
land be vested in the Omaha Tribe and the United States as
trustee.70

Like Judge Bogue's opinion in the district

court, the 8th Circuit's published decision contains a
comprehensive analysis of both the voluminous evidence
presented in the trial of the case, and the complex
principles of law applicable to those facts.

Although the

appellate court disagreed with certain portions of Judge
Bogue^s analysis regarding the defining characteristics of
"avulsion" and "accretion," the more fundamental basis for
its reversal of the lower court's decision was less
esoteric.

Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Judge

Donald Lay held that the district court had improperly
placed the burden of proof on the Omahas.

Lay cited a

rarely-invoked federal statute enacted in 1834, which
provides:
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In all trials about the right of property in which an
Indian may be a party on one side, and a white person
on the other, the burden of proof shall rest upon the
white person, whenever the Indian shall make out a
presumption of title in himself from the fact of
previous possession or ownership, (emphasis added).71
Judge Lay held that the 1854 Treaty established the Omahas'
"previous possession and ownership" of the land within the
original Barrett Survey.

Thus, under the statute, the tribe

was entitled to a presumption of title in its favor, and the
burden of proof fell on the Iowans to establish that the
land had been entirely eroded away from the reservation and
accreted to the opposite side.

7

7

After an exhaustive analysis of the massive trial
record, this time in the context of the reallocated burden
of proof, the Circuit Court ultimately held that the Iowa
claimants had established "only speculative inferences" as
to whether the river channel had moved as a result of
•
•
7
accretion
or avulsion.

3

•
Accordingly,
the court held that

the Iowans had failed to sustain their burden of proof at
trial, thus necessitating judgment in favor of the Omahas.
Just as Judge Bogue had expressed his personal distaste
for the result at the trial court level, the appellate court
acknowledged the seemingly harsh effect of its decision:
We recognize that to require [the Iowans] to prove
the cause of the river's movement occurring some 100
years after the event is indeed an onerous burden.
This may seem to be an injustice when one considers
that the [Iowans] have possessed and continuously
farmed the land without protest for nearly 4 0 years.
However, . ‘. . the clear policy of the federal
government mandates that the interests of the Omaha
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Indian Tribe be given their historical and statutory
protection.
These important possessory land interests
cannot be taken away on proof that is basically
speculative and conjectural. 4
Naturally, the Omahas were gratified by the Court of
Appeals' decision, while the Iowans expressed "shock and
disappointment."75

Attorney Thomas Burke, representing one

of the losing claimants, called the decision a "travesty"
that would have far-ranging adverse consequences in other
Indian land claims across the country.76

The Iowans asked

the United States Supreme Court to accept the case for
review, arguing that the 1834 statute created an
unconstitutional judicial preference for Indians based
solely upon race.
In November,
case. 7f°t

7 7

197 8, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the

•
• briefs and awaited the
As the parties
filed their

Court's decision, strong feelings continued to simmer at
Blackbird Bend.

Harold Sorenson, one of the Iowa farmers

who claimed part of the disputed land, expressed concern
about the future stability of land titles throughout the
region, predicting "If [the Omahas] win this one, there's
nothing to keep them from just keeping on going." ^

The

Omahas likewise viewed the fight in terms of its impact on
the future, but for them the essence of the matter was
different*

A3 Tribal Council member Clifford Wolfe, Sr.

told a reporter:
We think about our children and grandchildren.
From
the income [derived from the Blackbird Bend land],
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maybe they'll feel like we're people.
Maybe it'll help
their schooling, give them something to fall back on.
We want that land back.
Anyway we can get it back, we
want it back. 0
On June 20, 1979, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision.8^-

Like so many decisions of the high court, its

opinion in the Blackbird Bend case failed to settle the
matter outright, but rather returned the case to the lower
courts for further consideration.

The Supreme Court

declared that the 8th Circuit had been correct in its
application of the "burden of proof" statute to the
individual Iowa claimants, but had erred in applying the
statute against the state of Iowa itself, since a state
could not be considered a "white person" under the terms of
the statute.
On remand, the Circuit Court reconsidered its analysis
of the issues, but once again decided the case largely in
ft7
favor of the Omahas. *

.
The court entered a final judgment

awarding all but 700 of the 2,900 acres within the Barrett
Survey area to the tribe.

As to the 700 acres claimed by

the state of Iowa, the court returned the case once again to
the district court for further consideration, with
instructions to place the burden of proof back on the tribe.
Over the next eleven years, the seemingly interminable
litigation bounced back and forth between the district court
and the 8th Circuit Court five more times on the issue of
title to the 700 acres claimed by the state.83

Ultimately,
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the courts held that the Omahas had failed to meet their
burden of proving title to the remaining 700 acres in
dispute, and awarded the land to the State of Iowa.84
Approximately 3 00 additional acres were awarded to various
other non-Indian claimants for parcels that had previously
been acquired by "fee patents."

Thus, when the "Blackbird

Bend I" litigation finally ground to a halt sixteen years
after it commenced, the Omahas had been awarded title to
approximately 1,900 acres out of the 2,900 acres within the
Barrett Survey.

In addition, the erstwhile "owners" of the

land were awarded a judgment against the United States for
almost $2 million, plus prejudgment interest, for the value
of the improvements made to the property before it was
returned to the tribe.
Meanwhile, the tribe's claims to the acreage outside
the Barrett Survey within the Blackbird Bend lobe, and the
additional land in the Monona Bend and Omaha Mission Bend
areas to the north, remained to be resolved.
and 11].

[See Maps 10

Those much larger claims, which now became known

as "Blackbird Bend II," had been severed and placed in
abeyance by Judge McManus in 1979.

As the claims in

Blackbird Bend I were slowly resolved, Blackbird Bend II
took center stage.85
The dozens of Iowa farmers whose lands were at issue in
Blackbird Bend II had been following the convoluted
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proceedings in Blackbird Bend I for years.

As the threat to

their lands was resurrected, tension within the community
rose to new heights.

Monona County Sheriff Albert Wood

bluntly predicted bloodshed if the Omahas sought to "occupy"
any of the contested land:
The boys have deeds to the land.
They have paid taxes
on it. They aren't about to give it up.
If they get
pushed too hard, I know what will happen.
The river
will run red.
Although Wood's dire predictions of violence proved to be
overstated, the Omahas' attempts to proceed with their
remaining claims ultimately deteriorated into a long series
of acrimonious confrontations and ad hominen attacks between
the tribe's counsel, the attorneys for the Iowa landowners,
and the federal judiciary.

As the Omahas continued to press

their charges of fraud, conflict of interest, and collusion
on the part of their opponents and the courts, procedural
conflicts among the attorneys escalated to the point that
the district court ultimately imposed the harshest possible
sanction against the tribe.
On May 29, 1990, Federal District Judge Warren Urbom
entered an order in which he condemned the tribe's attorney,
William H. Veeder,

for his "systematic pattern of failure to

comply with court rules and orders," and dismissed all of
Q*7
the Omahas' remaining claims.
One year later, the 8th
Circuit Court upheld Urbom's ruling, and assessed a penalty
against the tribe of double the costs of the appeal for its
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continued prosecution of the "frivolous" claims of fraud and
Q Q

conspiracy.00

.

,

,

The judicial denunciation of William Veeder

continued, as the court declared:
. . . Mr. Veeder continues to exercise scurrilous
disrespect for the judges involved in this case.
He
stands obsessed with the charges of fraud by Judges
McManus and Urbom . . . notwithstanding this court's
prior dismissal of such a claim . . . Mr. Veeder
through his continued contumacious refusal to comply
with the district court orders has done a great
disservice to his client in important litigation.
It
is unfortunate in a case such as this that the client
must live or die by the conduct of its counsel. 9
When the Supreme Court denied the tribe's request for it to
review the case later that year, the Omahas' claims were
finally extinguished.

Four more years would pass, however,

before the courts resolved the last remaining issue in the
case.
After the dismissal of the Omahas' claims in Blackbird
Bend II became final, two counterclaims against the tribe
remained viable.

Those counterclaims had been filed by the

Iowans whose land the tribe had physically occupied since
1975, and they remained at issue because the tribe continued
to occupy the property even after the dismissal of, all its
remaining claims.

In April,

1993, the district court gave

title to the land to the Iowans, and awarded them more than
$400,000 for the rental value of the land during the tribe's
occupancy.

In January,

1995, the 8th Circuit affirmed the

district court's decision, and the 29 year old Battle of
9 0

Blackbird Bend finally came to an end. u
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While the Iowans expressed joy and relief at the final
disposition of the case, the Omahas vowed to fight on,
suggesting that they might re-occupy the land or even take
their claims to some other forum such as the United Nations
or the World Court.

Q "1

No such action was ever taken,

although the tribe did make a futile request to the Senate
Judiciary Committee for an "oversight hearing" to
investigate its grievances against the judges and government
QO
attorneys.
Notwithstanding the Omahas' lingering
- discontent, the Battle of Blackbird Bend is almost certainly
at an end.

The tribe was left with the 1,900 acres awarded

to it in the Blackbird Bend I litigation, and the Iowans
whose land had been threatened in Blackbird Bend II escaped
on procedural grounds, without being required to confront
the merits of the Omahas' claims.
It is too soon to draw any sweeping conclusions about
the long-term impact of the Blackbird Bend litigation on the
Omaha tribe.

Whatever "lessons" the case may hold will

require more time to fully manifest themselves.

It may

certainly be said, however, that the Battle of Blackbird
Bend represented one of the many steps taken by the tribe in
the last few decades to "resurrect itself" as a vibrant and
economically viable political and cultural entity.

The

courts' dismissal of most of the Omahas' claims as a
punitive measure against the tribe's attorney casts an

213

unsettling cloud on that determined effort.

Nevertheless,

the Omahas may take a measure of satisfaction in the fact
that a portion of the land they recovered in Iowa is now the
site of the tribe's successful gaming operation, Casino
Omaha.

That enterprise, combined with the farming

operations on the remainder of the land, have contributed
significantly to the tribal revenue base over the past
several years.

[See Figures 14-16].

They provide an

immediate, albeit incomplete, positive legacy for the Battle
of Blackbird Bend.
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FIGURE 14
CASINO OMAHA, OCTOBER 199 5
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Casino Omaha — "At Blackbird Bend"
October 1995

~V'

A v]ew of the Missouri River, looking north toward
Blackb_.rd Bend.
October 1995

FIGURE 15
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FICURE 16
Tribal farming operations at Blackbird Bend.

October 1995.
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Omaha Tribal Resolution No. 75-40, dated May 28, 1975, in
which the Tribal Council accused the government attorneys of
"gross double dealings, manipulation and abuse."
38 See "U.S. Official Defends Suit For Indians," Omaha
World-Herald. June 3, 1975, p. 3.
39 Kent Frizzell to Eddie Cline, quoted in "U.S. Official
Defends Suit For Indians," Omaha World-Herald. June 3, 1975,
p . 3.
40 "Complaint For Injunction, For A Stay Of State Court
Proceedings And Other Relief," May 20, 1975, Case No. C754026, Federal District Court for Northern District of Iowa,
Western Division.
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41 In their complaint, the Omahas asserted that the
government suit initiated on the day before had been "filed
over the protests of the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska," and was
"in effect a conduit to permit and allow [the Iowans] to
retake possession of the lands involved."
Ibid., para. 7.
42 "Application To Dismiss Or Hold In Abeyance," June 3,
1975, Case No. C75-4024, Federal District Court for Northern
District of Iowa, Western Division.
43 Omaha Tribal Resolution 75-40, May 28, 1975, attached to
"Application To Dismiss Or Hold In Abeyance," June 3, 1975,
Case No. C75-4024, Federal District Court for Northern
District of Iowa, Western Division.
44 One of the most comprehensive summaries of the tribe's
arguments on the fraud issue may be found in "Motion of
Omaha Indian Tribe To Have Disqualified and To Enjoin Evan
L. Hultman, United States Attorney, James J. Clear, and
Successors From Further Participation In TheSe Cases, And
Memorandum In Support," November 7, 1985, Case Nos. C754024, C75-4026, and C75-4067 consolidated, Federal District
Court for Northern District of Iowa, Western Division.
45 Ibid.
46 District Judge Edward McManus, "Order," June 5, 197 5,
Case Nos. C75-4024 and C75-4026 consolidated, Federal
District Court for Northern District of Iowa, Western
Division.
47 U.S. District Judge Edward McManus, "Order," July 1,
1975, Case Nos. C75-4024 and C75-4026 consolidated, Federal
District Court for Northern District of Iowa, Western
Division.
48 Notwithstanding the courts' repeated rejection of the
Omahas' arguments regarding Hultman's apparent conflict of
interest, it should be noted that there indeed seems to be
at least a orima facie appearance of such a conflict.
At
least one "disinterested" outside party offered support for
the tribe on that issue.
In 1987, The National Council of
Churches filed an amicus brief in which it argued that the
Omahas' claims regarding Hultman's conflict of interest were
"neither frivolous nor without merit," and that the
Department of Justice had "stymied and stultified the
efforts of the Tribe to act in its own behalf."
See "Motion
For Leave To File, Statement of Interest and Brief Amicus
Curiae of The National Council of Churches In Support of The
Omaha Indian Tribe's Rule 59 Motion," June 8, 1987, Case
Nos.' C75-4 02 4, C75-4026, and C75-4067 consolidated, Federal
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District Court for Northern District of Iowa, Western
Division.
49 "Complaint," Case No. C75-4067, October 6, 1975, Federal
District Court for Northern District of Iowa, Western
Division.
50 Quoted in "Indians Seek 3-Generation Land," Omaha WorldHerald . October 21, 1975, p. 4.
51 "River Land Feud May Go to Trial," Omaha World-Herald.
October 24, 1975, p. 14.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Jeff Withrow, "Indians Need Tug, Barge to Haul Harvest,"
Omaha Workd-Herald. October 26, 1975, p. 24-B.
55 Ibid.
District Judge Edward McManus, "Order," January 26, 1976,
Case No. C75-4067, Federal District Court for Northern
District of Iowa, Western Division.
57 District Judge Edward McManus, "Order," April 5, 1976,
Case Nos. C75-4024, C75-4026, and C75-4067 consolidated,
Federal District Court for Northern District of Iowa,
Western Division.
The Omahas thereafter consistently
referred to this important severance ruling as a sua sponte
order, which is one isued by a court on its own volition,
without a formal request from any party in the suit.
Technically, the April 5 Order probably should not be
considered to be sua sponte. since the court also ruled on
several pending motions within its Order.
It is true,
however, that there was no pending motion for severance from
any party before the court at the time.
58 The tribe's claims in Case 4067 were formally stayed by
the district court in 1979, pending the outcome of the other
cases.
Those claims were not reactivated until June 15,
1987.
See Omaha Indian Tribe v. Tract I - Blackbird Bend
A r e a , 933 F.2d 1462, 1464 (8th Cir. 1991).
59 In response to later tribal arguments regarding the
propriety of Judge McManus' severance order, the Eighth
Circuit Court observed that the tribe "did not object to the
district court's severance order either by motion for
reconsideration, request for interlocutory relief, or in any
of the subsequent appeals."
See 854 F.2d. 1094, n.5.
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60 There are 3,216 pages of trial transcript, and more
150 exhibits in the trial record.
61
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The doctrines of avulsion and accretion are discussed in
all of the reported court decisions in the Blackbird Bend
cases.
In addition, see Laurie Smith Camp, "Land Accretion
and Avulsion:
The Battle of Blackbird Bend," Nebraska Law
Review, 56, no. 4 (1977), pp. 814-35, and numerous other
sources cited therein.
The issue was not always as simple as that statement
implies.
As to the lands claimed by the tribe outside the
Barrett Survey line, the Omahas sought to show that the
additional land had accreted to the reservation as the river
moved eastward after the survey.
Thus the reservation had,
at first, been increased in size by accretion.
They then
argued that the newly created land had later been left on
the Iowa side by a sudden avulsion of the river back to the
west.
The District Court actually rendered two separate
opinions.
The first, United States v. Wilson. 433 F. Supp.
57 (N.D. Iowa 1977), was a memorandum opinion in which the
court resolved choice of law problems, analyzed the concepts
of avulsion and accretion, and discussed the allocation of
the burden of proof in the case.
The second opinion, United
States v. Wilson. 433 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Iowa 1977),
contained the court's specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the merits of the dispute.
64 United States v. Wilson. 433 F. Supp 67, at 89.
65 United States v. Wilson. 433 F. Supp. 67, at 92.
66 Judge Bogue's letter to the parties, dated May 2, 1977,
has been incorporated as part of the official record in Case
Nos. C75-4 02 4 and C75-4026 consolidated, Federal District
Court for Northern District of Iowa, Western Division.
It
is quoted and discussed in Camp, "Accretion and Avulsion,"
pp. 828-29.
The letter was also mentioned in the regional
press accounts of the decision.
See R.G. Dunlop, "Indians
Lose Court Battle for Iowa Farmland," Omaha World-Herald.
May 5, 1977, p. 1; "Court Rules Against Indians," Des
Moines Register. May 5, 1977, p. 1; and "Onawa Land Decision
Goes Against Indians," Sioux City Journal. May 5, 1977, p.
1.
67 "Indians Defy Court Order To Vacate," Omaha World-Herald,
May 13, 1977, p: 1.
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"Temporary Order of Stay," May 14, 1977, Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Case Nos. 77-1384, 1387 consolidated.
See
also Fred Thomas, "Indians Whoop It Up; Vacate Order
Halted," Omaha World-Herald. May 14, 1977, p. 15.
89 "Order of Stay," May 24, 1977, Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Case Nos. 77-1384, 1387 consolidated.
70 Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson. 575 F.2d 620 (8th Cir.
1978) .
71 25 U.S.C. section 194 (1834).
7 7

The Omahas had argued the controlling effect of this
statute in the District Court, but Judge Bogue rejected its
applicability.
He held that invocation of the statute
presupposed Indian possession of the land in question, and
that prerequsite for the statute's application was therefore
"inextricably entwined with the merits" of the case.
See
433 F. Supp. 57, at 66.
73 575 F .2d 620, at 651.
74 Ibid.
7 S

Fred Thomas, "Wide Impact Seen In Court's Award Of Land
to Tribe," Omaha World-Herald. April 12, 1978, p. 2.

77 See "Petitions For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United
States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit," Supreme
Court of the United States," October Term, 1978.
See also
Fred Thomas, "Attorneys Contend Victory for Indians
Threatens Whites," Omaha World-Herald, July 28, 1978, p. 12.
78 Reflecting the national prominence of the case, the
Attorneys General of 30 other states filed amicus curiae
(friend of the court) briefs in the Supreme Court, urging
the Court to accept the case for review.
See "Brief For
Amici Curiae in Support of the State of Iowa's Petition For
A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eighth Circuit," Supreme Court of the United
States," October Term, 1978, No. 78-161.
See also "High
Court to Check Indian Land Dispute," Omaha World-Herald,
November 13, 1978, p. 1.
79 Douglas Kneeland, "Blackbird Bend a Quiet Battleground,"
Omaha World-Herald, February 19, 1979, p. 12.
80 Ibid.
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81 Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe. 442 U.S. 653, 99 S. Ct.
2529 (1979) .
82 Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson. 614 F.2d 1153
cert, denied 449 U.S. 825 (1980).

(8th Cir.),

83 See United States v. Wilson. 523 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Iowa
1981), in which Judge Bogue held in favor of the Omahas on
the issue of title to the state-claimed land; United States
v. Wilson. 707 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1982), cert, denied 465
U.S. 1025 (1984), in which the 8th Circuit once again
reversed Judge Bogue, remanded the case for futher
consideration, and ordered the district court to award the
Iowa landowners the value of the "improvements" made to the
property prior to the Omahas' regaining possession; United
States v. Wilson. 578 F. Supp. 1191 (W.D. Iowa 1984), in
which Judge Bogue ruled in favor of the State.of Iowa as to
the 7 00 acres in dispute, and returned the case to Judge
McManus for further handling on the issue of "improvements";
Omaha Indian Tribe v. Jackson. 854 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir.
1988), cert, denied 490 U.S. 1090 (1989), in which the 8th
Circuit affirmed the award of the 7 00 acres to the State of
Iowa, and also affirmed an unpublished decision by Judge
McManus awarding the Iowa landowners $1,921,177.85 for the
value of the improvements made to the land previously
awarded to the Omahas; and finally, United States v. Wilson.
926 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1991), in which the Circuit Court
held that the government must pay simple rather than
compound prejudgment interest on the amount found owing to
the Iowans.
Q
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Once the case was returned to Judge McManus m 1984 for
final disposition, relations between the tribe and the court
deteriorated rapidly.
When McManus issued an order on
January 14, 1987 awarding the remaining land in dispute to
the state, members of the tribe physically barred surveyors
from the land, until McManus found them in contempt of
court.
When the judge entered his "Final Judgment and
Decree" in the case on May 29, 1987, Tribal Chairman Doran
Morris publicly declared that the ruling "proves that he's a
racist."
See "Tribal Leader Calls Judge a Racist," Sioux
City Journal. June 6, 1987; Kathy Hoeschen Massey, "Monona
Land Case Wraps Up," Sioux City Journal. June 3, 1987;
"Indians Block Surveying of Land," Omaha World-Herald.
February 11, 1987, p. 43; and Fred Thomas, "Tribal Arrests
Threatened If Disputed Land Entered," Omaha World-Herald,
March 16, 1987, p. 32.
85 See Fred Thomas, "Omaha Indian Tribe Sues For More Iowa
Land," Omaha World-Herald. February 2, 1986, p. 10-B.
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86 Fred Thomas, "Claims Threaten Recreation Tract,” Omaha
WorId-HeraId, February 22, 1980, p. 8.
qn
District Judge Warren Urbom, "Memorandum and Order," May
29, 1990, p. 10, Case No. C75-4067, Federal District Court
for Northern District of Iowa, Western Division.
88 Omaha Indian Tribe v. Tract I — Blackbird Bend Area. 933
F.2d 1462 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert, denied sub nom.
Omaha Indian Tribe v. Agricultural & Indus. Inv. Co.. 502
U.S. 942 (1991) .
89 933 F .2d 1462, at 1471.
90 See Rupp v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 45 F.3d 1241 (8th Cir.
1995).
See also Stacy M. Casey, "Tribe Ordered To Ray
$417,527," Sioux City Journal. April 13, 1993; and "Tribe
Considers Judgment," Sioux City Journal. April 16, 1993.
9^ For contemporary accounts of local reaction to the final
decisions in the litigation, from both sides' perspective,
see Frank Santiago, "Court Rules Against Indians in
Blackbird Bend Dispute," Des Moines Register. May 31, 1991,
in which Veeder described the court's ruling as a "great
tragedy" and "another example of how the Indian tribes are
being planned out of existence;" Kathy Massey, "Tribe Loses
Appeal, Court Rules Land Belongs to Iowa Owners," Sioux City
Journal. May 31, 1991; Frank Santiago, "Despite Setback,
Indians Vow To Fight For Iowa Land," Des Moines Register.
June 1, 1991; Frank Santiago, "Fickle Missouri Leaves Legacy
of Litigation," Des Moines Register. June 16, 1991, pp. IB
and 4B (including photos of key personalities on both sides
of the dispute); Kathy Massey, "Tribe Loses Land Battle,
High Court Refuses to Hear Appeal, Case Among the Oldest in
Federal Courts," Sioux City Journal. November 8, 1991, p. 1
and A14; and Kathy Massey, "Court Decision Stuns Landowner,"
Sioux City Journal, November 8, 1991, in which one of the
Iowa claimants estimates that the group spent more than
$200,000 in defending their claims, and describes himself as
"ecstatic" at the news of the final decision.
^ In an unpublished letter dated July 6, 1990, Tribal
Chairman Doran L. Morris asked Senator Joseph R. Biden,
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee to investigate
"the failure of the Federal Judiciary to fullfill its
obligation to provide the Tribe a full and fair trial before
a fair tribunal," and to remedy "the forced fraudulent
representation [of the Tribe] by the attorneys in the
Department of Justice."
Co-signed and undoubtedly authored
by William Veeder, the 30-page letter recited a long litany
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of grievances against the government attorneys and the
federal judges involved in the Blackbird Bend litigation.
Although the letter is rambling, one-sided, and self-serving
as to Veeder's culpability in the courts' dismissal of the
tribe.'s claims, it is nevertheless a valuable reflection of
the tribe's bitter outrage at the outcome in the Blackbird
Bend cases.
Despite repeated inquiries from the author to
the staff of the Judiciary Committee, the Senate's response
to the tribe's request, if any, has not yet been determined.
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CONCLUSION

Throughout its long history, the Omaha Tribe has
exhibited a cultural resiliency that is both remarkable and
inspiring.

During the nineteenth century, the Omahas

weathered every challenge that federal and state policy
makers could place before them, from the repeated violations
of solemn treaties to the disastrous allotment of tribal
lands.1

In the modern era as well, the Omahas' resolve to

maintain their political and cultural viability has been
repeatedly put to the test —

in the lawlessness of the

Public Law 280 years, the quest for retrocession, the long
and tedious journey through the Indian Claims Commission
(ICC), and the even more protracted odyssey of the Blackbird
Bend litigation.
To their great credit, the Omahas have emerged from
these struggles as a stronger and more resolute political
and cultural entity.

By aggressively pursuing that which

was "rightfully theirs" —

in the halls of Congress, the

state legislature, the ICC, and the federal courts —

the

tribe has achieved a significant measure of compensation for
centuries of past abuse.

The establishment of a tribal law

enforcement structure through retrocession, the creation of
economic development projects from the proceeds of the ICC
judgments, the opening of profitable Casino Omaha, and the
initiation of additional tribal farming operations in
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Blackbird Bend have all helped advance the people.

During

the last few years, a sense of restrained optimism on the
reservation has replaced more than a hundred years of
deprivation and despair.2
recently observed,
before.

As tribal member Wayne Tyndall

"People are working more than ever

There is more self-esteem, and people are becoming

more self-sufficient.

The casino has really changed the

complexion of the overall community.

Everyone is thankful

for that."3
Certainly Casino Omaha has been the key to much of the
recent improvement in the reservation economy and morale.
As profits from the casino replenish the tribal treasury,
Omaha leaders are striving to invest those proceeds in ways
that will produce the best possible long-term return.

Just

as with the ICC judgments, the tribe has distributed a
portion of the annual casino profits to its members on a per
capita basis.4

The remainder of the annual revenues has

been used for a multitude of development programs,

including

road repairs, school renovation and supplies, scholarship
programs, expansion of health facilities, water system
improvements, and a youth emergency shelter.

The tribe is

working with government officials and independent
consultants to implement a comprehensive plan for sorelyneeded commercial enterprise on the once-impoverished
5
reservation.
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Yet much remains to be done.

As both tribal leaders

and outside observers have acknowledged, the revenues
generated by Casino Omaha are not a panacea for all of the
tribe's remaining concerns.

The tribe is acutely aware that

the gambling well may run dry at any time.6

Indeed, as

competing casinos proliferate in Council Bluffs, Iowa and
elsewhere, and as Indian gaming operations throughout the
country draw increasing Congressional scrutiny, the future
of the Omahas' relatively isolated casino is far from
certain.
As the Omahas look to the future, chronic problems
linger for tribal attention.

Among many other issues, the

tribe must address pressing concerns related to drug and
alcohol abuse, educational and medical deficiencies, and a
continuing internal factionalism between on and off
reservation members.

Like all other tribes across the

country, the Omahas must also prepare to weather impending
reductions m

federal funding for Indian services.

7

Whatever problems remain to be addressed, however, the
members of the Omaha Tribe can and should take strength from
the remarkable perseverance demonstrated by their forebears.
As this thesis is designed to demonstrate, the Omahas'
collective character as "survivors" has been as notable in
the modern era as at any other time in the tribe's long
history.

By withstanding the "dragon's nest" of PL 280,
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forging ahead with retrocession, and enduring years of
litigation in the ICC and the federal courts, the Omahas
have created for themselves an enduring foundation of
political and cultural tenacity.

That legacy should serve

them well as they confront the challenges of the twentyfirst century.
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NOTES

For a comprehensive examination of the problems incurred
by the Omahas in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth
centuries, see Judith A. Boughter, "Betraying Their Trust:
The Dispossession of the Omaha Nation, 1790-1916," (Master's
Thesis, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1995).
o
A recent and extremely useful exploration of the general
mood and status of the reservation is provided in Michael
Kelly, "Hope, Problems Combined in Reservation Life," Omaha
World-Herald. November 24, 1994, p. 1.
3 Ibid., 12.
4 Julie Anderson, "Two Tribes Distribute Casino Cash," Omaha
World-Herald. December 23, 1994, p. 14.
5 Kelly,

"Hope, Problems Combined in Reservation Life," 12.

6 Ibid., 13.
7 See Kendrick Blackwood, "Nebraska Tribes Feel Besieged,"
Omaha World-Herald. October 9, 1995.
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APPENDIX I

Wh e r e a s it is t he po l i cy o f C o n g r e s s , as
r ap i d l y as possible, to m a k e the I n d i a n s
w i t h i n the ter ri t ori al limits o f the U n i t e d
States s u b j e c t to the s a me l aws a n d e n t i 
tled to t he s a m e privileges a n d r e s p o n 
sibilities as are a p p l i c ab l e to o t h e r ci t i z e n s
o f the U n i t e d St at es, to e n d t h e i r s t a t u s as
w a r d s o f t h e U n i t e d St at es, a n d to g r a n t
t h e m all o f t h e r i ghts a n d p r e r o g a t i v e s
p e r t a i n i n g to A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n s h i p ; a n d
Wh e r e a s the I n d i a n s w i t h i n t h e t e r r i t o r i al
limits o f t h e U n i t e d S t at e s sh o u l d a s s u m e
t hei r full r e s ponsi bi l i t i es as A m e r i c a n
citizens: N o w , t h e r e f o r e , b e it
Resolved by the House o f R epresentatives (tbe
Senate concurring),

T h a t it is d e c l a r e d to be the sense o f C o n 
gress that, at t he earl iest p oss i bl e t i me , all o f
the In di an tribes and the in di vi du al
mem bers th er eof located within the States of
Cali forni a, F l o r i d a , N e w Y or k , a n d T e x a s ,
an d all o f the f o l l o w i n g n a m e d I n d i a n t r i b e s
and i ndi vi dua l m e m b e r s t he r e o f , s h o u l d be
freed fr o m F e d e r a l s u p e r v i s i o n a n d c o n t r o l
and f r om all disabil it ies a n d l i mi t a t i o n s s p e 

cially appli cable to I ndi ans: T h e Fl at head
T r i b e of M o n t a n a , the K l a m a t h T r i b e of
O r e g o n , the M e n o m i n e e T r i b e o f W i s c o n 
sin, the P o t o w a t a m i e T r i b e o f Ka nsas and
N e b r a s k a , an d those m e m b e r s o f the C h i p 
p e wa T r i b e wh o are o n the T u r t l e M o u n t a i n
Reservat ion, N o r t h Da k o t a . It is f u r t h er
declared to be t h e sense o f C o n g r e s s that,
u p o n the release o f s u c h tr ibes a n d i n d i v i d u 
al m e m b e r s t h e r e o f f r o m su c h disabilities
a n d li mitations, all offices o f t he B u r e a u of
I n d i a n Affairs in t h e St at es o f Cali forni a,
Florida, N e w York, a n d T e x a s an d all ot her
offices o f the B u r e a u o f I n d i a n Affairs w h o s e
p r i m a r y p u r p o s e was to serve a n y I n d i a n
tr i b e o r i n d i v i d u a l I n d i a n freed f r om Federal
super vi si on s h oul d be a bol i she d. It is f ur t h e r
declared to be the sense o f C o n g r e s s t h a t the
S e c r e t ar y o f t h e I n t er i o r s h o u l d e x a m i n e all
existing legislation de a l i n g wi t h s uc h I n d i 
ans, and treaties b e t w e e n t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f
the Un i t e d St a t es and ea c h su c h tribe, and
r ep o r t to C o n g r e s s at the earliest pract icabl e
date, b u t not later t h a n J a n u a r y 1, 1954, his
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for su c h legislation as, in
his j u d g m e n t , m a y be n ec e ss a r y to a c c o m 
plish the p u rp o s e s o f this resoluti on.

House Concurrent- Resolution 108
U.S. , Statutes at Large 67

(August 1, 1953) : B132
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' A n A e t'to c o n f e r Jurisdiction.on the StM es^or CauTornia.' M in n eso ta , Nebras-^'
k a , O r e g o n , a n d W i s c o n s i n . *<vith r e s p e c t t o c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e s a n d c i v i l
c a u s e s o f a c t i o n c o m m i t t e d or a r i s i n g o n I n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n s - w i t h i n '
. ------------- _ s u c h S t a t e s , a n d . f o r o t h e r p u r p o s e s . ~~ • ,j _
" . ’A ' U '
•

Be i t p.)i nc t e d ' b y the Senate a n d ' H o v s e of Re p r es en t at i ves nf t h e ' U n i t ed
St-alcs of Ameri ca, i n Congr ess assembled, T h a t :
■ ...

C h a p t e r 53 o f t i t l e IS, U n i t e d S t a t e s , C o n e , is h e r e b y a m e n d e d by
i n s e r t i n g a t t h e e n d o f t h e c h a p t e r a n a l y s i s p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n 1151
of such title
t h e f o l l o wi n g - n e w i t e m :
“ I l fi 2.
S t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r of f en se s c o m m i t t e d by o r a g a i n s t
In d i a n s in the In d i a n c o u n tr y . "
S e c . 2. T i t l e 18. U n i t e d S t a t e s C o d e , is h e r e b y a m e n d e d b y i n 
s e r t i n g : in c h a p t e r 53 t h e r e o f i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r s e c t i o n l l i i l a n e w
s e c t i o n , to b e d e s i g n a t e d a s s e c t i o n 11G2,
as follow s:
'■§ 11G2. S t a t s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r o iT e n s e s c o m m i t t e d by o r a g a i n s t
r a d i a n s in t h e I n d i a n c o u n t r y
" ( a ) E a c h o f t h e S t a t e s l i s t e d in t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e s h a l l h a v e
j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r o f f e n s e s c o m m i t t e d b y o r a g a i n s t I n d i a n s i n tin;
a r e a s of I n d i a n c o u n t r y list ed o p p o s i t e th e n a m e of the S t a t e to th e
s a m e e x t e n t t h a t s u c h S tate h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r offenses c o m m i t t e d
e l s e w h e r e w i t h i n t h e S l a t e , a n d t h e c r i m i n a l l a w s of s u c h Stale s h a l l
h a v e the s a m e f o r c e and eff ec t w i t h i n s u c h I n d i a n c o u n t r y a s t h e y
h a v e e l s e w h e r e w i t h i n the S t a t e :
" S ta te of
I n d i a n c o u n t r y a l Tec t ed
California
...........................All I n d i a n c o u n t r y w i t h i n t h e S l a t e
M i n n e s o t a ...........................All . I n d i a n c o u n t r y w i t h i n t h e S t a t e , e x c e p t
t h e Ro d L a k e R e s e r v a t i o n
N e b r a s k a ..................
All I n d i a n c o u n t r y w i t h i n t h e S t a t e
O r e g o n .................................. All I n d i a n c o u n t r y w i t h i n t h e S t a t e , e x c e p t
the W a rm Springs Reservation
W i s c o n s i n . . . : ................ All I n d i a n c o u n t r y w i t h i n t h e S t a t e , e x c e p t
the M en o m in e e R e s e rv a t io n
j
“ ( b ) N o t h i n g in t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l a u t h o r i s e t h e a l i e n a t i o n , e n c u m 
b ra n c e , o r ta x a t io n of any r e a l or pe rso nal p ro p e r ty , i n c l u d in g w a t e r
r i g h t s , b e l o n g i n g to a n y I n d i a n o r a n y I n d i a n t r i b e , b a n d , o r c o m 
m u n i t y t h a t is h e l d in t r u s t b y t h e U n i t e d S t a l e s o r is s u b j e c t to a
re s t r i c t i o n a g a i n s t aliena tio n im posed by the .U nited S l a t e s ; .or.shaM
a u t h o r i z e r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e u s c - o f s u c h p r o p e r t y in a m a n n e r i n c o n 
s is te n t w ith any Federal treaty, agreem ent, or statute or w ith any
regulation made p ursuant thereto; or shall-deprive any lu d ia n -o r
a n y I n d ia n tribe, band, or co m m u n ity , of a n y righ t, p riv ile g e , or
im m u n i ty a ffo rd e d u n d e r F e d e ra l .tr e a ty /'a g re e m e n t,- or s t a t u t e - w i t h
l v s p e c t lo h u n t i n g , " t r a p p i n g , ' o r f i s h i n g o r t h e ' x o n t r o l , l i c e n s i n g , - ' o r
regulation Ihereof.
' '
••
" ( c j T h e p r o v i s i o n s of s u c t i o n s . i l . 5 2 a n d 1153 o f t h i s c h a p t e r s h a i l
n o t be a p p l i c a b l e w i t h i n t h e a r e a 3 o f I n d i a n c o u n t r y l i s t e d in s u b
section ( a ) of th is section."

Public Law 83-280
U.S.,

Statutes at Large 67

(August 15,

1953):

583
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S e c . 3.
C h a p t e r So o f t i t l e 23,. U n i t e d Stat es C o d e , i s ' h e r e b y
a m e n d e d b y i ns e r t i ng a t t h e ' en d of the c h a p t e r analysis p re c e d i n g
section 1331 of such title the fol lowing new item:
"IGtlO. S t a t e c i vi l j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a c t i o n s to w h i c h I n d i a n s a r e
parties."
'’
S e e . 4. T i t l e 23,. U u i l e d S t a t e s C o d e , is h e r e b y a m e n d e d b y i n 
s e r t i n g in c h a p t e r - ' d o t h e r e o f i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r s e c t i o n 1 3 5 9 ' a n e w
s e c t i o n , to b e d e s i g n a t e d as s c c t i o u 13G0,
as follows: .
"S 13G0. S t a t e , c i vi l j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a c t i o n s to w h i c h I n d i a n s a r e
parties
- .■ ■
" ( a ) E a c h o f t h e S t a t e s l i s t e d in t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e s h a l l h a v e
j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r ci vi l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n b e t w e e n I n d i a n s o r t o w h i c h
i; d i n n s a r e p a r t i e s w h i c h a r i s e i n t h e a r e a s o f I n d i a n c o u n t r y l i s t e d
■i p p o . ' i t c t h e n a m e o f t h e S t a t e to t h e s a m e e x t e n t t h a t s u c h S t a t e h a s
j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r o t h e r ci vi l c a u s e s o f a c t i u n , a n d t h o s e c i v i l l a w s o f
: u e h S l a t e t h a t a r e of g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n t o p r i v a t e p e r s o n s o r
p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y s h a l l h a v e t h e s a m e f o r c e a n d elTcct w i t h i n s u c h
I nd ia n c o u n t r y as they have e l s e w h e r e w i t h i n the S t a t e :
’" S t a t e o f
I n d i a n c o u n t r y affected
California
.......................... Al l I n d i a n c o u n t r y w i t h i n t h e S t a t e
Minnesota
All I n d i a n c o u n t r y w i t h i n t h e S t a t e , e x c e p t
the Re d L a k e R e s e r v a t i o n
Nebraska
Al l I n d i a n c o u n t r y w i t h i n t h e - S l a t e
O r c g u u .................................. Al l I n d i a n
c o u n t r y w ith in the S tat e, e x c e p t
the W a r m S p r i n g s R e s e r v a t i o n
Wisconsin
.......................... Al l I n d i a n c o u n t r y w i t h i n t h e S t a t e , e x c e p t
the M e n o m in e e R e se r v a t i o n
“ HO N o t h i n g in t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l . a u t h o r i z e t h e a l i e n a t i o n , e n c u m 
b r a n c e . o r t a x a t i o n o f a n y r eal o r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , i n c l u d i n g w a t e r
r i g h t s , b e l o n g i n g to a n y I n d i a n o r a n y I n d i a n t vi bc, b a n d , o r c o m . m u n i l y t h a t is h e l d in t r u s t b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o r is s u b j e c t t o a
l^ strictinn a g a i n s t alienation imposed by the United S tates; o r shall
a u t h o r i z e - r e g u l a t i o n o f t h e u s e of s u c h p r o p e r t y i n a 1 m a n n e r i n c o n 
s i s t e n t with, a n y F e d e r a l - t r e a t y , a g r e e m e n t , or s t a t u t e or w i t h a n y
. r e g u l a t i o n m a d e p u r s u a n t th er et o : or shall c o n f e r j u r i s d i c t i o n u p o n
t h e S t u m to- a d j u d i c a t e , i n p r o b a t e p r o c e e d i n g s - o r o t h e r w i s e , t h e n w n r r s h i p o r r i g h t to p o s s e s s i o n o f s u c h p r o p e r t y o r a n y " i n t e r e s t
therein. .
.
.
- - “ ( c ) A n y t r i b a l o r d i n a n c e o r c u s t o m h e r e t o f o r e or. h e r e a f t e r
a d o p t e d by a n I n d i a n tribe, band, or community..in the ex er ci se o f a n y
a u t h o r i t y w h i c h it m a y possess shall, i f not i n c o n s i s t e n t ^ w i t h a n y
a p p lic a b le civil l a w of the S tate, be given full fo rce an d e f fe c t in th e
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f c i v i l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n p u r s u a n t to t h i s s e c t i o n . ”
S e c . 5.
S e c t i o n ~L o f t h e - A c t - o f O c t o b e r 5, 10-10 (G:l S t . nt . T d o , c h .
GO-5), i s h c r c - b y r e p e a l e d , <J b u t s u c h r e p e a l s h a l l n o t a l l e c t a n y p r o 
c e e d i n g s h e r e t o f o r e in stitu ted u n d e r t h a t section.
S e c . 0.
X o t w . t n s t a n d i n g th e - p r o v i s i o n s of an y E n a b l i n g A c t f o r
t h e a d m i s s i o n o f a Sta le , the c o n s e n t of the U n i t e d S t a l e s is h e r e b y
g i v e n -to t h e p e o p l e o f - a n y S t a t e t o a m e n d , w h e r e n e c e s s a r y , t h e i r
S t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n o r e x i s t i n g s t a t u t e s , as the c a s e m a y be, to r e m o v e
a n y l e g a l i m p e d i m e n t to t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f c i v i l a n d c r i m i n a l j u r i s 
d i c t i o n : n a c c o r d a n c e wi th, t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s A c t ; P i u v i d c t l ,
T h a t the p r u v i s i o n s of this,.Aet sh all n o t becom e effective w i t h re
s p e c t t o s u c h a s s u m p t i o n off j u r i s d i c t i o n b y a n y s u c h S t a t u u n t i l t h e
people iHercnf Im re a p propriately am ended th eir State c o n s titu tio n
or s t a t u t e s a s t h e c a s e m a y be.
S e c . 7.
T h e c o n s e n t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is h c r e h y g i v e n to a n y
e t h e r S t a t e n o t h a v i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t to c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e s
o r c i v i l c a u s e s - o f a c t i o n , o r w i t h r e s p e c t to b o t h , a s p r o v i d e d f o r i n
t h i s A c t , to a s s u m e j u r i s d i c t i o n a t s u c h t i m e a n d i n s u c h m a n n e r a s
t h e p e o p l e o f the. S L a t e s h a l l , b y a f f i r m a t i v e l e g i s l a t i v e - a c t i o n , o b l i 
g a t e a n d b i n d t h e S t a t e to a s s u m p t i o n t h e r e o f .
A p p r o v e d A u g u s t 15, 1253.
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IKS OHARA TRIES CP TERRAS!LA
• Resolution Ho. 6

-bo

rRIEESAS, the Civil and Criminal jurisdiction on the Gran
vation va.s transferred to the State of Tebrasha under ?u
230, and

cr p

:i/TIERSAS, the Omaha Tribe of Uebra.ska is ?. federal- corporation,
chartered under the Act of June 18, 1934 (4Q Stat 924) us
amended, and under authority of Art. 4, Section. 1 (a) C on 
stitution. end Bylaws of the Omaha Tribe of ITebr?.s;ca as anended,
and
"

p. cl- id

iTnERSAS, the operation of this law for a period of sixte
has not been effective in providing adeouate protection
lives and "property of the iuiucers of th_e Omaha. Tribe, -?n

BEERS A.S , under the Civil Eights Act of 1953, the S. 3. is author
ized to accept retrocession of such, jurisdiction,
ITO’V, THZESEQEE, BE IT PESOL7ED, that the Omaha Tribal Council of
the Oman?. Tribe of ITebraskn declares itself in favor of such
retrocession and of the U. S. assuming full responsibility of
providing adecuate law' end order services within the exterior
boundaries of the Cnah?. Reservation,
BE IT RESOLVED BUEIHZ5., that the Omaha. Tribal Council rec_uests
urgent action, upon this Resolution where this transfer nay bring
tiie needed services in law and order to the Omaha Tribe.
•CERTIFICATE
T/E, the undersigned, Chairman and Secretary of the Omaha Tribal
Council, certify that on the 29TH day of January, 1959} at its
regular monthly meeting duly convened, the Cmaha Tribal Council
voted to adoob the a.'oove Resolution by a. vote of 5 for end 0
oc-pi
n
t
—e
-*t .*

v .- 0

Dated thus 29th day of January,

19o9r

Omaha Tribal Resolution 69-33, January 29,

1969

Expressing the tribe's desire for retrocession
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■Ls=i=u.Tuim or 3 ^ u w ; c a -

ilcirrurrti a^ilou— —

-UXIIUTIYX KtiOLOTIO.T 17 ■
l A i . r w J u < e d -\t U i ; l r l i t ! , r , c » u a « I 1 . C . . V . K a l a a u l i t
i £ i - a n ; - ------------------------------------- > r i c t , o m < - » i r t , w . » . X i i c » r « o c ) t ( . l t 5 H - U t » t x i < t •

—

VUCR^AS, tlt« itatc of Nebraska, eas. cl*** civil—

ami crloinal jurisdiction over ladl.xnfi
IM:

Indian tJrri\ 07~f Lh ■

state by-the let of Cangrest of Aucust 15. 155 j

kno^-n iz fubllt Lau 230; a n d VMEXSUS,

f\Azled

to : t « U U y

—

■■■■■— ----

ten*rally

-

— ■

j
.

. ^

Lhd I s 1 u a p t loiv o f sucA J u r l s < i i e t i o n

incressinc c o n s

-

Tor 1 a* enforcement

|

!I

certain counties of Nebraska, and particularly In Thursco
County ; and --------------- :
-------------------------------" ■ "■

VKIRJLAw, b e c a m e of restrictions In orl^inal-

Crinii at i.1no ;n r n u r n o n tosmcy

to inaaxn = u w

inunji triue*,-

Thurston- County has noc had.a sufficient ta_r base to o««c the —
lne/taj Inc e « u : of law »nf«rt{«ne;

and------------- ■-----------

------------------------------- ;inc* 1157,

I

i:ac« assistance £±z See

i

provided, for. law :nfor«o*«nC p u r p o x s 1a Thurston County, and the —

coat of this ai:ls:^\<« has l n c r r n e d each bl«rw\iu*; and ■ ‘--- ----- 1
--------------------- V x n t A l ,

NbUe

Lae JO-28*, adopted as an let — *■■

o C Congress on April 11, 13*** cootalaj a nvastr of previsions—

^

deaLlng wllh. elill rlcJita and Jurisdiction of teilSAs ? a n d

^

-

-------------------- VXE7XJ*S, See e loa *03 (a) of fu*lie* Lav 10- 23* — I
provide! that ch« lhalted Slates Is. authorised to accept s_r«tr^--icession of all* or any a e i s v n of 12»e Jurisdiction hcquXred byjt'te pursuant *.o N b l l e Lav 26ff of 1153;'

-- --

-virtaiAS. a c: M l t c « « of J < v > c n of the
Lcclsl*tu*"0 -appointed Uy •.the'^CjceutlTc hoard.of th e .Lcf^la 1st i>»e —— —
jCouncll^Tollo-rtnf: 'adond'ons^f hvhlie Lae •J0 T2 6*“haa.atudAed the
jproOlcor of lav. enfor«c*«ot In Indian areas of 'this state and th<

‘

.question of rcVrocYaxion'of Jurl^d-lctloo^* and hxx; >c t
load—
,ers of th<-Ovoaha and*Ylnnc ba po tribes^, towvey officials , . and- - * ^

j o fficials, o f

the

Bureau of Indian Affairs.**
-MOV, TlL3 ^ T D r r r

or

n ir

i ^ z s .t jlsjca

T* - u i c i i L s T O 'a r j u l i c i t : c m

|---------------------- 1 .

.

TT V O L T E S
s t s s io h

fcT T> 3 Tl£^3 DC3 •

a a s d t .l s i

--------—

Th-■»t C-Sc State of L!cbt~us?a be.-cTy ret.-r— —

Jeedci to the United lOatea all Jurisdiction over offenses cos

^—

!

:olttcd by. © c 'acolnsc Indlsos in the arras of Indian eounrry l o c a u d
■in Thursron.Caunry

X c b r u l a ,'"»«© uire^l— by —xh«— S-t-icu of. — O n s t a o —

i purao an t to. rub Lie Lav.280 of 1153, rierpt as-provided tn -........CparecrapA 2 *C this resolution, ---L*2, 71

‘

the rvtTO«es:iofl cf Jurisdiction c on—

;tcincd in pxrmcr»pb 1 .of this, resolution sbxUL not apply xo any --- ;
•offenses Lnrolvlnc *h« operation of w t o r Tebielts on, public roadsior MfJivayj . ----------------------k---------—

“

j

— 5 .. TbaC the Executive iAsrd o f tbc Lo gl.i— \1st 1 v«- Countil Is hereby iutb*rlicd and direcccd to. tzi'r iJ_L ooe- — 1
•• vsary action- Us pot. l i b rira oluLion inLo.o£fectr 's ocJa_ a c "Z±orr t-o--• lhcludi

L m n f t * - n c s vlth lb* C* p*j“t»c-nt. o f the Interior: ihd t h e

-

jdoyutr c x n t *z StLrvau of ln«lian LCfxLrx e onctmlnc'tht x s m c p c i ojv of —
. liv-cnforecreot rv s pons IbiLltle*. In’ tbar’vre xs 0 f Lndixn- cecBirrr *---IooT»r<d by tbJ_a r r a « W t i o o .

— ------ -— ”

|

Nebraska Legislative Resolution No. 37, April 16,

1969.

"Retroceding" criminal jurisdiction on the Omaha Reservation
back to the federal government
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Ofri ce
OMAHA

of

the

INDIAN

Secretary
RESERVATION,

..

NE3R.
N otice

of A c c e p ta n c e of R eb ro cessio n :
of J u r isd ic tio n
£

P u rs n e n c to th e a u th o r ity v ested tnd>
th e S e c re to ry of th e I n te r io r by E x eca—
tir e O rd e r No. 11435 (33 ?JFL. 17339). I-',
h e re b y accep t, as of 12:01 ann_, ejs_d, d
O c to b e r 25. 1970. re tro c e ssio n to the^U n ite d S ta te s of all J u ris d ic tio n ex ercised '
by th e S ta te ot Nebraska, orer ocTensea-co c am itte d by or a g a in s t I n d ia n s In thea re a s cx In d ia n c o u n try lo c a te d w ith in
the b o u n d arie s of th e O m a h a In d ia rc R es e r r a ti c a in T h o ro tc n C a u n ty , Nedr_^.
3-S fo d o rrs:
£;
l o t 3 c f i< c . 04. T . 25 N .. P.. 5 S t 'o f ' h e 2 L r h " P r in c ip a l, i f e n d ! a n : h e n c e f s_sc :o h e n o r h - " ;
e a s t c o r n e r o f T . 24 N\. R . 7 S . o f h e S ix th .;
P r in c ip a l M endl& n-. h e n c e s o u h . t o h e . . .
s c r u h lin e c£ h » O c a P a I n d i a n R e s e r r * —^
l i o n m c n z h i l l y su r re y e -d ; h e n c e e a j x a l c c g —
h e s o u h lin e of h e O m a h a I n d ia n , . a r s e m ^ ; l o a a s e n g i n e ! ! j r u r r - y e d :o c n e U n e b -e -•
r s - e e n s e e n 22 a n d 33. T l 24 X , P.. 10 2_ a C '
h e S i x h P r h d p e l M e r id ia n : h e n c e a o r h '':o h e r o r h ^ e r t c o m e r c f se-c. 2 '.. T . 2-4 ffn.
10 I . c f h o S i x h P r i n c i p a l M -en rib in :■;
h e n c e e a j t Co h e f a s t e n b o u n d a r y U no oXI_
h e S i x e s x f tv e b r x a ta c h e n c e In. a ' t o r t i H - ’
■s-erterly C lr s c d c n . a lo n g a a id b o u n d a r y l ln o r
:o h e n o r h U n e o f s e c . 35. T . 2 5 NO A . 9 Z_ c f h e S i x h P r in c ip a l M e r id ia n e x t e n d e d ;
e a s t ; h e n c e ~ e r t a lo n g h e s e c t i o n lin e s to
h e n c r h ^ c s t c o m e r of ’.c c I o f s e e . 2 8 . T . 0 5 '
N .. P.. 7 I . of ' h e S i x h P r i n c i p a l M e.-idLan;
h e n c e s o u h to h e a o r h e n s c c o m e r o f lo t
3 o f sec. 12. T. 25 N.. P . 7 Z. c f h e S i x h
P r h c i p c i M e r .d la n ; h e n c e -v e s t to h e c o r h ■va-st c o m e r c f lo t 2. s e c . 10. T . 25 N . P.. 5 3o f h e S i x h P r in c ip a l M e r id ia n ; h e n c e s o u h
a i c n g h e —esc b o u n d a r y l i n e o f h e C r c a
E n d ia n P -e s e r r a c ic n as o r i g i n a l l y r u r r e j e d
to h e t e n : o f b e g i n n i n g .

e x c e p t cfTanses in v o lv in g th e o p e ra tio n
of mo cor ve nicies on public ro a d s or h ig h or3.r3 x h ic h re procession h s
pandered
a n d o d e re d by L-egislativs P h s c lu tio n No.
37 passed by the L e g isla tu re cf Me brands
in 3 0 th reg u la r session c a th e 1 6th cny
of A pril 1969.
W a l t e r J . n ic r r r .L .

S e c re to ry of the. Interior.
O c r o s m 15. 1970.
[P .P ..

hoc.

"0-14:319:
3 :4 7

35 Federal Register 16598,

P ile d .
. I

O c t.

23.

1970:

am

October 16, 1970.

The federal government's "partial" acceptance of
offer of retrocession, October 16, 1970

N e b r a s k a 's
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Ltcisr-vTvns

or

uF.n.ii.sia

ric im -ssco b a Ic.dislaturs

nnsT ssdsioif

.

.

LIC IS LAT r/t 3tt0CUTI0it is

I n t r o d u c e d by C. V. Kolcqulse,

.

lfith District

lTHIRtA.5, the eightieth Session of the hehras'aa
State

IJS 5 , adopted Legislative Resolution

Legislature,

37,

r e l a t i n g to the retrocession to the United States of J u r i s 
d i c ti on
ar eas

over offenses coccsitted by or against

of .Indian country

Indians

located in Thurstc n Count/,

ac q ui re d by the State of llebrtsia pursuant

in the

hebras'ea,

to ?ublic

Law

220

of IS53;ar.d
Vdll.SAS, the United States has
r e t ro c e ss ic n
said

of

Legislative Resolution j7:;ov, ThnHEvc.ti. z z

0?

r.oc accepted

ir. accordance alth the terra ar.d provisions

it .
’.zxolyld sr i m i ;j. z * o sr.s

T M Z ZICHTI-SICOirt) alCISLATUP.r 0? hza.uts KA, ?L?-S7 szssrch:
1.

That the action of the L i gh tie th Session of

the Nebrask a State-Legislature-,
■Resolution

27 is rescinded,

1?49%-'approving L e g i s l a t i v e

and the offer of r e tr o c e ss io n

t h e r e i n contained is withdrarn.
■7 y
'tion be

;j: q -.~2 . ~ ^Thatr a duly -atCcsCed^co

L-vy his. r< soi u - ^

transalttcd by .the X l s r k of the leg is l at ur e ‘to the •

Secretary, of Interior of the United States.

L

''.7

/ V A , ,

I, Ylncent □. 3rosn, hereby certify

that the

f o r eg o i ng is a true and correct copy of Le g is lat ive
tion 16, whichl vas passed by the -Legislature
Il gh ty -se con d Legislature,
of ~ebruary,

first

Session,

Resolu

of N e b r a s k a

on the

in

first day

1971.

CLJL2K O i Tll£ LICiSLATU.l:

Nebraska Legislative Resolution 16, February 1, 1971
Attempting to "rescind" the offer of retrocession
tendered two years earlier

241

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscripts
Final Report to the American Indian Policy Review
Commission. Task Force Four: Federal. State, and Tribal
Jurisdiction. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1976.
Indian Claims Commission.
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska. Dockets
11, 138, 225-A,B,C,D.
New York: Clearwater Publishing
Co., 1973. [University of Nebraska at Omaha Microfilm
Collection, Call # E98.C6U6].
Doran L. Morris, Omaha Tribal Chairman.
Letter to Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
July 6, 1990.
Unpublished.
Available in
the History Department office of Professor Michael
Tate, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Dillon S. Myer Papers.
Harry S. Truman Presidential
Library. Independence, Missouri.
Philleo Nash Papers.
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library.
Independence, Missouri.
Program and Proceedings. Third Annual Conference on Indian
Affairs. "Indian Problems of Law and Order.11 Institute
of Indian Studies, State University of South Dakota.
June 16-17, 1957.
United States District Court, Northern District of Iowa,
Western Division.
Case Nos. C75-4024, C75-4026, and
C75-4067.
Court files and documents, 1975-1995.
Sioux
City, Iowa.
United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Case Nos.
77-1384, 1387 consolidated.
Court files and documents,
1977-1995.
St. Louis, Missouri.
United States Supreme Court.
Case No. 78-161.
Appendix and
Briefs, October Term, 1978.
Washington, D.C.
"Winnebago Agency Subject Files." Records of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, Federal Records
Center, Kansas City, Missouri.

242

Government Documents
Decisions of the Department of Interior. Vol. 61, M-36184,
1954 .
Kappler, Charles J . , comp, and ed.
Indian Affairs:
Laws
and Treaties. Vol. 2. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1904.
Nebraska Legislative Council.
Report of the Legislative
Council Interim Study Committee on Judiciary - Indian
Retrocession. Committee Report No. 226, 1976.
Nebraska Legislative Journal. "Message from Gov. Victor E.
Anderson to The President, the Speaker, and Members of
the Legislature," 1957.
_______ .

Legislative Resolution 37, 1969.
Legislative Resolution 16, 1971.

Nebraska Session Laws. 1957, 1967, 1974.
Royce, Charles C., comp.
Indian Land Cessions in the United
States.
Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of
American Ethnology, Part 2. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1899.
United States Code. Title 18 sections 1153, 1162; Title 25
sections 194, 1323; Title 28 section 1360.
U.S.

Congressional Record.

U.S.

Federal Register.

U.S.

1953, 1956, 1961, 1968.

Vol. 33 (1968), Vol. 35 (1970).

Statutes at Large. Vol. 4 (1830), Vol.
Vol.
22 (1882), Vol. 23 (1885), Vol. 36
Vol.
43 (1925), Vol. 44 (1926), Vol. 60
Vol.
67 (1953), Vol. 75 (1961), Vol. 78
Vol.
80 (1966), Vol. 82 (1968).

10 (1854),
(1910),
(1946),
(1964),

U.S. Congress.
House.
Hearings on H.R. 459. H.R. 3235, and
H.R. 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
Interior and Insular Affairs Comm. 82nd Cong., 2nd
sess. , 1952.
_.
Providing For the Disposition of Funds
Appropriated to Pay a Judgment in Favor of the O m a h a
Tribe. H. Report 891, 89th Congress, 1st sess., 1965.

243

. Report With Respect to The House Resolution
Authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs to Conduct an Investigation of the Bureau of
Indian A f f airs. H. Report 2503, 82nd Cong., 2nd
s e s s ., 1953.

_______ .

H. Report 848.

_______ .

H. Res. 698.

83rd Cong.,

1st sess.,

82nd Cong., 2nd sess.,

1953.

1952.

U.S. Congress.
Senate.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs. United States Senate, on S. 2 0 1 0 .
Parts 1 and 2, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1975-76.
________ . Providing For the Disposition of Funds Appropriated
to Pay a Judgment in Favor of the Omaha Tribe of
Nebraska, and For Other Pu rposes. S. Report 1683, 89th
Cong., 2d sess., 1966.
________ . Providing for the Disposition of Judgment Funds of
the Omaha Tribe of Indians. S. Report 598, 87th Cong.,
1st sess., 1961.

_______ .

S. Report 699. 83rd Cong.,

1st sess.,

1953.

_______ .S . Report 1553. 89th Congress, 2nd sess., 1966.
U.S. President.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Harry S. Truman. 1946. Washington,
D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1962.

Court Decisions
Fontanelle v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska. 298 F. Supp. 855
(D. Neb. 1969), aff'd. 430 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1970).
Kitto v. State. 98 Neb. 164 (1915).
Loval Band or Group of Creek Indians v. United States.
97 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
Marion v. State. 16 Neb. 349 (1884).
Oliphant v. Suguamish Indian Tribe. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).

244

Omaha Indian Tribe v. J a c kson. 854 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir.
(1988), cert, denied 490 U.S. 1090 (1989).
Omaha Indian Tribe v. Tract I — Blackbird Bend A r e a . 93 3
F.2d 1462 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert, denied sub
nom. Omaha Indian tribe v. Agricultural & Indus. Inv.
Co. 502 U.S. 942 (1991).
Omaha Indian Tribe v. W i l s o n . 614 F.2d 1153
cert, denied 449 U.S. 825 (1980).
Omaha Indian Tribe v. W i l s o n . 575 F.2d 620

(8th Cir.
(8th Cir.

1980),
1978).

Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Fontanelle. 430 F.2d 143
(8th Cir. 1970).
Omaha Tribe of Indians v. United Sta tes . 53 Ct. Cl. 549
(1918), rev'd in part and aff'd in p a r t . 253 U.S. 275
(1920).
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Village of Walt h i l l . 3 34 F. Supp.
823 (D. Neb. 1971).
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Village of W alt hill. 460 F.2d
1327 (8th cir. 1972).
Painter v. I v e s . 4 Neb.

122

Robinson v. S i g l e r . 187 Neb.

(1875).
144,

Rupp v. Omaha T r i b e . 45 F.3d 1241
State v. G o h a m . 187 Neb.

35,

187 N.W.2d 756
(8th Cir.

187 N.W.2d.

305

(1971).

1995).
(1971).

Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United Stat es. 348 U.S.

273

(1955).

United States v. Alcea Band of Til la mook s. 341 U.S.
(1951).
United States v. Omaha Tribe of Indians. 253 U.S.
(1920).
United States v. W i l s o n . 433 F. Supp.

48

275

57 (W.D. Towa 1977).

United States v. Wilson.

433 F. S u p p . 67

United States v. Wilson.

523 F. Supp.

874

(W.D.

Iowa 1977).

(W.D. Iowa 1981)

United States v. Wilson. 707 F. 2d 304 (8th Cir.
cert, denied 465 U. S. 1025 (1984) .

1982),

245

United States v. Wilson. 578 F. Supp. 1191 (W.D. Iowa 1984).
United States v. Wilson. 926 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1991).
Village of Walthill v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska. 409 U. S.
1107 (1973) .
Wilson v. Omaha Tribe. 442 U.S. 653 (1979).

Newspapers
Des Moines Register. May 1977, May-June 1991.
Lincoln Star. August-September 19 56, September-November
1957, November-December 1958, May 1961, February 1970,
July 1970, August 1972.
Lincoln Sunday Journal and Star. May 1958, December 1958.
New York Times. August,

1953.

Omaha World-Herald. 1945-1995.
Pender [Nebraska] Times, July 1969.
Sioux City Journal. April 1973, May 1977, June 1987,
May 1991, November 1991, April 1993.
Walthill [Nebraska] Citizen. September 1956, December 1958
June 1962, February 1964, January-February, 1970.

Oral Histories and Interviews
Alfred Gilpin, interviewed by Cynthia M. Dillenberg
(Oberwetter), May 12, 1977, Audiotape of 50 minutes,
American Indian Oral History Project, Department of
History, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Oral History Interview with Dillon S. M ve r. May 1974,
transcript printed in Vol. 2, Harry S. Truman
Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri.

246

Peter J. Peters, interviewed by Richard W. Peterson,
January 26, 1976, Audiotape of 30 minutes, American
Indian Oral History Project, Department of History,
University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Personal interview with Ed Zendejas, Omaha tribal member and
former Omaha Tribal Judge, September 14, 1995.

Books. Theses, and Dissertations
Boughter, Judith A.
"Betraying Their Trust: The
Dispossession of the Omaha Nation, 1790-1916."
Master's thesis, University of Nebraska at Omaha,

1995.

Cadwalader, Sandra A., and Vine Deloria, Jr., eds. The
Aggressions of Civilization. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1984.
Canby, William C . , Jr.
American Indian Law .
Publishing Company, 1988.

St. Paul: West

Fay, George E . , comp.
Charters. Constitutions and Bv-Laws
of the Indian Tribes of North America: Part 13.
Midwestern Tribes. Occasional Publications in
Anthropology, Ethnology Series, No. 14. Greeley,
Colorado: Museum of Anthropology, University of
Northern Colorado, 1972.
Fixico, Donald L. Termination and Relocation: Federal
Indian Policy. 1945-1960. Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1986.
Justice and the American Indian: The Impact of Public Law
280 Upon the Administration of Justice on Indian
Reservations. Washington, D.C.: National American
Indian Court Judges Association, 1974.
Meriam, Lewis.
The Problem of Indian Administration.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1928.
Murray, William G. Appraisal of Omaha Tract in Nebraska,
1854. New York: Clearwater Publishing Co., 1957.
Philp, Kenneth R. John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform,
1920-1954. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977.

247

Prucha, Francis Paul.
American Indian Treaties. The History
of a Political Anomaly. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994.
_______ . The Great Father: The United States Government and
the American Indians. 2 vols.
Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1984.
Rosenthal, Harvey D.
"Their Day in Court: A History of the
Indian Claims Commission."
Ph.D. diss., Kent State
University, 1976.
Smith, G. Hubert.
Omaha Indians: Ethnohistorical Report on
the Omaha People. New York: Garland Publishing, 1974.
Strickland, Rennard, and Charles F. Wilkinson, eds. Felix S.
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian La w. Revised Ed.
Charlottesville, Virginia: Michie Bobbs-Merrill, 1982.
Sutton, Imre, ed.
Irredeemable America: The Indians' Estate
and Land Claims. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1985.
Tate, Michael L. The Upstream People: An Annotated Research
Bibliography of the Omaha Tribe. Native American
Bibliography Series. No. 14. Metuchen, New Jersey:
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1991.
Washburn, Wilcomb E. Red Man's Land/White Man's Law: A
Study of the Past and Present Status of the American
Indian. New York: Scribner, 1971.
Wunder, John R. Retained Bv The People. A History of
American Indians and the Bill of Rights. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994.

Articles
Bohn, Dorothy.
"'Liberating' the Indian, Euphemism for a
Land Grab." The Nation 178 (February 10, 1954):
150-151.
Camp, Laurie Smith.
"Land Accretion and Avulsion:
The
Battle of Blackbird Bend." Nebraska Law Review 56
(1977): 814-35.

248

Carriker, Robert C.
"The Kalispel Tribe and the Indian
Claims Commission." Western Historical Quarterly 9
(January 1978): 19-31.
Clinton, Robert N.
"Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian
Lands:
A Journey through a Jurisdictional Maze."
Arizona Law Review 18 (1976): 503.
_______ . "Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian
Lands: The Historical Perspective." Arizona Law Review
17 (1975): 951.
Collier, John.
"Back to Dishonor."
(May 12, 1954): 578-80.

Christian Century 71

Danforth, Sandra.
"Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian
Claims Commission."
North Dakota Law Review 49 (Winter
1973) : 359-403.
Ehrlich, Daniel Henry.
"Problems Arising From Shifts of the
Missouri River on the Eastern Border of Nebraska."
Nebraska History 54 (Fall 1973): 341-63.
Formanek, Rjean K.
"Blackbird Hills Indian Land Dispute
Settled by Placing the Burden of Proving Title on the
Non-Indian Party and Incorporating Nebraska Water Law
Into the Federal Standard." Creighton Law Review 13
(Summer 1980): 1098-1102.
Friedman, Howard M.
"Interest on Indian Claims: Judicial
Protection of the Fisc." Valparaiso University Law
Review 5 (Fall 1970): 26-47.
Goldberg, Carole E.
"Public Law 280: State Jurisdiction
Over Reservation Indians." UCLA Law Review 22
(February 1975): 535-594.
Herzberg, Stephen.
"The Menominee Indians: Termination to
Restoration." American Indian Law Review 6, no. 1
(1978): 143-186.
Hood, Susan.
"Termination of the Klamath Tribe of Oregon."
Ethnohistory 19 (Fall 1972): 372-392.
Hoover, Herbert.
"Yankton Sioux Tribal Claims Against the
United States, 1917-1975." Western Historical
Quarterly 7 (April 1976): 125-142.

249

Le Due, Thomas.
"The Work of the Indian Claims Commission
Under the Act of 1946." Pacific Historical Review 26
(February 1957): 1-16.
Lurie, Nancy O.
"The Indian Claims Commission." Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science
436 (March 1978): 97-110.
McKee, Howard I.
"The Platte Purchase." Missouri
Historical Review 32 (January 1938): 129-47.
Nielsen, Richard A.
"American Indian Land Claims: Land
versus Money as a Remedy." University of Florida Law
Review 25 (Winter 1973): 308-26.
Suzuki, Peter T.
"Retrocession and Jurisdictional Issues
Facing the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska." Man & Life.
Journal of The Institute of Social Research and Applied
Anthropology 18 (January-June 1992): 1-10.
Thomas, Mark W.
"Constitutional Law — Equal Protection -Supreme Court Upholds Validity of Preferential
Treatment of Indians in Land Disputes -- Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe." Creighton Law Review 13 (Winter
1979): 619-32.
Vance, John T.
"The Congressional Mandate and the Indian
Claims Commission." North Dakota Law Review 45 (Spring
1969): 325-336.
White, John R.
"Barmecide Revisited: The Gratuitous Offset
in Indian Claims Cases." Ethnohistorv 25 (Spring
1978): 179.
Wilkinson, Charles F.
"Civil Liberties Guarantees When
Indian Tribes Act as Majority Societies:
The Case of
the Winnebago Retrocession." Creighton Law Review 21,
no. 3 (1987-88): 773-799.

